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Abstract
Implications of Fraud Detection Decisions
Marie Rice
This dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine the implications of fraud detection
decisions. The first study examines whether auditors’ mindfulness practices influence their ability to
accurately detect fraud risk factors. The second study evaluates whether organization type influences
whether and how perpetrators are punished. The third study evaluates whether management’s decision to
increase controls when fraud occurs has unintended negative consequences for other employees. Together,
these studies contribute to accounting literature related to fraud detection.
Study one evaluates the effects of mindfulness practices (i.e. emotion regulation) on auditors’
ability to identify and accurately recall fraud risk factors in audit evidence. Emotion regulation strategies
have differing effects on cognitive load that may impact auditors’ ability to identify fraud risk factors and
recall details about fraud risk factors. Auditors use prompts to further enhance their ability to identify
fraud risks. This study finds that emotion regulation strategy does not affect the ability to identify fraud
risk factors or the ability to recall fraud risk factors. However, this study highlights variance in the
effectiveness of prompts, which are relied upon in audit process as a tool to increase focus but have also
been shown to increase cognitive load in psychology literature. For example, Amazon Mechanical Turk
participants who are prompted to be mindful of discrepancies within financial information less accurately
identify such discrepancies (i.e. fraud risk factors) as compared to those who do not receive a prompt.
Students, on the other hand, are more likely to identify fraud risk factors when prompted to do so.
Suggestions for future research are provided to expand on this finding.
In study two, we use the ACFE survey data to examine the impact of fraud severity and the
perpetrator’s status and organization type on the victim organization’s decisions in pursuing an outcome
against the principal perpetrator. We find that as fraud severity increases, the severity of the outcome
pursued against the principal perpetrator increases as well. Supporting status characteristics theory, we
also show that victim organizations pursue less severe outcomes against a perpetrator with a high status
as compared to a perpetrator with a low status when the duration of the fraud is short. As the fraud duration
increases, however, victim organizations pursue equally severe outcomes against all perpetrators. Lastly,
governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are more likely to pursue no outcome than
to terminate the principal perpetrator, as compared to publicly traded organizations. Further, governmental
and not-for-profit organizations are more likely to terminate and criminally prosecute than just terminate
the principal perpetrator.
In study three, we examine potential unintended consequences when fraud, such as employee theft,
is detected. Management teams often increase or modify formal controls when fraud, such as employee
theft, is detected. However, doing so may have unintended consequences for the perpetrator’s coworkers.
For example, affective event theory explains that when employees believe that the response is unfair, they
become counterproductive, reducing the firm’s overall productivity. We test whether theft by a coworker
reduces non-offending employee productivity using a two-period experiment with groups of two
employees and one manager. Employees can steal each period and, if theft is detected in period one,
managers can increase detection for all employees in period two. We find that two out of three managers
increase inspections for all employees, even without incentive to do so. Further, we find that employees’
affect intensity and ability to be influenced by others are related to their levels of productivity and
likelihood of taking in period 1 but not taking in period 2.
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CHAPTER ONE -INTRODUCTION
Occupational fraud has a significant effect on organizations and contributes to
approximately thirty percent of business failures in the United States annually (Lipman and
McGraw 1998; Snyder and Blair 1989; Marasi, Bennet, and Budden 2018), generating a nontrivial
impact to the economy. Thirty-three percent of retail, manufacturing, and service employees
surveyed self-reported stealing from their employer (Clark and Hollinger 1983). To combat
occupational fraud, organizations decide how to train auditors to detect fraud, whether to punish
the perpetrator, and/or whether to increase the likelihood of detecting other perpetrators’ frauds in
the future. Whether organizations detect fraud and how they address fraud is an important
empirical question because of the organizational and economic implications. This dissertation
examines these decisions in experimental or archival studies.
Auditors work in high stress, high client interaction environments and often face
contentious situations (Bergner, Peffer, and Ramsay 2016) that lead to high turnover intention
(Parker and Kohlmeyer 2005). To deal with this environment, auditors engage in self-preservation
and self-regulatory mechanisms to manage their emotional reactions. However, the coping
mechanism they employ impacts their ability to recall details (Gross 2002). In study one, I conduct
a 3 x 2 experimental design, manipulating the type of emotion regulation strategy an auditor may
deploy and whether the participant is prompted to focus on inconsistencies in audit evidence,
proxies for potential fraud risk factors. I measure the number of fraud risk factors identified
(“Quantity”), as proxied by inconsistencies in information between pieces of audit evidence, and
the accuracy with which fraud risk factors are described (“Accuracy”). Results show that emotion
regulation strategy does not affect the ability to identify fraud risk factors or accurately recall fraud
risk factors identified, regardless of whether there are prompts to identify such factors.
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However, participants within different sample pools react to the study’s manipulations in
different ways. For example, Amazon Mechanical Turk (“mTurkers”) participants identify more
fraud risk factors (proxied by discrepancies within financial documents) when they are not
prompted to do so, as compared to when they are prompted to do so while graduate students
(“Grads”) more accurately identify fraud risks when they are prompted to do so. This finding is
interesting and adds to a body of audit literature that finds that prompts are effective tools to
increase focus (e.g. Brazel, Jones, and Prawitt 2014; Hammersley, Carpenter, and Bamber 2010).
It further highlights findings in psychology literature that prompts increase cognitive load and may
have unintended consequences. These differences may be due to cognitive processing or construct
relevance. However, graduate students are less familiar with mindfulness and may redirect their
cognitive load toward the experimental task instead of the emotion regulation strategy to which
they were assigned. This study contributes to audit literature by highlighting potential boundary
conditions with the use of prompts and offering recommendations for future research.
When fraud is detected, organizations choose whether and how to punish perpetrators
involved in fraud schemes. Prior literature shows that punishment severity is correlated with crime
severity (Wolfgang, Figlio, Tracy, and Singer1985) and differs by the victims’ and perpetrators’
characteristics (Albonetti 1998; Wheeler et al. 1988; Hagan and Parker 1985). In study two, we
examine the impact of fraud severity, the perpetrator’s status, and the organization type on the
victim organization’s decision to pursue an outcome against the principal perpetrator. To our
knowledge, no prior study has examined these interactions in an occupational fraud setting. We
find that as fraud severity increases, the severity of the outcome pursued against the principal
perpetrator increases as well. However, victim organizations pursue less severe outcomes against
high status perpetrators, as compared to low status perpetrators in fraud cases with a short duration.
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As the fraud duration increases, however, victim organizations pursue equally severe outcomes
against all perpetrators. Lastly, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are
more likely to pursue no outcome against principal perpetrators as compared to publicly traded
organizations. However, governmental, and not-for-profit organizations are more likely to
terminate and criminally prosecute the principal perpetrators, pursuing harsher outcomes. We
conclude that fraud outcome is determined not only by the severity of the fraud act, but also by the
status of the perpetrator who committed the fraud and the type of the victim organization. This
study contributes to fraud literature by providing a multivariate analysis of fraud punishments and
adds to literature on executive fraud.
After fraud is detected and the perpetrator is punished, organizations often make changes
to prevent recurrence, but these changes have a spillover effect on the perpetrator’s coworkers. For
example, managers may use formal controls, such as inspections of employees’ work, to increase
workplace conformity (Bedford, Malmi, and Sandelin 2016) and to punish workplace deviance
(Parilla, Hollinger, and Clark 1988), like employee theft. However, increased controls may
negatively impact employees who are not engaged in wrongdoing and may perceive the
inspections to be an unfair punitive or threatening action against them (Chenhall, Hall, and Smith
2010; Penney and Spector 2005).
Counterproductive workplace behavior occurs when employees seek retribution against the
organization for the perceived unfair treatment. Contrarily, if management chooses to not punish
fraud by increasing controls, employees who do not commit fraud may later engage in fraud. In
study three, we examine the effects of managers’ use of formal controls to increase detection of
fraud in future periods on employee productivity. To evaluate coworker productivity and
management’s response to fraud, we conduct a two-round experiment with groups of four
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participants, including one manager and two employees. Both roles, manager, and employee, are
explained to all participants. In each round, employees choose how many hours of their 40-hour
work week to contribute toward company productivity and whether they will take $0.50 from the
investment fund. In round one, managers inspect one employee’s decisions. If the manager
observes an employee take from the investment fund, they may choose to increase inspections in
round two from one employee to two employees. We find that two out of every three managers
will increase controls for all employees when fraud is detected, even when not incented to do so.
Further, we find that participants’ affect intensity and ability to be influenced by others are related
to their productivity and whether they will take from the investment fund in period 1. However,
this finding does not hold in period 2. This study contributes to managerial controls and fraud
literature by evaluating the effects of management’s decisions in response to fraud on the
perpetrator’s coworkers.
Addressing and managing fraud is an important component of organizational risk
management as fraud can result in both economic and human capital damage. This dissertation
examines three stages of fraud risk management: detecting fraud, issuing punishment to the
perpetrator, and managing the effects of changes to the environment after fraud is detected using
three separate studies. A conceptual model is shown in Figure 1.
--Insert Figure 1—
This dissertation provides suggestions for future research to further explore these concepts.
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model

Employee
commits
fraud

(Study 1) Auditors
detect fraud

(Study 2) Organization
management punishes
fraudsters

(Study 3) Coworkers
respond to the way
management
addresses fraud
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CHAPTER TWO - CURSE OF THE POKER FACE: THE EFFECTS OF MINDFULNESS
ON AUDITORS’ ABILITY TO IDENTIFY FRAUD RISK FACTORS

Marie M. Rice
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mmr0016@mix.wvu.edu

Author Note
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ABSTRACT
The present study evaluates the effects of mindfulness practices (e.g. emotion regulation) on
auditors’ ability to identify and accurately recall fraud risk factors in audit evidence. Auditors work
in a contentious environment and use coping mechanisms, such as mindfulness, to deal with the
negative effects. Mindfulness practices are a fast-growing trend and include emotion regulation.
Emotion regulation strategies have differing effects on cognitive load that may impact auditors’
ability to identify fraud risk factors and recall details about fraud risk factors. Auditors use prompts
to further enhance their ability to identify fraud risks. While I find that emotion regulation strategy
does not affect the ability to identify fraud risk factors or the ability to accurately recall fraud risk
factors, this study contributes to audit literature by showing that prompts have varying effects for
participant proxies used in audit research. Amazon Mechanical Turk (“mTurk”) participants are
more accurate when not prompted than when they are given a prompt, but graduate students are
more accurate when prompted than not. Overall, the two groups are similarly accurate in their
identification of fraud risk factors. These sample groups also differ in the amount of time spent on
the study, familiarity with mindfulness, and years of experience. Future studies should examine
these attributes and their effect on the usefulness of prompts in an audit setting.
Keywords: mindfulness, emotion regulation, audit, fraud
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INTRODUCTION
Auditors work in high stress, high workload (Persellin, Schmidt, Vandervelde, and Wilkins
2014), high client interaction environments and often face contentious situations (Bergner, Peffer,
and Ramsay 2016) that lead to burnout (Herda and Lavelle 2012), low organizational commitment,
and high turnover intention (Parker and Kohlmeyer 2005; Greenhaus, Collins, Singh, and
Parasuraman 1997). During the COVID-19 pandemic, these challenges have been further increased
by the necessity to work from home while caring for family members (NF1 2021; Antonova,
Schlosser, Pandey, and Kumari 2021; Conversano et al. 2020; Katella 2020; Saricali, Satici, Satici,
Gocet-Tekin, and Griffiths 2020). The pressures auditors face may result in premature workpaper
signoff (Herda, Cannon, and Young 2018 a,b), unauthorized reduced sample sizes, or underreported
time (Sweeney and Pierce 2006). To combat the effects of the pressures and to reduce stress
(Anderson 2020), auditors engage in self-preservation and self-regulatory mechanisms to manage
their own reactions in social interactions with each other, supervisors, and clients to facilitate
successful interpersonal relationships. Such coping mechanisms improve work relationships and
enable auditors to accomplish organizational goals (Jeung, Kim, and Chang 2018), including
providing quality audit services.
Recent trends in public accounting and large corporations (e.g. Aetna, Google, Amazon,
SAP, and Thomson Reuters) highlight the importance of mindfulness as such a coping mechanism.
Mindfulness has been shown to improve focus (Fisher 2020), decision-making, and mental clarity
(Brooks 2020; KPMG 2015). Mindfulness is the act of intentionally quieting one’s mind to observe
the present moment and environment, and to self-regulate one’s responses to these observations
(Bishop et al. 2004). Practicing mindfulness is a metacognitive process (Bishop et al. 2004) that
increases focus, attention, the ability to regulate emotions and respond flexibly, and decreases
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reactivity (Davis and Hayes 2011). The ability to be mindful is a trait-level attribute that can be
increased through state-level interventions and practices (Chang and Stone 2019; ), such as
meditation and self-regulation. Mindfulness practices are a fast-growing trend and there are over
3.7 million related videos on YouTube (YouTube 2020) and devices like smartphones enable access
to mindfulness tools. These applications and tools have become even more important during the
COVID-19 pandemic, when mental health and wellness have been taxed. Albeit a popular trend,
many individuals do not understand that the benefits of mindfulness, including decentered
awareness of the present moment and increased attention to detail, are affected by the emotion
regulation strategies deployed by individuals.
For instance, auditors may develop a “poker face” to ensure their physical reaction to stress
or confrontation does not betray their actual, felt emotions (Butler, Wilhelm, and Gross 2006) in
the workplace. Cambridge dictionary defines a poker face as “an expression on someone's face that
does not show what they are thinking or feeling” (Cambridge 2020). While having a poker face can
be very useful in the workplace (Waldron and Krone 1991), suppressing expressed emotion in this
way also has unintended negative effects on the individual’s working memory, including recall, and
attention to detail (Gross 2002). For example, auditors’ use of emotion suppression may reduce
their ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors. Auditors may therefore benefit from an
alternative emotion regulation strategy, cognitive reappraisal. The goal of cognitive reappraisal is
to reframe negative situations into positives and its benefits include increased memory capacity and
reduced felt negative emotions in conflict situations.
Prior industrial/organizational psychology and social psychology literature has studied the
effects of emotion regulation on working memory and attention to detail (e.g. Good et al. 2016; Fiol
and O’Connor 2003). Herda, et al. (2018 a,b) applies these concepts in the accounting realm by
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evaluating the effects of mindfulness on auditors’ decision-making. Specifically, Herda, et al. (2018
a,b) find that auditors are less likely to engage in premature workpaper signoffs when they are
prompted to be mindful of external financial statement users and that supervisors’ prompts to be
mindful reduce audit quality threatening behavior. This study extends Herda, et al. (2018 a,b) by
prompting participants to consider discrepancies in financial information while they engage in an
emotion regulation strategy (“ERS”), a specific mindfulness practice. Thus, while the prompt used
in this study is like the one used in Herda, et al. (2018 a,b), the construct of mindfulness is more
narrowly defined. Specifically, I conduct a 3 x 2 experiment, manipulating type of emotion
regulation strategy and whether the participant is prompted, to assess the effect of ERS on auditors’
ability to identify fraud risk factors present in financial statement information. I find that ERS does
not affect the ability to identify fraud risk factors, as proxied by inconsistencies in information
between pieces of audit evidence, or the accuracy of the fraud risk factor (i.e. recall quality).
However, these findings may be confounded by the level of cognitive processing participants use
during the task.
Audit practice attempts to address the conflict between the affect-inducing environment
auditors face and the level of cognitive processing (Petty and Caciopo 1986) required for their tasks
by using prompts, such as checklists, and instructions to focus auditors’ attention to certain risks.
Prior literature has shown that such prompts increase auditors’ ability to identify inconsistencies
between financial reporting documents (e.g. Hobson, Mayew, Peecher, and Venkatachalam2017;
Brazel, et al. 2014; Trotman and Wright 2012; Asare and Wright 2004). However, prompts also
invoke cognitive processing and can increase cognitive load (Block, Hancock, and Zakay 2010).
Therefore, while prompts are helpful, their use may have unintended consequences. Participants in
this study respond to prompts in differing manners. Specifically, prompted graduate student
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participants more accurately identify fraud risk factors (i.e. discrepancies in financial information)
than those who are not prompted, but mTurkers are less accurate in identifying fraud risk factors
when prompted than when not prompted. These differences may be due to the level of cognitive
processing participants exhibit during the experiment, or participants’ variance in familiarity with
mindfulness. On average, the two participant groups are similarly accurate in the identification of
fraud risk factors.
My study contributes to audit literature related to auditors’ evaluation of audit evidence,
particularly when primed, and audit firm management by offering additional considerations for the
use and effectiveness of prompts as a tool for fraud detection with different subpopulations of
accounting professionals. This finding is particularly timely, given an upcoming article in Auditing:
A Journal of Practice and Theory on the use of non-professionals as audit judgment and decisionmaking research subjects (Leiby, Rennekamp, and Trotman 2021). My study provides further
research opportunities that contribute to the growing body of psychosocial literature related to
mindfulness and emotion regulation, such as when and how mindfulness influences client
negotiations, audit team brainstorming sessions, or other interpersonal interactions within the
accounting setting. Finally, my study highlights the importance of evaluating the
operationalizations of promoted benefits in audit practice, as opposed to accepting them at face
value. Are they really walking the talk?
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The concept of mindfulness stems from Buddhist traditions, which include šamatha and
vipašyanâ, calming oneself and thinking clearly, respectively (Dunne 2011). Mindfulness is defined
as “a state of consciousness characterized by receptive attention to and awareness of present events
and experiences, without evaluation, judgment and cognitive filters” (Glomb, Duffy, Bono, and

11

Yang 2011, p.119). It is premised on the belief that awareness of the present moment and attention
to the details occurring therein improve ability to assess the situation and manage one’s response to
it. Prior literature has examined mindfulness as either an extension of (Shapiro and Schwartz 2000)
or an antecedent to (Brown, Ryan, and Creswell 2007a) self-regulation theory. Mindfulness extends
self-regulation by adding conscious awareness and intentional choice (Shapiro and Schwartz 2000)
to self-observation, judgment about one’s behavior as compared to situational norms, and affective
reaction (Bandura 1991). Mindful examination also precedes self-regulatory behavior choice and
may be viewed as a separate, but related construct from self-regulation (Mackenzie and Baumeister
2015). However, it differs from self-control and self-awareness, which are also related to selfregulation, in that it discourages preservation of the “self” and identity by permitting all stimuli in
the present moment to be brought into the conscious mind without judgment (Brown, Ryan, and
Creswell 2007a). It also differs from situational awareness, which emphasizes evaluating and
prioritizing situational details to form cognitive patterns and predictions about future events
(Endsley 1995).
The goals of mindfulness include decentering oneself from the present moment to focus
attention (Hulsheger, Walkowoiak, and Thommes 2018) and allow for an objective analysis of the
current situation; reducing automaticity of thoughts (Glomb et al. 2011); increasing awareness of
one’s emotional and physiological responses to situational stimuli (Glomb et al. 2011; Hulsheger et
al. 2018); and improving mental, emotional, and physical health (Chang and Stone 2019; Chambers,
Gullone, and Allen 2009). It emphasizes monitoring distractions, disengaging from them, and
focusing attention on a specific target (Dunne 2011). Unlike emotional intelligence, the awareness
and management of one’s own and other’s affective responses, mindfulness requires intentional
behavior modification (Jimenez-Picon et al. 2021). Mindful focusing allows for the intentional
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redirect of attention from one thing to another (Bishop et al. 2004). The benefits of mindfulness
have been validated in psychology, neurology, and industrial/organizational psychology literature
and have positive impacts on organizational outcomes (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016) and
individual competence (Brown and Ryan 2003).
Mindfulness Practices
Mindfulness is a trait-level attribute, but individuals can increase mindfulness via state-level
experiences, interventions, and practices (Chang and Stone 2019; ) like meditating and learning to
self-regulate emotional and physiological responses in line with situational stimuli (Grandey 2000).
Learning to self-regulate improves overall emotional competency, which further increases selfawareness (Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts 2004). Self-regulation refers to aligning one’s reactions
with standards or expectations (Baumeister and Vohs 2016) and is key to mindfulness (Hulsheger
et al. 2018) and interpersonal interaction (Rime 2007). Self-regulating one’s attention enables the
prioritization of goal-relevant over goal-irrelevant stimuli (Ochsner and Gross 2005) while selfregulating one’s emotional and physiological responses to situations enables self-control (Bandura
1991), conscientiousness, and adaptability (Goleman 2001). Self-regulation also increases selfefficacy (Bandura 1991) and can lead to increased performance and competence (Baumeister and
Vohs 2016; Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016).
Mindfulness has Gained Popularity in Recent Years
Mindfulness has been encouraged in popular press and has gained popularity in Australia,
Canada, China, New Zealand, Western Europe, and the United States in recent time, with higher
prevalence in western cultures (Selva 2019). Information on mindfulness and mindfulness practices
and interventions are widely available. There are over 3.7 million mindfulness videos on YouTube
(YouTube 2020) and devices like smartphones enable access to mindfulness tools. Mental health
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and wellness have become an increasingly publicized topic, and has been highlighted in the media,
particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic (Katella 2020). Mental health professionals and
researchers have promoted the use of mindfulness practices as a way to mitigate the isolation,
despair, and other mental health issues many have faced during this time (Antonova, Schlosser,
Pandey and Kumari 2021; Katella 2020; Saricali, Satici, Satici, Gocet-Teken, and Griffiths 2020).
Mindfulness practices are a useful skill in the workplace where display rules and
organizational norms dictate when and how individuals in certain roles should respond to situations
(Gandey 2000; Waldron and Krone 1991). This is particularly true in industries with high stress
(Eby et al. 2019) and client interaction (Grandey 2000), along with the necessity to multi-task
(Chang and Stone 2019), like auditing. Indeed, three of the Big 4 accounting firms joined with
several large investment and law firms to form the City Mental Health Alliance, which promotes
mental health and mindfulness in the workplace. Mindfulness is encouraged by the Big 4 public
accounting firms as a means to enhance overall well-being (PwC 2020); to reduce stress and
increase cognition (KPMG 2015); and to improve focus (Fisher 2020), decision-making, and mental
clarity (Brooks 2020; KPMG 2015). Mindfulness has been examined in conjunction with
accounting practices (Chang and Stone 2019) and accounting outcomes, such as audit quality
(Herda, et al. 2018 a,b). Chang and Stone (2019) explain that mindfulness may facilitate deeper
cognitive processing, increased awareness, reduced framing effects, and increased skepticism.
Herda, et al. (2018 a,b) find that mindfulness improves audit quality by reducing pre-mature
workpaper signoffs and the benefits of mindfulness can be attained simply through supervisor
prompts.
However, anecdotal evidence from the accounting profession indicates that mindfulness
may not be widely accepted within the profession. A senior manager with a Big 4 firm explained
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that, although the firm posts information about mindfulness on its site, execution of the program is
sporadic. For example, the firm had a webinar on mindfulness and mindfulness practices, but “it
was unprompted, and we were not told beforehand” (B1 2021). This comment aligns with Chang
and Stone’s (2019) finding that accounting firms may promote mindfulness on their websites but
do little more to ensure its effectiveness or integration into firm culture. When mindfulness is
enacted within firms, the promotion of mindfulness by accounting firms is often operationalized as
a wellness benefit for stress reduction and is targeted toward new employees (NF1 2021). These
initiatives are more successful when firm leaders support the program. Bono, Foldes, Vinson, and
Muros (2007) explain that top-down initiatives are essential when implementing emotion regulation
programs in the workplace.
In one large firm, the mindfulness program was inspired by an executive leader who
meditates and engages in mindfulness practices (NF1 2021, NF2 2021, NF3 2021). The program
at this firm includes national support through the human resources function, as well as support and
promotion within each region; approximately one-third of firm employees participate in the
program (NF3). The firm also provides access to a mobile application to enable participation by all
employees. Employees report increased confidence in client negotiations and presentations, along
with reduced anxiety and stress, and overall mood improvement (NF1 2021, NF2 2021). Employees
further state that the mindfulness program is a “differentiator for retention” (NF1 2021). Firm
management explains that “The largest take away is awareness…a sign that it’s getting integrated
into the culture” (NF3 2021). Smaller firm principals, consultants, and trainers similarly report
leading mindfulness initiatives to improve objectivity and focus, facilitate client negotiations,
reduce angst, and increase belief in having “enough time, money, space, whatever…” (F1 2021).
Thus, while accounting professionals report positive outcomes from practicing mindfulness, and
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the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for such programs, accounting firms have not
fully embraced the trend.
Mindful Self-Regulation reduces Contention
Mindful self-regulation is an alternative mechanism to surface acting, which is common in
emotion labor industries with high client interactions. Employees engage in surface acting by
forcing themselves to display expected physiological and emotional responses during interactions
with each other, customers, and supervisors, that may be contrary to what they feel (Grandey 2000).
Surface acting increases the burden of processing cognitive and affective information while
attempting to control one’s behavioral and emotive responses, causing a depletion of working
memory (Schmeichel 2007; Unsworth and Spillers 2010). Surface acting is cognitively and
emotionally taxing and is negatively associated with stress (Grandey 2003) and burnout (Mo and
Shi 2017).
The audit profession is prone to burnout and turnover (Cannon and Herda 2016; Herda 2012;
Herda and Lavelle 2012) and it is important for auditors to learn coping skills, like mindful emotion
regulation, to help them deal with their contentious environment. Mindful self-regulation enables
individuals to deal with others who may be contentious or difficult without lashing out or becoming
stressed (Goleman 2001), distancing themselves from the event. Mindful self-regulation yields only
a small to medium effect on cognition (Chang and Stone 2019). Cognitive load theory explains that
individuals have a capacity for simultaneous cognitive processing (Bannert 2002). As cognitive
load increases, individuals have a harder time recalling information and accessing working memory.
Higher cognitive load impedes performance and affects judgments (Fraser et al. 2012; Block, et al.
2010). Mindful self-regulation both decreases the negative effects from contention and stress and
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allows the individual to use their cognitive resources in other ways; accounting firms would benefit
from encouraging auditors to practice mindful self-regulation.
Emotion regulation is a deliberative, effortful cognitive process (Ochsner and Gross 2005)
that can be defined as “the set of processes whereby people seek to redirect the spontaneous flow
of their emotions” (Koole 2009, p.6). Emotion regulation is studied as a self-control mechanism for
cognitive processes (Koole 2009; Schmeichel 2007; Grecucci, Giorgetta, Van’t Wout, Bonini, and
Sanfey 2013) and as a temporal process (Koole 2009; Gross 2001). Emotion regulation helps reduce
implicit automaticity and improves the explicit control over one’s thoughts and attention, and the
subsequent response (Gyurak, Gross, and Etkin 2011). Prior literature in this vein explores
neocortical activity that occurs when an individual regulates emotion and finds that the orbitofrontal
and prefrontal cortex are activated along with the limbic system, indicating simultaneous cognitive
and affective activity in reward centers of the brain (Grecucci et al. 2013; Sripada et al. 2013;
Goleman 2001). The temporal nature of selecting an emotion regulation strategy results in varying
levels of emotion regulation effort (Koole 2009), and neocortical activity and depletion may vary
by emotion regulation strategy (“ERS”; Gross 2002).
Emotion regulation strategies are selected based on their temporal execution and the
individual’s intent and preferences. The modal/process model of emotion regulation focuses on five
key points in the process: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment,
cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross 2001). Emotion regulation may occur early or
late in the temporal chain via emotion regulation strategies. For example, an auditor preparing for
a client meeting may consider several possible responses from the client to anticipate and plan their
reactions to those responses. A later response modulation strategy may include amplifying positive
emotions while visiting with clients to reduce discomfort. For example, an auditor may focus on
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the positive aspects of the client’s business and how the audit process may benefit those successes.
The temporal nature and method by which each strategy is executed results in different
consequences in different situations (Sheppes et al. 2014).
Effects of Mindfulness Practices Vary by Emotion Regulation Strategy
The effects of mindfulness vary based on the ERS employed and can have unintended
consequences, depending on the situation. This paper focuses on two specific goal-oriented
strategies, emotion suppression and cognitive reappraisal. Goal-oriented strategies are influenced
by the individual’s beliefs about situational norms and the types and amount of emotionally charged
information present in the situation (Koole 2009). They exist on a continuum, from those that seek
emotion exaggeration to emotion adjustment techniques to eliminating emotion response. Goaloriented strategies occur throughout the emotion regulation process and focus on self-control of
attention, information intake, and physiological response (Koole 2009). The effects of goal-oriented
strategies persist over time, with adjustment techniques having the longest duration (Brockman et
al. 2017; Halperin and Gross 2011). Emotion suppression and cognitive reappraisal are both downregulation strategies that seek to reduce negative emotions; however, they do so in different ways.
The benefits of mindfulness also vary based on the emotion regulation strategy deployed.
This paper examines emotion suppression and cognitive reappraisal. Emotion suppression inhibits
expressed emotion, which leads to increased cognitive load, decreased positive affect, and memory
deficits. It is characterized by a lack of emotion expression, otherwise known as a poker face.
Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, and Kopelman (2001) explain, “social psychologists argue that
expression of positive emotion, in contrast to a poker face, can be an advantage” (p.155) in the
workplace. Cognitive reappraisal reframes negative situations as positive, which leads to early
cognitive activation, and increased memory, and greater felt positive emotions than negative
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emotions, which persist over time. The differences in cognitive processing between emotion
regulation strategies likely translate into higher ability to recall a greater number of details from
reading materials and to recall them more accurately when using cognitive reappraisal than when
suppressing emotion. Auditors’ recall and attention to detail are essential when they are reviewing
financial reporting documents, particularly when assessing fraud risks or identifying fraud risk
factors.
Emotion suppression
When an individual believes that emotions are uncontrollable or excessive, they are likely
to select a strategy that avoids or inhibits emotion, such as emotion suppression (Trincas, Bilotta,
and Mancini 2016). For example, when auditors believe they must please an angry client to keep
the account, they may suppress their emotions to get through a meeting with that client. Emotion
suppression is a well-researched (see Koole 2009) response modulation strategy that seeks to reduce
behavioral signals that betray felt emotion (Gross 2013). Like surface acting where individuals’
mask their felt emotions, it is reflected in a “poker face,” but does not reduce the effects of felt
emotions (Butler, Wilhelm, and Gross 2006) or psychophysiological responses (Koole 2009; Gross
2013). Suppressing negative emotion can lead to more positive or fewer negative interactions
(Waldron and Krone 1991) and a willingness to negotiate. Le and Impett (2013) find that
suppressing negative emotion while making sacrifices (i.e. giving up one’s self interests) leads to
perceived emotional authenticity, which improves interpersonal relations. Likewise, suppressing
positive emotion ensures compliance with behavioral expectations, such as not laughing during
meetings.
However, emotion suppression invokes cognitive processing in both the neocortical region
and the limbic system (Grecucci, Pappaianni, Siugzdaite, Theuninck, and Job 2015; Gross 2013;
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Ohira et al. 2006), which increases cognitive load. Cognitive processing time, working memory,
including recall, and attention to detail are negatively affected by emotion suppression (Gross,
Richards, and John 2006; Gross 2013; Goldin McRae, Ramel, and Gross 2008; Bonano, Papa,
Lalande, Westphal, and Coifman 2004). Additionally, increased sympathetic cardiovascular
activity occurs with emotion suppression (Gross and Levenson 1997; Gross, Richards, and John
2006 ). The negative effects of emotion suppression persist over time and individuals who engage
in emotion suppression self-report increased negative affect (Koole 2009) and a higher level of
negative, as opposed to positive, felt emotions (Gross 2013). Emotion suppression of negative affect
also reduces job satisfaction and increases intention to quit (Cote and Morgan 2002). Those who
suppress emotions subsequently negatively change their behavior toward coworkers with whom
they interacted while suppressing emotion, and report liking and trusting the individual less after
emotion suppression (Waldron and Krone 1991). In an audit context, this may manifest in more
contentious relationships within audit teams, or between auditors and clients. For example, auditors
ask probing questions of their clients to gain an understanding of the organization’s ethical climate,
processes and systems, and any changes that have occurred since the prior audit engagement, which
may become contentious. During these interactions, auditors are expected to remain objective, and
some may suppress their emotions to maintain a poker face during heated conversations. Doing so,
however, may impair auditors’ ability to focus during the meeting or reduce the information auditors
recall from such encounters.
Cognitive Reappraisal
Cognitive reappraisal is a cognitive change strategy, which occurs after the individual
appraises a current situation (Gross 2001). Cognitive change strategies seek to modify appraisal of
situational information to alter its emotional significance (Gross and Samson 2007). Its goal is to
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reduce negative affect by replacing negative felt emotion with positive felt emotion by
recontextualizing the situation (Gross 2013; Koole 2009). It is particularly helpful in mitigating
the effects of stress from situations that are beyond the individual’s control (Troy, Shallcross, and
Mauss 2013). For example, auditors who feel overburdened by their workload may perceive that
they lack control to reduce the burden. Instead of focusing on their stress, cognitive reappraisal
provides a way to focus on the positive aspects of the workload (e.g. clients who seek out and
appreciate the firm’s work, job security, the governance role provided by the auditor to the investing
community and regulators, etc.). Similarly, an auditor who perceives that a client’s management
team is unethical or dishonest may reframe the situation by focusing on the transparency their work
provides within the financial reporting process and to the client’s governing board and external
stakeholders.
McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, and Gross (2012) explain that the ability to reappraise is
improved with practice, and reappraisal ability is positively related to how often one practices
reappraisal, improved memory capacity, and overall well-being. This is likely because the increase
in felt positive emotions over felt negative emotions persists over time. Halperin and Gross (2011)
find that the positive effects of reappraisal, including holding on to hope and intent to provide aid
to enemies, lasted over five months in a wartime conflict.
The benefits of reappraisal also include reduced cognitive load on the limbic system and
early activation of the neocortical region, which enables the moderation of emotion and increased
cognitive activity (Goldin, et al. 2008) that exceeds activity levels associated with natural emotional
response (Sripada et al. 2013). Fulford, Feldman, Tabak, McGillicuddy, and Johnson (2013) find
that reappraisal leads to cognitive flexibility, improved emotion regulation and problem solving.
Although cognitive reappraisal has long-term positive benefits and aids memory and recall, auditors
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are encouraged to have a skeptical mindset while evaluating fraud risks (Charron and Lowe 2008;
Vinten, Payne, and Ramsay 2005), and are discouraged from considering non-fraud alternative
explanations. Specifically, they are discouraged from “viewing the world with rose-colored glasses”
and are instead incentivized to think critically and exhibit stoicism. While prior studies of cognitive
reappraisal in the workplace are limited, results have shown that it acts as a coping strategy for
workplace bullying (Wilkins 2014) and reduces negative response when provoked to anger (Mauss,
Cook, Cheng, and Gross 2007). The ability to reduce contention in the workplace is particularly
important to auditors who work with each other and both serve and evaluate their clients.
Minimizing anger in these settings facilitates effective relationships.
Cognitive reappraisal emphasizes change of thought while emotion suppression relies on
modifying physiological response (Gross 2006). Therefore, cognitive reappraisal attempts to
change felt emotion while emotion suppression seeks to modify expressed emotion, yielding
different effects in the ability to be aware of one’s surroundings and attention to detail. Increased
cognition coupled with the long-term positive effects of prosocial behavior can be very beneficial
to workplace interactions. Therefore, auditors who engage in emotion suppression may experience
cognitive overload from the burden of managing the situation and hiding their felt emotions, while
those who reframe the situation as positive may cope with the situation using problem-solving skills,
without adding to their cognitive load. I hypothesize that auditors who exercise cognitive
reappraisal are likely to identify more fraud risk factors and to accurately recall fraud risk factors
more accurately, than those who engage in emotion suppression. I develop hypotheses 1a and 1b
from this line of inquiry:
H1a: Cognitive reappraisal leads to identification of more fraud risk factors in financial
information than emotion suppression.
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H1b: Cognitive reappraisal leads to more accurate identification of fraud risk factors in
financial information than emotion suppression.
Prompts to Identify Discrepancies within Financial Information Moderate the Effect of
Emotion Regulation Strategy on the Accurate Identification of Fraud Risk Factors
The effects of mindful attention to detail when an individual engages in cognitive
reappraisal or emotion regulation are likely moderated by prompts and primes. Prompts induce
cognitive processing (Block, et al. 2010), adding to an individual’s cognitive load. The cognitive
load induced by prompting auditors to be attentive to discrepancies within the financial information
they review impedes the cognitive capacity of those engaging in emotion suppression but has little
effect on cognitive capacity when one engages in cognitive reappraisal. Contrarily, prompts
improve focus (Brazel et al. 2014) and prompting auditors to be mindful of discrepancies that exist
in financial information may mitigate the negative effects of the additional cognitive load from
emotion suppression. Therefore, prompts may either cause cognitive overload or improve auditors’
ability to focus when they suppress emotions. Cognitive reappraisal does not impede cognitive load;
thus, prompting an auditor to be mindful of discrepancies that may exist in financial information
likely enhances their ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors. The differing effects of ERS
on the accuracy with which fraud risk factors are identified are likely moderated by whether an
auditor is prompted to consider discrepancies within financial information or not.
Extensive audit literature has examined the effects of priming and prompts on audit risk
assessments and subsequent audit-related decisions. Auditors prompted to consider explicit
information or to evaluate inconsistencies in audit evidence are more likely to identify errors or
fraud. For example, Hobson et al. (2017) show that auditors are less likely to identify cognitive
dissonance markers in transcripts of calls between chief executive officers and investment analysts
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in fraud firms than in non-fraud firms, except when prompted with a definition of cognitive
dissonance. Auditors are also unlikely to identify inconsistencies between non-financial measures
and financial reports, unless prompted to do so (Brazel et al. 2014). Similarly, Simon (2012) finds
that auditors who are prompted to link management’s goals to audit evidence identify more relevant
fraud risks and select audit procedures that are more correlated to the identified risks. Bowlin (2011)
finds that auditors are only likely to allocate audit resources to low-dollar, high-strategic risk
accounts when prompted to consider management’s response to the allocation of audit resources.
Likewise, Herda, et al. (2018 a,b) find that auditors who receive prompts from supervisor coaching
are more likely to consider the effect of their work on financial statement users and to subsequently
reduce premature workpaper signoffs.
Conversely, Hammersley, Bamber, and Carpenter (2010) show that priming results in
effective fraud risk assessments when auditors are reviewing summary information, but not specific
information, which shows the moderating effect of document type on priming and prompts.
Therefore, while prompts are frequently used in audit practice, they have both positive implications
by focusing attention and can lead to negative, unintended consequences. Thus, the effects of
prompting auditors to be mindful of discrepancies that exist within financial information while they
are engaging in emotion regulation strategies likely impacts their ability to accurately identify fraud
risk factors, as proxied by discrepancies within financial information.
I hypothesize:
H2a: Prompted auditors identify more fraud risk factors in financial information than nonprompted auditors.
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H2b: Auditors who are prompted to be mindful of discrepancies within financial
information will identify more fraud risk factors when they practice cognitive reappraisal,
as compared to when they suppress emotions.
H2c: Prompted auditors more accurately identify fraud risk factors in financial information
than non-prompted auditors.
H2d: Auditors who are prompted to be mindful of discrepancies within financial
information more accurately identify fraud risk factors when they practice cognitive
reappraisal, as compared to when they suppress emotions.
The effects of emotion regulation strategies on the detection of fraud risk factors interacts
with prompts such that when prompted to be mindful of discrepancies that may exist in financial
information, auditors who engage in cognitive reappraisal likely improve their performance by
more accurately identifying fraud risk factors, as compared to auditors who suppress their emotions.
Therefore, the effect of prompts moderates the relationship between emotion regulation strategy
and the ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors. However, the relationship between ERS and
the ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors does not only occur through prompts. This leads
to a clarifying hypothesis:
H3: The effect of prompting moderates, but does not mediate, the relationship between ERS
type (cognitive reappraisal/emotion suppression) and the ability to accurately recall fraud
risk factors identified.
Prior research shows that, when prompted by checklists or specific client information,
auditors are likely to increase audit procedures to address identified risks related to the prompt, but
not overall (Hammersley et al. 2010; Asare and Wright 2004). Therefore, I further hypothesize that
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additional procedures recommended by auditors to address the fraud risk factors identified will be
related to discrepancies in the financial information they identify:
H4: Additional audit procedures identified will be related to the prompt to identify
inconsistencies between the documents but will not include other potential fraud risks.
Figure 2 represents a theoretic model for this study.
--Insert Figure 2-DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This paper examines the effects of mindfulness practices on auditors’ recall and attention to
detail in an experimental design with samples of Amazon Mechanical Turk (“mTurk”) workers 1
and accounting and finance students.
Development of Experimental Materials
I follow extant accounting studies related to auditors’ attention to fraud risk factors when
examining inconsistencies between types of financial reporting evidence (see also Hobson et al.
2017; Brazel et al. 2014; Trotman and Wright 2012; Asare and Wright 2004). Experimental packets
include information that auditors and investment analysts routinely collect in the course of their
work, including audio files and transcripts from earnings call question and answer sessions and the

1

The proposal for this study included the use of Prolifics panel participants. However, Prolifics was only
able to provide 3 participants who met the study’s criteria. Similarly, Qualtrics and Amazon panels did not
provide a sufficient number of participants to achieve power in this study (36 and 27, respectively). Leiby
et al. (2021) explain that this is a common issue with audit judgement and decision-making research, and
recommend that researchers use professional auditors to validate experimental materials but use “non-expert
participants” (p.33), such as mTurkers and students, to ensure full studies achieve sufficient power.
Conversely, they recommend that researchers consider running small, focused experiments initially to verify
that the experiment applies to the audit setting and then to run the full study with non-expert participants
(see Kadous, Proell, Rich and Zhou 2019). This study uses professional auditors to develop experimental
materials and accounting and finance students, including Master of Business Administration and Master of
Accountancy students, who are familiar with the experimental tasks, to validate the study’s results.
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quarterly financial reports discussed during an earnings call. Earnings calls are divided into two
subparts: a scripted session of remarks prepared and delivered by company management and a
question and answer session between presenting management and investment analysts and others.
During prepared remarks, management relays the financial results for the company during the
current financial reporting period, as well as year-to-date. The subsequent question and answer
(“Q&A”) session between company management and investment analysts and others is a candid
discussion based on questions from those who call in to a queue moderated by an outside investment
relations firm. Prior literature has shown that the Q&A sessions in earnings calls are more
informative than the prepared remarks (Mayew, Sethuraman, and Venkatachalam 2020; Matsumoto,
Pronk and Roelofsen 2011; Kimbrough and Louis 2011) and management’s responses in these
question and answer sessions reveal cognitive dissonance markers when management is relaying
information that they know to be untruthful (Hobson, Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012).
Fraud firms exhibit a higher number of inconsistencies between financial and non-financial
measures than non-fraud firms (Brazel et al. 2009); therefore, the experimental materials are related
to a fraud firm and a non-fraud competitor. The fraud firm was subject to a Securities and Exchange
Commission Audit and Accounting Enforcement (“AAER”) covering the period presented.
However, the case brought by the SEC2 against the firm did not include charges of fraud under Rule
10b-5. Rather, the SEC charged the firm with violations of the books and records provisions,
including failure to maintain adequate controls. The selection of this firm was intentional as
accounting professionals may be familiar with companies charged under SEC Rule 10b-5.

2

These methods differ from prior studies that first archivally establish relationships between the proxied fraud
risk factor by applying the Dechow f-score to similar materials (Hobson et al. 2011) or measuring the effect
of the difference between financial and non-financial measures on fraud risk (Brazel et al. 2009).
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I use an expert panel of Manager/Sr. Manager-level public accountants in Big 4 and national
firms (“Panel participants”) to facilitate the development of the financial documents evaluated by
participants, as described in Appendix A. As part of the process, the expert panel listed discrepancies
they noted between the information within each firm. Feedback from panel participants revealed
that the experiment took more time to complete than expected (approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour)
and that it elicited deep thinking (Petty and Caciopo 1986) and metacognitive processing (Roelle,
Nowitzki, and Berthold 2017). One panel member was also able to identify the fraud firm during
this process.
The list of discrepancies noted by the expert panel was compared to the findings noted in
the AAER for the fraud firm, and a list of words that may be predictive of fraud cases (see Purda
and Skillicorn 2015). Following Berry and Mielke (1988), I measure the level of agreement
between raters and with the SEC AAER for each discrepancy noted. Where agreement was
moderate to high (Cohen’s kappa > 0.600), the discrepancy was included in the experimental
materials. The final list included an equal number of actual discrepancies and erroneously identified
discrepancies between the earnings call question and answer session and the financial statement
excerpts, for each firm. In addition, the expert panel identified potential substantive tests they may
employ to reduce the identified risks.
To reduce experimental burden, a second phase of design was implemented using only
materials related to the fraud firm (see Appendix B), as fraud firms exhibit a higher number of
discrepancies than non-fraud firms (Brazel et al. 2009). Phase II participants are solicited using
Amazon Mechanical Turk3 (“mTurk”) via their screening platform, Cloud Research. In this phase,

3

Controls within Cloud Research were deployed to ensure participants were familiar with the experimental
task and experienced study participants. Specifically, mTurkers have participated in at least 500 studies, had
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I explain mindfulness by having participants read an article on the benefits of mindfulness that
describes mindfulness practices related to self-regulation and seek participants’ feedback on the
experimental tasks, as described in Appendix B. Phase II panel participants were asked to select
discrepancies noted between the financial information for the fraud firm from a drop down of the
final list identified and agreed to by the expert panel. mTurk participants in Phase II strongly agreed
on the discrepancies in the information provided within the group and with the SEC AAER
(Cohen’s kappa = 0.909). Feedback from Phase II participants revealed that the experiment took
approximately 35-40 minutes to complete, which was longer than desired. Therefore, a summary
of the article provided to the expert panel 4 and Phase II participants was included in the final
experimental materials. Final experimental materials are available in Appendix F 5.
Independent Variables
In the final experimental materials, I randomly assign participants to an ERS condition [IV1ERS], including emotion suppression (“Suppress”), cognitive reappraisal (“Reframe”) or a control
group (“Control”)6. Random assignment adds control by dispersing those with varying levels of

an approval rating of at least 80%, earned at least a bachelor’s degree, worked in an office in the Finance or
Business Service industries, were currently employed full-time, and work at least 36 hours per week.
4
I follow experimental research in psychology, which shows that merely instructing participants to engage
in emotion suppression or cognitive reappraisal yields significant differences between the conditions (e.g.
Sripada et al. 2014; Goldin et al. 2008; Richards and Gross 2000).
5
The proposal for this study included the use of participants’ self-reported heart rate variability (“HRV”)
throughout the study via screenshot from the participant’s personal heart rate monitoring application as a
means to confirm participants’ engagement with the assigned emotion regulation strategy condition (i.e. a
secondary manipulation check). This process was included in Phase II, however, participants uploaded
various files that did not show their HRV. Therefore, the lack of control in this setting negates the use of
HRV as a manipulation check. Per the WVU IRB, removing HRV from the study also reduces the data
privacy requirements, enabling the use of Qualtrics for data collection, instead of REDCap.
6
I choose emotion suppression because of its relevance to the audit profession and its correlation with
negative, or skeptical, mindsets, which are encouraged in auditing. In the psychology literature, emotion
suppression and cognitive reappraisal are often compared in studies on emotion regulation (see Gross
2001, 2013).
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trait-level ERS preference between groups. Participants in each group are provided information
related to the mindfulness practice they are assigned to and given instructions on how to exercise
the practice. For example, participants in the Suppress group are told to refrain from showing
emotion, while those in the Reframe group are try to feel less negative about the information
presented, and those in the control group are told to thoughtfully consider the information presented
(see Appendix F).
As a manipulation check, participants are asked to identify the mindfulness practice they
utilized during the activity (“ManCk1”). Upon completion of the manipulation check, participants
are reminded of the mindfulness practice they are assigned to and are told that they are to read
information about a company and answer related questions. Following Brazel et al. (2014), I prompt
one-half of the participants to identify inconsistencies between documents related to quarterly
financial reporting for a public company [IV2- Prompt]. Following participants’ evaluation of the
experimental materials, participants complete a second manipulation check (“ManCk2”). Table 1
lists the conditions assigned and the corresponding cell sizes.
--Insert Table 1-Dependent Variables
After reviewing the company’s earnings call and financial information, I ask participants to
rate the likelihood that company management is engaging in financial misreporting on a scale of 1
to 100 [DV1- financial reporting fraud]. I also ask each participant to identify the discrepancies
they noted in the financial information from the final list developed during the design of the
experimental materials, and then to select the fraud risk factors they identified, if any. I measure
the ability to identify fraud risk factors as a count of the fraud risk factors selected from the final
list of fraud risks that exist in the SEC’s AAER, as provided by the expert panel [DV2- Quantity].
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I further measure ability to accuracy with which participants identify inconsistencies that exist
within the company documents [DV3- Accuracy] as the number of correctly identified fraud risk
factors less the number of incorrectly identified fraud risk factors. That is [(#correct + # of avoided
incorrect answers) - # incorrect], thus accuracy can range from -8 to 8 (e.g. 4 accurately identified
correct answers + 4 accurately avoided incorrect answers - 0 incorrect answers = 8). Evaluating
financial information in this way is a metacognitive process that requires deep thought and
concentration. Roelle et al. (2016) explain that cognitive processes, such as emotion regulation and
prompts, influence metacognitive processes by either setting the stage for elaboration, or by
overloading cognitive capacity.
I further ask participants to identify additional substantive tests [DV4- Test] they might
employ to mitigate the risks identified. Four options are provided from the list developed by the
expert panel, two of which are related to the discrepancies between the documents (i.e. recalculation
of the allowance for doubtful accounts and allocation of revenue by product type), one of which
may be extrapolated from the materials (i.e. tests of internal controls), and one of which is not
related to the experimental materials provided (i.e. goodwill impairment test). I measure whether
the participant identified additional tests, and if so, whether the tests identified correlate with the
fraud risks the participant noted.
Additionally, I measure the duration of time participants spend on the study as a secondary
mechanism to validate their ERS engagement. Emotion suppression adds to cognitive load and
decreases working memory while cognitive reappraisal increases it. Therefore, I evaluate
participants’ cognitive processing times as evidence of the execution of their assigned ERS. I expect
participants assigned to the suppress condition to spend more time processing the experimental
materials than those in the reframe or control conditions, as emotion suppression increases cognitive
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load. I further expect that participants who are prompted to be mindful of discrepancies within
financial information will spend more time on the experimental materials than those who are not
prompted, as prompts also induce cognitive processing. Therefore, participants who are assigned to
the suppress condition and are also prompted will likely spend the most time on the study, as
compared to those who are assigned to the reframe or control conditions and/or are not prompted.
Further, participants who are in the reframe or control conditions and are not prompted to be mindful
of discrepancies within financial information will likely spend the least amount of time on the study.
In closing, I collect process measures related to the individual’s frequency practicing
mindfulness and emotion regulation, and the likelihood that their current employer encourages
mindfulness. I further ask participants to self-report the difficulty they encountered cognitively
processing the experimental materials (i.e. focusing, stopping, and thinking, remembering details).
Finally, I ask participants to provide their sex at birth, highest level of education, number of people
in their current place of employment, position within their current firm, and number of years they
have worked full-time.
Sample Selection
A 3x2 study requires a minimum of 120 participants to achieve power; therefore, I follow
Leiby et al. (2021) and use online participants to acquire enough subjects to reach power. I obtain
mTurk participants via Cloud Research7(n=54)8, deploying controls to ensure participants represent
financial professionals familiar with the experimental tasks.

7

9

The study is described as

Prolifics (n=3), Amazon Mechanical Turk (n=27), and Qualtrics (n=36) panels (see Leiby et al. 2021; Peer,
Brandimorte, Samat, and Acquisti 2017) were considered as sample sources but were unable to provide a
sufficient number of participants to achieve power.
8
The study yielded a 55.4% abandonment rate.
9
Controls include: exclusion from participation in prior studies related to the current study (e.g. participation
in design of the experimental materials); mTurk approval ratings of at least 80%; college education (i.e.
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“Mindfulness and Financial Information”. 10 Leiby et al. (2021) and Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and
Stinson (2018) explain that the use of controls in this way helps validate participant attributes and
provides greater assurance over data quality, in the absence of a controlled environment. Prior
studies have shown that mTurkers are a more representative sample of the general population than
student samples. However, extant literature is unclear on whether mTurkers provide quality
responses in longer studies. For example, Bellingtier and Neupert (2017) find mTurkers to be an
acceptable population for daily diary studies, which require multiple contacts between participants
and experimenters over several days. Conversely, Aguinis, Villamor, and Ramani (2021) and
Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema (2013) explain that mTurkers are less attentive than other
participants, particularly with longer experimental tasks, and often abandon studies with such
tasks11.
To validate the study results in the audit setting and increase the number of study participants,
I further recruit undergraduate accounting students (n=30), and graduate students enrolled in Master
of Business Administration and Master of Accountancy programs at a large Mid-Atlantic university

bachelor’s degree or higher); experience with investments; U.S. citizen; employed as an office worker,
finance professional, business service professional, or office worker; work at least 36 hours per week; block
duplicate IP addresses; block suspicious geocodes (i.e. non-matching to IP location); and block low quality
participants.
10
There is a growing body of literature related to the effects of mindfulness on financial information analysis
and decision-making (see Engels, Kumar and Philip 2020; Charoensukmongkul and Aumeboonsuke 2018,
2016; Ng 2018, Stone 2011, Gonzalez and Byron 2010; Shefrin 2008). Chambers, Gullone, and Allen (2009)
explain that when mindfulness is practiced, it becomes automatic and requires less cognition to perform.
Thus, those familiar with mindfulness and financial information analysis are more likely to provide quality
responses in this study.
11
To offset these risks, I compensate mTurkers in two parts. Each mTurker receives nominal compensation
of $0.25 for participating in the study and those who provide quality response receive a bonus of $3.75.
Therefore, mTurkers are extrinsically motivated to complete the study.
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(n=48)12. Accounting students are likely more familiar with the audit processes and exhibit greater
cognitive processing of the experimental materials.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
As described above, I expect that participants assigned to the cognitive reappraisal condition
will identify more fraud risk factors and more accurately identify fraud risk factors than participants
assigned to the control or emotion suppression conditions. Further, I expect prompting participants
to be mindful of discrepancies that may exist in financial information has a positive main effect on
the ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors and moderates the relationship between emotion
regulation strategy and the ability to accurately recall fraud risk factors.
Exploratory Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using IBM SPSS version 27 and PROCESS by Andrew Hayes. Analysis
of the descriptive statistics for continuous variables show 11 outliers in study duration. Four of
these outliers included durations more than 83 minutes and seven had durations less than 5 minutes.
The data is left-skewed and kurtotic, particularly in the ERS= Control condition. As such, additional
data analysis was completed. Univariate and multivariate analyses show that these outliers do not
affect the dependent variables 13 or the models of interest. However, considering these results,
median duration time to complete the study is used for supplemental analysis of participants’
cognitive processes.

12

Student participants were either compensated with a $10 Amazon gift card or a combination of extra credit
and a $5 Amazon gift card. Student participants were compensated regardless of the quality of their response.
There was no statistically significant difference in results provided within student samples between
compensation arrangements.
13
Analyses were run including and excluding outliers. No statistically significantly differences were noted in
the results.
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Univariate and multivariate analyses were performed on all other variables. Sex at birth
revealed that there are 2.58 times more males than females in the study. 14 The number of males
exceeds females in each condition. No other data anomalies were identified, and data were
consistent across conditions. Overall descriptive statistics are in Tables 2 through 5.
--Insert Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5-Bivariate correlations were examined for all variables using Spearman (non-parametric) and
Pearson (parametric) coefficients. Spearman correlations for ordinal variables show that the
identification of fraud risk factors is positively related to the accurate identification of fraud risk
factors (rho = 0.575, p<0.01), the number of additional tests selected to address fraud risk factors
(rho = 0.353, p<0.01), and the duration of time participants spend on the study (rho= 0.280, p<0.01).
Spearman correlations also show that the number of financial statements analyzed on a quarterly
basis is negatively related to participants’ difficulty remembering details about the financial
information they reviewed (rho= -0.176, p<0.05). Conversely, how much time participants spend
on the study is positively related to related to the number of financial statements they analyze on a
quarterly basis (rho= 0.182, p<0.01) and the number of additional tests participants select to address
the fraud risks they identify (rho= 0.313, p<0.01).
Pearson correlations for linear relationships show that the accurate identification of fraud
risk factors is negatively related to difficulty focusing on the task (r= -0.191, p<0.05). Participants’
self-reported difficulty focusing on the experimental task (r= -0.184, p<0.05) and difficulty
remembering facts about the information reviewed (r = -0.256, p<0.05) are negatively related to

14

Anderson, Reilly, Gorrell, Schaumberg, and Anderson (2016) find the gender differences in emotion
regulation are most related to shame and the length of time needed to recover from negative emotions. This
study asks participants to modify both positive and negative emotion. Therefore, no gender effect is expected.
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how frequently they practice mindfulness. Participants’ difficulty remembering facts is also
negatively related to how frequently they practice emotion regulation (r = -0.189, p<0.05). Finally,
participants’ frequency of practicing mindfulness (r = 0.220, p<0.05) and emotion regulation (r =
0.269, p<0.01) are positively related to the likelihood that their current employer encourages
mindfulness and the frequency of practicing mindfulness is positively related to the frequency of
practicing emotion regulation (r=0.664, p<0.01).
Table 6 provides the Pearson (Lower) and Spearman (Upper) correlation coefficients of
interest. These relationships show that the data support the benefits of mindfulness and the impact
of practicing mindfulness on cognitive load (Grecucci, Pappaianni, Siuzdaite, and Theuninck 2015).
--Insert Table 6-However, the benefits of mindfulness and the related cognitive load may differ based on
whether and how often participants practice mindfulness. Block, et al. (2010) explain that
familiarity with constructs decreases participants’ cognitive load and improves performance. As
previously described, this study finds that the frequency of practicing mindfulness is positively
correlated with the accurate identification of fraud risk factors and differs between samples. In this
study, mTurk (“mTurkers”) participants (M= 5.26) and Undergraduate students (“Undergrads”)
(M=5.00) are more likely to practice mindfulness than Graduate (“Grads”) students (M=3.02).
mTurk participants (M=4.83) and Undergrads (M=4.41) are also more likely to practice emotion
regulation strategies than Graduate students (M=3.23). Undergrads (n=19) are also more likely to
report high school graduation as their highest level of education than Grads (n=6) or mTurkers
(n=4) and mTurkers report having a higher average number of years of full-time work experience
(M=5.77), as compared to Grads (M=0.43) or Undergrads (M=0.76). The differences between
sample groups may affect participants’ ability to manage the cognitive processes of emotion
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regulation and prompts while engaging in the metacognitive experimental task in this study.
Descriptive statistics between samples are available in Tables 7 through 9.
--Insert Tables 7, 8, and 9; Figures 3, 4, and 5-Given these results, the differences noted between samples were evaluated for statistical
significance. Based on preliminary analyses of the descriptive statistics, chi square test of
association by sample, and analyses of variance, differences were noted between samples in the
frequency of practicing mindfulness or emotion regulation. Familiarity with mindfulness and
emotion regulation or financial statement analysis should improve automaticity, reducing the
cognitive load such activities impose on the participant, freeing the individual to allocate greater
cognition toward prompts and the experimental tasks. Therefore, I evaluate whether participants’
familiarity with mindfulness or emotion regulation or financial statement analysis significantly
affects participants’ ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors.
Frequency practicing mindfulness or emotion regulation. Using a multivariate analysis of
covariance (MANCOVA) model, I assess whether differences in familiarity with mindfulness or
emotion regulation between sample source (“samples”) are statistically significant. 15 Preliminary
assumption checking revealed that data was normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test
(p>0.05); there were no univariate or multivariate outliers, as assessed by boxplot and Mahalanobis
distance (p>0.001), respectively; there were linear relationships, as assessed by scatterplot; no
multicollinearity (r = 0.664, p< 0.01), and homogeneity of variance-covariance, as assessed by
Box's M test (p= 0.693). The differences between samples on the combined dependent variables
was statistically significant, F (3, 109) = 4.137, p=0.001; Pillai’s Trace = 0.203; partial η2 = 0.101.

15

The model included controls for number of financial statements analyzed, education, gender, position with
current firm, and years of experience.
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mTurkers and Undergrads are statistically significantly more likely to practice mindfulness and
emotional regulation than Grads (MmTurk = 5.26, SD= 1.29; MUndergrads = 5.00, SD= 1.81; and MGrads=
3.02, SD = 2.45, respectively) and are more likely to practice emotion regulation than Grads
(MmTurk= 4.83, SD= 1.51; MUndergrads= 4.30, SD= 1.59; and MGrads= 3.23, SD= 1.88, respectively).
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs showed that both practicing mindfulness [F(2, 111) = 11.160, p<
0.001; partial η2 = 0.167] and emotion regulation [F(2, 111)= 6.612, p=0.002; partial η2 = 0.106]
were statistically significantly different between the sample groups, using a Bonferroni adjusted α
level of 0.025.
Bonferroni post-hoc tests show that mTurkers practice statistically significantly higher
mindfulness, on average, than Grads (MDiff=2.24, SE=0.44, p<0.001). Likewise, Undergrads
practice mindfulness at a marginally significantly higher average rate than Grads (M Diff= 1.98,
SE=0.45, p<0.001).

However, the difference in practicing mindfulness did not statistically

significantly differ between Undergrads and mTurkers (p=1.000). Bonferroni post-hoc tests also
show that mTurkers (MDiff= 1.60, SE=0.35, p < 0.001) and Undergrads (MDiff= 1.17, SE=0.41, p<
0.001) practice statistically significantly higher emotion regulation, on average, than Grads.
However, the difference in practicing emotion regulation did not statistically significantly differ
between Undergrads and mTurkers (p = 0.91).
--Insert Table 10-These results indicate that mTurk and undergraduate student participants are more familiar
with mindfulness and emotion regulation than graduate student participants. Participants’ frequency
of practicing mindfulness and emotion regulation reduces the amount of cognitive load they spend
regulating their emotion during the study and frees their cognitive capacity for the experimental
tasks. Therefore, I evaluate whether the differences in mTurker and Undergrad frequency of

38

practicing mindfulness or emotion regulation influence their ability to identify fraud risk factors or
their ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors, as compared to Grads.
Financial statement analysis. I test whether the number of financial statements participants
analyze each quarter significantly differs between samples and whether such experience affects
participants’ ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors. Chi square tests of association show
that Undergrads are less likely to analyze one to nine (36.67%) financial statements quarterly than
mTurkers (51.85%) or Grads (52.08%), but are more likely to analyze 10 to 24 financial statements
per quarter (43.33%) than mTurkers (29.63%) or Grads (29.17%), χ2=17.518, p=0.025.
Additionally, the difference in years’ work experience between mTurk subjects (M=5.77) and
Undergrads (M=0.76) or Grads (M=0.43) is statistically significant, χ2= 17.518, p= 0.025.
To assess the effects of emotion regulation strategy and prompts on the ability to accurately
recall fraud risk factors (i.e. Accuracy), I run a between-subjects analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) 16 . Using an alpha level of 0.05 to evaluate homogeneity assumptions, Levene's
homogeneity of variance test was not statistically significant for both dependent variables (p>0.01).
Results indicate that the interaction effect of Prompt * Sample statistically significantly affects
ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors, F(2,86)=2.620, p=0.079, partial ŋ2=0.057.
Specifically, mTurk participants were statistically significantly more accurate in identifying fraud
risk factors when not prompted (M=5.19, SD=1.77) than when prompted (M=4.56, SD=2.16,
p=0.062). The ERS x Sample interaction was not statistically significant, however, F (2,86)= 0.061,
p= 0.988, partial ŋ2 = 0.004. In addition, Education [F (1,86) = 4.686, p= 0.033] and the number of

16

The model included controls for number of financial statements analyzed, education, gender, position with
current firm, and years of experience.
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financial statements analyzed per quarter F (1,86)=8.387, p=0.005, had statistically significant
effects on the ability to accurately recall fraud risk factors.
--Insert Table 11-In addition to the differences between samples noted previously, I evaluate whether
differences exist between samples that may also impact participants’ cognitive load. Specifically, I
examine whether differences’ in the amount of time participants spend on the study significantly
statistically differ between samples.
Duration and Cognitive Processing. As discussed earlier, eleven outliers were identified in
the amount of time spent on the study. Although the outliers did not have a statistically significant
effect on the variables of interest in this study, duration also serves as a proxy for cognitive
processing used (Gross 2013; Goldin et al. 2008). Therefore, I evaluate median duration in time
between samples and condition 17 to assess whether participants’ cognitive processing differed
between emotion regulation condition or sample. The effects of ERS, prompt, and sample on
duration time are also compared, removing outliers.
Examination of median duration in minutes shows that mTurkers exhibit greater cognitive
processing when not prompted across ERS conditions (Suppress= 22.60; Control= 17.87,
Reappraisal=16.24) as compared to when they are prompted (Suppress= 18.71; Control= 7.50,
Reappraisal=13.00). Contrarily, graduate students exhibit greater cognitive processing when
prompted (Suppress= 40.98; Control= 28.65, Reappraisal=22.33) than when not prompted
(Suppress= 25.65; Control= 28.23, Reappraisal= 21.68). Further, graduate students exhibited the

17

Median duration to complete the study was highest when participants suppressed emotion (Median=
22.70) and lowest when participants reframed the situation (Median= 18.13), showing that the ERS
manipulation was effective. However, results within each sample varied.
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highest cognitive processing and mTurkers exhibited the lowest amount of cognitive processing
when prompted across ERS conditions, as proxied by duration in minutes (see Table 13).
Undergraduates exhibit varying cognitive processing times across conditions, such that they endure
greater processing times when prompted in the Reappraisal condition (Median= 22.33) than when
not prompted (Median= 21.68) but lower processing time in the Suppress condition when prompted
(Median= 22.27) than when not prompted (Median= 25.81; see Table 13). These results indicate
that mTurkers allocate fewer cognitive resources to the study and perform a less thorough
evaluation of the experimental materials, as compared to graduate students. The differences may be
related to the influence of affective information on the samples, such as the fact that mTurkers are
more familiar with mindfulness (Mean=5.26) than graduate students (Mean= 3.02) or may simply
be reflective of a lack of attention.
--Insert Tables 12-13; Figure 6-Univariate analysis of variance was also performed to assess whether the mean duration is
statistically significantly different between sample, ERS, and/or prompt. Residual analysis was
performed to test for the assumptions of the ANOVA. Outliers were removed and the data was
assessed by inspection of a boxplot; normality was assessed using Shapiro-Wilk's normality test for
each cell of the design and homogeneity of variances was assessed by Levene's test. Residuals were
normally distributed (p > .05) and there was homogeneity of variances (p = 0.621). All pairwise
comparisons were run where reported 95% confidence intervals and p-values are Bonferroniadjusted. Although the median durations between samples were not statistically significantly
different, the unweighted marginal means of duration for mTurkers, undergraduate students and
graduate students were 18.80 (SE = 1.464), 22.86 (SE = 2.540) and 33.99 (SE = 4.489), respectively.
The mean difference between mTurkers (18.80, 95% CI [15.85, 21.74]) and graduate students
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(33.99, 95% CI [24.95, 43.03]) of -15.20 is statistically significantly different, p = 0.002. Therefore,
it appears that graduate students exhibited greater cognitive effort on the experimental task, which
may contribute to differences noted. However, there was no effect of emotion regulation strategy
or prompt on duration in minutes.
--Insert Table 14 and Figure 6-These results indicate that differences between samples in this study are different enough to
potentially skew the results. To prevent the introduction of bias into the coefficients, tests of
hypotheses are performed within each sample, as opposed to across samples 18, 19.
Tests of Hypotheses - mTurk
The effects of ERS (H1a) and Prompts on Fraud Risk Identification (H2a and H2b)
To evaluate whether differences in participants’ frequency of practicing mindfulness or
emotion regulation affect their ability to identify fraud risk factors, depending on whether prompts
affect their ability to identify fraud risk factors, I test H1a, H2a, and H2b using a cumulative odds
ordinal logistic regression with proportional odds to determine the effect of emotion regulation
strategy on the ability to identify fraud risk factors 20. There were proportional odds, as assessed by
a full likelihood ratio test comparing the fitted model to a model with varying location parameters,

18

Testing the hypotheses within each sample reduces cell sizes and lowers power below acceptable levels.
Additional observations are necessary to achieve power and derive reliable results.
19
Using small sample sizes within each participant pool (“sample source”) biases against finding
significant results as the cell sizes are too small to achieve power. Therefore, it is likely that trends within
the data may not be statistically significant, but may be worthy of future study.
20
The model was also run including controls for 1) frequency of mindfulness practices, frequency of emotion
regulation practice, whether the participants’ current firm encourages mindfulness, or 2) participant
characteristics (i.e. years of experience, experience analyzing financial statements, education level, current
job position, gender). However, the model fit was poor as many cell sizes were below 5. As such, a separate
chi square test of association was conducted to address these attributes to the error term in this model. No
significant relationships existed.
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χ2(15) = 7.353, p= 0.947. The Pearson goodness-of-fit test indicated that the model was a good fit
to the observed data, χ2(15) = 6.584, p= 0.968, but 5 cells (16.7%) had frequencies lower than five.
The final model statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above the
intercept-only model, χ2(5) = 13.596, p= 0.018, Pseudo R2= 0.235.
Results show that there is a statistically significant two-way interaction between mTurkers
assigned to the control emotion regulation strategy and prompts to be mindful of discrepancies
within financial information [Wald (1) = 7.083, b= 3.650, SE= 1.372, p= 0.008], as compared to
those in the reframe condition21. While H2c does not include the control ERS, the finding highlights
the effect of prompts when participants do not engage in emotion regulation. Further, there is also
a significant main effect of prompting mTurkers to be mindful of discrepancies within financial
information (Yes vs. No) on the ability to identify fraud risk factors [Wald (1) = 7.044, b= -2.952,
SE= 1.112, p= 0.008]. However, the effect is in the opposite direction of that hypothesized in H2a.
That is, mTurkers are more likely to find 0 (n=3) or 1 (n=13) fraud risk factors than 2 (n=5), 3 (n=4)
or 4 (n=3) fraud risk factors when prompted than when not prompted (n= 1, 6, 10, 5, and 4,
respectively). Thus, mTurk participants are less likely to identify fraud risk factors when they are
prompted to identify discrepancies within financial information than when they are not prompted
to do so.
This finding is contrary to expectations as prompts should improve performance by
increasing participants’ focus. It is possible that mTurkers are less influenced by prompts than
student participants. This finding is interesting as mTurkers’ familiarity with mindfulness and
emotion regulation implies that they have greater cognitive capacity to allocate toward prompts and

21

The control condition was also used as a referent category. Results did not change.
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the experimental task than those unfamiliar with mindfulness and emotion regulation. Contrarily,
mTurkers may simply be less attentive than student participants and prompts may not be sufficient
to attract their attention. Aguinis, Villamor, and Ramani (2020) explain that mTurkers are less
engaged than student participants in longer experiments, such as those that invoke metacognitive
processes. This finding is interesting as mTurkers represent the general population and may be more
like new entrants to the audit profession than graduate students. Audit practitioners are directing
their mindfulness programs toward new practitioners (NF1 2021), who may already be familiar
with mindfulness practices.
Results show that there is also a main effect of the control condition emotion regulation
strategy [Wald (1) = -5.804, b= -2.454, SE= 1.019, p= 0.0016] on the ability to identify fraud risk
factors. Further, mTurkers who reframe their negative thoughts as positive thoughts are more
likely to identify 0, 1, 2, or 3 fraud risk factors than mTurkers who suppress their emotions during
the study; however, these results are not statistically significant, partially supporting H1a.
--Insert Table 15; Figures 7—
The effects of ERS (H1b) and Prompts on Accurate Identification of Fraud Risks (H2a and
H2b)
I test hypotheses H1b, H2c and H2d within the mTurk sample to assess the effects of
emotion regulation strategy and prompts on the ability to accurately recall details about fraud risk
factors (i.e. Accuracy). I run a 3 x 2 22 between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA),
controlling for participants’ frequency practicing mindfulness or emotion regulation, and the

22

Participant’s evaluation of the likelihood that the firm was engaging in financial misreporting was initially
included in the model, but the model violated the assumption of sphericity, and was modified accordingly.
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likelihood that the participant’s current firm encourages mindfulness 23. Using an alpha level of 0.05
to evaluate homogeneity assumptions, Levene's homogeneity of variance test is not statistically
significant for both dependent variables (p>0.01). Results indicate that the interaction effect of
Prompt * ERS does not statistically significantly affects ability to accurately identify fraud risk
factors F(2,35) =0.057, p=0.945, partial ŋ2 =0.108, refuting H2d. Additionally, mTurk participants
assigned to the control condition who were not prompted were statistically significantly more
accurate in identifying fraud risk factors when not prompted (M=5.19, SD=1.77) than when
prompted (M=4.56, SD=2.16, p=0.083). The main effect for prompts (H2c) on the accurate
identification of fraud risk factors is not statistically significant. Results suggest that the ability to
accurately recall fraud risk factors identified (H2d) is not affected by the interaction between the
control emotion regulation condition and

prompts; however, the main effect of accurately

identifying fraud risk factors is not statistically significantly predicted by emotion regulation
strategy with mTurk participants.
--Insert Table 16; Figure 8—
Moderating Effect of Prompts (H3)
To evaluate whether prompts moderate the relationship between ERS and the ability to
accurately identify fraud risk factors, I examine the interaction between ERS and Prompt. A chisquare test for association is conducted between additional tests selected to address fraud risk
factors identified and the prompts given to auditors. All expected cell frequencies were greater than
five. There is no statistically significant association between additional test selected, χ 2(5,48)=
1.225, p= 0.312 (see Table 16). Likewise, the type of test selected is not statistically significantly

23

The model controlled for gender, education level, position, and years of experience.
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related to prompts. Thus, while Hammersley et al. (2010) find that auditors identify additional
procedures related to prompts, participants in this study did not correlate such procedures to
discrepancies within the financial information in the experimental materials. It is also possible that
mTurk participants did not feel that the discrepancies identified warranted further testing.
Additional Substantive Testing Related to Prompts (H4)
A chi-square test for association is conducted between additional tests selected to address
fraud risk factors identified and the prompts given to auditors. All expected cell frequencies were
greater than five. There is no statistically significant association between additional test selected
and the number of fraud risks identified, χ2(1) 0.126, p > 0.10. Likewise, the type of test selected is
not statistically significantly related to prompts to identify discrepancies within financial
information. Thus, while Hammersley et al. (2010) find that auditors identify additional procedures
related to prompts, participants in this study did not correlate such procedures to discrepancies
within the financial information in the experimental materials. It is also possible that study
participants did not feel that the discrepancies identified warranted further testing. As such,
participant’s self-report that management is involved in financial misreporting is evaluated in
supplemental analyses. These results indicate that mTurk participants do not correlate the fraud
risks they identify with additional substantive tests.
In summary, mTurkers more accurately identify fraud risk factors when they are not
prompted, as compared to when they are prompted. Thus, while the main effect of prompt is
significant in the test of H2a, the direction of the finding is the opposite of that expected. Possible
explanations for this finding may be that mTurkers 1) were able to reduce their cognitive capacity
used on the emotion regulation manipulation and allocate cognitive resources to the task, or 2)
prompted mTurkers experienced cognitive overload because of the prompt and experience the
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unintended consequences of being prompted, or 3) mTurk participants were inattentive during the
study and the prompt manipulation was ineffective for them. While this study does not provide
sufficient data to further examine these explanations, future research may examine the finding
further.
Tests of Hypotheses - Undergrads
The effects of ERS (H1a) and Prompts on Fraud Risk Identification (H2a and H2b)
To evaluate whether differences in participants’ frequency of practicing mindfulness or
emotion regulation affect their ability to identify fraud risk factors, depending on whether prompts
affect their ability to identify fraud risk factors, I test H1a, H2a, and H2b using a cumulative odds
ordinal logistic regression with proportional odds to determine the effect of emotion regulation
strategy on the ability to identify fraud risk factors.24 However, there were marginal proportional
odds, as assessed by a full likelihood ratio test comparing the fitted model to a model with varying
location parameters, χ2(15)=24.214, p=0.062. Similarly, the Pearson goodness-of-fit test indicated
that the model is a moderately good fit to the observed data, χ2(15)=22.961, p=0.085, but 12 cells
(40.0%) had frequencies lower than five. The final model is not statistically significantly predictive
of the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, χ 2(5)=4.686, p= 0.455, Pseudo
R2= 0.158.
Therefore, a multinomial logistic model is run to test hypotheses H1a, H2a and H2b. The
Likelihood ratio test indicated that the model is not a good fit to the observed data, χ 2(8) = 11.478,

24

The model was also run including controls for 1) frequency of mindfulness practices, frequency of emotion
regulation practice, whether the participants’ current firm encourages mindfulness, or 2) participant
characteristics (i.e. years of experience, experience analyzing financial statements, education level, current
job position, gender). However, the model fit was poor as many cell sizes were below 5. As such, a separate
chi square test of association was conducted to address these attributes to the error term in this model. No
significant relationships existed.
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p= 0.176. The final model statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above
the intercept-only model, χ2(32) = 47.117, p= 0.041, Pseudo R2= 0.873. Using zero as a reference
category, results show that there is no statistically significant difference in whether undergraduate
student participants identify 1, 2, 3, or 4 fraud risk factors, as compared to identifying zero fraud
risk factors, regardless of which emotion regulation (H1a) or prompt (H2a) condition they are
assigned to. Similarly, the interaction between emotion regulation strategy and prompt to be mindful
of discrepancies within financial information (H2b) did not statistically significantly predict
whether undergraduate students identified 1, 2, 3 or 4 fraud risk factors as compared to identifying
zero fraud risk factors.
However, there is a main effect of the frequency with which undergraduate students practice
emotion regulation and the likelihood that they would identify two fraud risk factors. Specifically,
the when emotion regulation frequency increases by 1 unit, the probability of choosing two fraud
risk factors is 2.951 times higher than the selecting zero fraud risk factors. While this finding is
interesting, multinomial results are difficult to generalize because of their specificity and the fact
that emotion regulation is correlated with identifying two as opposed to zero fraud risk factors does
not provide context about undergraduate students’ behavior.
--Insert Table 17; Figure 9—
The effects of ERS (H1b) and Prompts on the Accurate Identification of Fraud Risks (H2c
and H2d)
I test hypotheses H1b, H2c and H2d within the Undergrad sample to assess the effects of
emotion regulation strategy and prompts on the ability to accurately recall details about fraud risk
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factors (i.e. Accuracy), I run a 3 x 2 25 between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA),
controlling for participants’ frequency practicing mindfulness or emotion regulation, and the
likelihood that the participant’s current firm encourages mindfulness 26. Using an alpha level of 0.05
to evaluate homogeneity assumptions, Levene's homogeneity of variance test is not statistically
significant for both dependent variables (p> 0.01). Results indicate that there is no main effect of
emotion regulation strategy (H1b) or prompt (H2c) to be mindful of discrepancies within financial
information on the ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors. Similarly, there is no interaction
effect between emotion regulation strategy and prompt on the ability to accurately identify fraud
risk factors, refuting H2d.
These results indicate that the ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors is not predicted
by emotion regulation strategies or prompts with Undergrad participants.
--Insert Table 18; Figure 10—

Moderating Effect of Prompts (H3)
To evaluate whether prompts moderate the relationship between ERS and the ability to
accurately identify fraud risk factors, I examine the interaction between ERS and Prompt. Given
that the interaction between ERS and prompt is not statistically significant, it is unsurprising that
prompts do not either moderate or mediate the relationship between ERS and the ability to
accurately identify fraud risk factors.

25

Participant’s evaluation of the likelihood that the firm was engaging in financial misreporting was initially
included in the model, but the model violated the assumption of sphericity, and was modified accordingly.
26
A separate model also controlled for gender, education level, position, and years of experience. Results
did not statistically significantly differ.
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Additional Substantive Testing Related to Prompts (H4)
A chi-square test for association is conducted between additional tests selected to address
fraud risk factors identified and the prompts given to auditors. All expected cell frequencies were
greater than five. There is a statistically significant association between Undergrads identifying a
fraud risk factor in the allowance for doubtful accounts and selecting an additional test selected to
recalculate the allowance for doubtful accounts, χ2(1)=8.571, p=0.003. This finding is important as
Undergrads were the only sample group to identify the need to perform additional tests related to
an important fraud risk in the materials provided. These results indicate that Undergrads correlate
some fraud risks with additional tests to address the risks, partially supporting H4 for Undergrads.
Tests of Hypotheses - Grads
The effects of ERS (H1a) and Prompts on Fraud Risk Identification (H2a and H2b)
To evaluate whether differences in participants’ frequency of practicing mindfulness or
emotion regulation affect their ability to identify fraud risk factors, depending on whether prompts
affect their ability to identify fraud risk factors, I test H1a, H2a, and H2b using a cumulative odds
ordinal logistic regression with proportional odds to determine the effect of emotion regulation
strategy on the ability to identify fraud risk factors. There were proportional odds, as assessed by a
full likelihood ratio test comparing the fitted model to a model with varying location parameters,
χ2(15)=16.950, p=0.322. The Pearson goodness-of-fit test indicated that the model was a good fit
to the observed data, χ2(15)=14.008, p=0.520, but 5 cells (16.7%) had frequencies lower than five.
The final model did not statistically significantly predict the dependent variable over and above the
intercept-only model, χ2(5)=8.524, p=0.130, Pseudo R2= 0.171. As such, results show that there is
no statistically significant effect of emotion regulation strategy (H1a) or prompt (H2a) on the ability
to identify fraud risk factors. Similarly, there is no interaction effect between emotion regulation
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strategy and prompt (H2b). However, the model does not fit the data well and only explains 17.,1%
of the variance in graduate students’ ability to identify fraud risk factors.
To improve the model, controls for mindfulness frequency, frequency practicing emotion
regulation and the likelihood that the participant’s current firm encourages mindfulness practices.
However, the assumption of parallel lines was violated in this model. Therefore, a multinomial
logistic regression was run to assess the effects of emotion regulation strategy and prompts on the
ability to identify fraud risk factors. There was no statistically significant difference in the
likelihood that graduate students would select 1, 2, 3, or 4 fraud risk factors, as compared to zero
fraud risk factors.
--Insert Table 19; Figure 11—
The effects of ERS (H1b) and Prompts on the Accurate Identification of Fraud Risks (H2c
and H2d)
I test hypotheses H1b, H2c and H2d within the Grads sample to assess the effects of emotion
regulation strategy and prompts on the ability to accurately recall details about fraud risk factors
(i.e. Accuracy), I run a 3 x 227 between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for
participants’ frequency practicing mindfulness or emotion regulation, and the likelihood that the
participant’s current firm encourages mindfulness 28 . Using an alpha level of 0.05 to evaluate
homogeneity assumptions, Levene's homogeneity of variance test is not statistically significant for
both dependent variables (p>0.01). Results indicate that the main effects for emotion regulation
strategy (H1b) and prompting participants to be mindful of discrepancies within financial

27

Participant’s evaluation of the likelihood that the firm was engaging in financial misreporting was initially
included in the model, but the model violated the assumption of sphericity, and was modified accordingly.
28
A separate model also controlled for gender, education level, position, and years of experience. Results
did not statistically significantly differ.
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information (H2c) on the accurate identification of fraud risk factors were not statistically
significant. Results further show that the interaction between emotion regulation strategy and
prompts (H2d) is also not statistically significant.
--Insert Table 20; Figure 12—
However, this model likely suffers from low power as a visual inspection of a plot of fraud
risks identified by emotion regulation condition shows that graduate students in the suppress
condition exhibit variability in the number of fraud risk factors they identify. However, the shape
of the distribution for the fraud risk factors graduate student participants identify in the control and
reframe conditions is curvilinear. This finding has potential implications for audit firms
implementing mindfulness programs as there may be a point at which the emotion regulation
strategy is less salient than the effects of emotion suppression when auditors are also prompted.
Further, participants assigned to the suppress/prompt=N condition were less likely to identify 1, 3,
or 4 fraud risk factors, as compared to Grads in the reframe condition. Also, Grads in the
suppress/prompt=N condition identify 3 or 4 fraud risk factors in alignment with theoretical
expectations for emotion regulation strategy. That is, those in the suppress condition are least likely
to identify 3 or 4 fraud risk factors, and those in the reframe condition are most likely to identify a
higher number of fraud risk factors. Similarly, Grads who are prompted are more likely to identify
1, 2, 3, or 4 fraud risk factors and less likely to identify 0 fraud risk factors than those who are not
prompted. However, Grads in the reframe condition who are prompted are less accurate in their
identification of fraud risk factors than those in the control or suppress conditions, contradicting the
impact of cognitive load theory on emotion regulation. Although these findings are not statistically
significant, the data trends are interesting as they support the impact of emotion suppression on
cognitive load by showing that when participants engage in emotion suppression, the number of
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fraud risk factors they identify is lower than other emotion regulation strategies, but that the
difference is mitigated when participants are prompted to focus on indicia of fraud risk.
Moderating Effect of Prompts (H3)
To evaluate whether prompts moderate the relationship between ERS and the ability to
accurately identify fraud risk factors, I examine the interaction between ERS and Prompt. The
interaction effect of ERS x prompt does not have a statistically significant effect on the accurate
identification of fraud risk factors. Therefore, prompts do not moderate or mediate (refuting H3)
the relationship between ERS and the ability to accurately identify fraud risk factors.
Additional Substantive Testing Related to Prompts (H4)
A chi-square test for association is conducted between additional tests selected to address
fraud risk factors identified and the prompts given to auditors. All expected cell frequencies were
greater than five. There is no statistically significant association between additional test selected
and the number of fraud risks identified, χ2(1) 0.823, p > 0.10. Likewise, the type of test selected is
not statistically significantly related to prompts to identify discrepancies within financial
information (i.e. all odds ratios were less than 1). Thus, while Hammersley et al. (2010) find that
auditors identify additional procedures related to prompts, participants in this study did not correlate
such procedures to discrepancies within the financial information in the experimental materials. It
is also possible that study participants did not feel that the discrepancies identified warranted further
testing. As such, participant’s self-report that management is involved in financial misreporting is
evaluated in supplemental analyses. These results indicate that Grad participants do not correlate
the fraud risks they identify with additional substantive tests.

53

Between Sample Analysis
Conducting within-sample analysis produces interesting results related to prompts.
However, the sample sizes are so small with such analysis that power is not achieved, and results
may only be utilized as guidance for future research. To expand on the opportunities for future
research, I conduct a comparative analysis of the descriptive statistics between participant samples
to highlight data trends.
For example, as described previously, participants in this study are either prompted to be
mindful of discrepancies within financial information or not. While prompts are commonly used in
audit practice to hone auditors’ focus to specific matters (Hobson et al. 2017, Brazel et al. 2014;
Hammersley et al. 2010), they also induce cognitive processing and may impair cognitive load
(Roelle et al. 2015; Block et al.2010). This study finds that Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in
the prompt-Yes condition are less accurate in identifying fraud risk factors than those who are not
prompted. Student participants, however, more accurately identify fraud risk factors when prompted
than when not prompted (see Figure 14). Similarly, Figure 15 shows that participants who both told
to suppress their emotions and are prompted to be mindful of discrepancies within financial
information are more likely to vary in the number of fraud risk factors they identify. That is, while
the number of identified fraud risk factors form a curvilinear shape in all the other conditions in this
study (i.e. Suppress/No Prompt, Reframe/Yes Prompt, Reframe/No Prompt, Control/Yes Prompt,
Control/No Prompt), the shape of the distribution of identified fraud factors in the Suppress/Yes
Prompt condition approximates a bimodal distribution. While these results are not statistically
significant, future studies should examine when and how prompts affect audit professionals and
non-professional audit research participants.
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Supplemental Analyses
In addition to the variables of interest, I collect process measures related to participants’
perceptions about the financial information evaluated during the study. For example, participants’
belief that the company may have engaged in financial misreporting may impact the number of
additional substantive tests they select to address the fraud risk factors. Alternatively, the number
of fraud risk factors identified may influence participants’ perception of whether the company is
engaged in financial misreporting or not.
Financial Misreporting. Examining whether participants believed company management of
the firm described in the experimental materials committed financial misreporting likely impacts
the identification of fraud risk factors. That is, if a participant believed the company is engaging in
fraudulent financial reporting, they may be more likely to identify a higher number of fraud risk
factors in the company’s financial information than if they do not believe the company is engaging
in such activities. In this study, participants assigned to the Suppress condition may still feel
negative affect but are told to contain such feelings. These negative feelings may influence
participants’ beliefs in whether the company is engaging in financial misreporting. Conversely,
participants in the Reframe condition are told to replace negative affect with positive affect.
Therefore, they may be less likely to perceive that the company is engaging in misconduct. I
examine whether such differences exist between these conditions and between sample source, based
on the differences in mTurkers and student participants noted previously.
A one-way ANOVA is conducted to examine the effects of sample, ERS, and prompts on
the likelihood management is engaging in financial misreporting (“FRF”). Residual analysis is
performed to test for the assumptions of the ANOVA. Outliers were assessed by inspection of a
boxplot; normality is assessed using Shapiro-Wilk's normality test for each cell of the design and
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homogeneity of variances is assessed by Levene's test. There were no outliers, residuals were
normally distributed (p > .05) and there is homogeneity of variances (p = 0.287).
The main effect of sample on the likelihood that financial misreporting is occurring is
statistically significant, F(2, 129) = 3.069, p= 0.050, partial η2 = 0.052. No other relationships were
statistically significant. All pairwise comparisons were run where reported 95% confidence
intervals and p-values are Bonferroni-adjusted. The unweighted marginal means of financial
misreporting scores for mTurkers, undergraduate students and graduate students were 44.854 (SE
= 3.052), 50.00 (SE = 4.142) and 55.68 (SE = 3.13), respectively. The mean difference between
mTurkers (44.85, 95% CI [38.81, 50.90]) and graduate students (55.68, 95% CI [49.48, 61.88]) of
-10.83 is statistically significantly different, p = 0.05. That is, mTurkers are less likely to believe
that the company is engaging in fraudulent financial reporting than graduate students. However, the
difference is not affected by emotion regulation strategy or whether the participant is prompted.
This finding indicates that, although participants’ ability to identify fraud risk factors does not differ
(H1a), even when they are prompted to consider such factors (H2a), there are differences in how
mTurkers and graduate students interpret the experimental materials. These differences may relate
to the participants’ attentiveness and allocation of their cognitive resources in this study.
--Insert Table 23 and Figures 13-14-CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
My study contributes to audit literature by highlighting potential boundary conditions with
the effectiveness of prompts. This study includes several limitations and provides suggestions for
future research. In addition, the effects of cognitive processing, construct familiarity, or experience
may impact the effectiveness of prompts.
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Sampling
While the present study yielded small sample sizes and misaligned participants, the findings
gave rise to additional research questions. Experimental research suffers from participants’ selfselection bias, therefore, future studies in mindfulness in accounting may seek mixed methods
designs to include survey or firm-sourced secondary data. Suggestions for alternative study designs
and future research are provided in the following section.
Increasing Mundane Realism May Increase the Salience of Mindfulness Practices
This study only includes one participant, but emotion regulation strategies are most often
deployed when individuals interact, and such interactions may have a stronger effect on emotion
regulation in future studies (see Curtis, Dennis, and McNamara 2017; Burgoon et al. 2002).
Interpersonal emotion regulation is dynamic and more likely relevant to accounting (Zaki and
Williams 2013). Emotions elicited in social interactions are qualitatively different from individual
decisions (Grecucci et al. 2013). For example, individual decision-making does not involve social
contexts of fairness, equity, cooperation, and socially driven emotions (Grecucci et al.2013), which
trigger emotional response. The level of emotional response is impacted by others’ responses to an
individual’s emotional reaction and each party’s emotional competence (Goleman 2001). Auditors
are more likely to engage in emotion suppression when facing difficult client interactions than just
when prompted.
Analysis of the effect of prompts on the ability to identify fraud risk factors shows that
participants in the Suppress condition behave differently than those in the Control or Reframe
conditions in this study. Specifically, while the number of fraud risk factors in the prompt= Yes
condition has a curvilinear shape in the Reframe and Control ERS conditions, the distribution varies
in the Suppress condition as shown in figure 16.
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Auditors may suppress their emotions during difficult client meetings to maintain a poker face.
Therefore, future studies may evaluate the effects of emotion suppression or cognitive reappraisal
when dyads of auditors or auditors and auditees interact, and whether these effects differ by the
dyad’s composition (Wong, Tschan, Messerli, and Semmer 2013).
Alternative Mindfulness Practices May Have a Stronger Effect on Fraud Risk Detection
To achieve ecological validity, this study only evaluates specific components of mindfulness.
Mindfulness includes both physiological and emotion self-regulation practices. Physiological
regulation includes moderating breathing and heart rate with a goal of reducing emotion-betraying
psychophysiological reactions (Mauss and Robinson 2010). Shapiro and Schwartz (2000) find that
conscious attention to breathing results in even, deeper breaths and intentional regulation of heart
rate leads to rhythmic regularity, but shallow breathing. Prior literature shows that heart rate is
negatively related to emotion regulation, while heart rate variability is positively related to emotion
regulation (Mason, Scrimm, Zaccoletti, Tornatra, and Goetz 2018; Denson, Grisham, and Moulds
2011). Further, heart rate variability is positively related to multiple-text comprehension (Mason et
al. 2018).
Accounting firms emphasize the use of meditation as a mindfulness practice. Meditation
includes the regulation of breathing and heart rate. The present study does not evaluate the
physiological attributes of mindfulness, which may have a stronger effect on fraud risk detection
than mere primes. Future research should also consider the effects of mindful meditation on fraud
risk detection. Further, auditors’ ERS may be assessed via physiological measurements, such as
skin conduction or functional electroencephalograph images (Troy et al. 2013). Other studies may
also evaluate the effects of ERS on cognitive dissonance markers (Hobson et al. 2017) in auditee
commentary or earnings call transcripts.
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In addition, this study only evaluates the effect of two out of six emotion regulation
strategies on auditors’ ability to recall details about fraud risk factors at one point in time. Additional
studies may examine the effects of other ERS on audit processes or may measure ERS in different
ways. Other emotion regulation strategies, such as emotion exaggeration/amplification, may be
more beneficial than suppression (Koole 2009) or may decrease working memory (Schmeichel
2007) to the same degree as emotion suppression. Future studies may evaluate the effects of emotion
exaggeration or other emotion regulation strategies on audit quality-threats. Likewise, emotional
modification strategies, such as surface acting, may have differing effects on auditors’ ability to
identify fraud risk factors. Extensions of this study may include mindfulness or emotion regulation
practices over a longer period with student populations to both increase the salience of the
constructs and capitalize on subjects’ knowledge of the audit process.
Mindfulness is both a state-level and trait-level attribute. Prior research shows that increases
to trait-level mindfulness increases state-level mindfulness (Chang and Stone 2019: Kiken et al.
2015); however, I only manipulate mindfulness at a single point in time. This singularity also
negates the implications of the temporal nature of emotion regulation (Gross 2013), which explains
that emotion regulation is a process during which each goal-activated strategy is deployed. For
example, emotion suppression occurs while an individual cognitively processes an event; however,
cognitive reappraisal occurs before an event occurs. Future studies may also examine the temporal
or longitudinal effects of mindfulness on fraud risk detection.
When and Why Does the Effect of Prompts Differ?
Prompts may produce unintended consequences with certain participant pools or when
participants experience high cognitive load when evaluating fraud risk factors. This study finds
that prompts to identify discrepancies within financial information yield differing effects of
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participants’ ability to accurately recall fraud risk factors. However, the data does not lend itself to
further inquiry as to why such difference exists because the difference is noted between samples.
For example, mTurkers’ attention or cognitive processing may be less than other groups in this
study. Alternatively, graduate students may have experienced excessive cognitive load because of
their lack of familiarity with mindfulness, or they may have allocated their cognitive resources to
the experimental task instead of using some of it for the emotion regulation strategy to which they
were assigned. Future research may examine whether and how participant characteristics affect the
usefulness of prompts, or whether boundary conditions limit the cognitive processing induced by
prompts. Prompts likely induce greater cognitive processing when they are fully understood, and
individuals can elaborate information subsequently received. As such, future studies may examine
whether bias, affect, or self-regulation (as discussed in this study) impact the effectiveness of
prompts.
Does Construct or Audit Process Familiarity Have a Greater Effect on Sample Selection?
The present study finds variance in the effectiveness of prompts between samples of proxies
for auditors (i.e. mTurkers and graduate students) 29. mTurkers in this study are more familiar with
the constructs of interest (i.e. mindfulness and emotion regulation) and are more likely to engage
with them. As such, I find that mTurkers’ cognitive processing times align with emotion regulation
theory (e.g. greater processing times for emotion suppression than reappraisal). However, graduate
students’ cognitive processing does not follow suit. It is possible that the metacognitive processing
exhibited during the experimental task increases cognitive load to the point that the cognitive effects

29

mTurker and graduate student participants in this study are demographically similar, with the exception
of number of years’ tenure in their current profession. However, their results in this study are often
statistically significantly different, thus comparing and contrasting these groups offers additional research
opportunities.
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of emotion regulation is reduced for graduate students. That is, graduate students are so focused on
the task that the emotion regulation strategy to which they are assigned is not utilized during the
study.
These differences yield additional methodological research questions regarding the impact
of construct familiarity on selecting the appropriate sample for audit research. In light of Leiby et
al.’s (2021) forthcoming publication related to the use of proxies for audit judgment and decisionmaking research, future studies should examine whether merely soliciting participants from the
various online sources is appropriate, given both the research question and study design. For
instance, audit practitioners use prompts from early in their tenure, often before they graduate with
an undergraduate degree. However, the prompts may not be as effective for new employees, who
are more like the general population than those with experience. While Leiby et al. (2021)
emphasize the importance of considering the research question with sample selection and the use
of non-professional participants to achieve power, their study is silent regarding experimental
design. Future research may examine the balance needed between experimental task and research
question in sample selection in an audit setting.
Antecedents to Mindful Emotion Regulation May Influence Results
While this study manipulates mindful emotion regulation and measures its effect on fraud
detection, antecedents to mindful self-regulation may modify the relationship. Therefore, future
studies may consider examining the effect participant characteristics have on mindful selfregulation, such as gender or affect. For example, Nolen-Hoeksema (2012) finds that women are
more likely to ruminate on their emotions and dissect them while men use external coping
mechanisms, such as alcohol, to regulate their emotions. This finding supports Zlomke and Hahn’s
(2008) prior finding that women not only ruminate on their issues more frequently than men but
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are also more likely to consider multiple perspectives and are less likely to blame others for their
problems. McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, and Gross (2008) explain that these differences are
likely because men engage in lower levels of cognitive processing than women when regulating
emotion, and women are more likely to use positive affect when engaging in cognitive reappraisal.
In this study, there is a higher number of men than women across conditions and samples.
Therefore, the results may be affected by gender bias. Future studies should examine whether
gender affects emotion regulation strategy in an audit context.
In addition to gender, trait-level affect may influence one’s ability to regulate emotions
and/or the emotion regulation strategy employed. For example, emotion suppression is positively
correlated with negative affect, while cognitive reappraisal is positively correlated with positive
affect. While my study randomly assigns participants, who experience positive and negative affect
into each condition, future studies may evaluate the effects of positive or negative affect on ERS
selection.
Extension to Other Subjects Within Fraud Detection Population
The present study evaluates the effect of auditors’ emotional regulation strategy on fraud
detection. However, auditors are only one group of individuals involved in the detection of fraud.
For example, in addition to literature on auditors’ role in fraud detection, a large and growing body
of literature examines linguistic and numeracy clues in financial reports that may lead informed
investors to detect fraud (Chen, Wu, Chen, Li, and Chen 2017). Informed investors act as an
external governance mechanism for firms (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010) by participating in
corporate earnings calls (Cen, Chen, Dasgupta, Ragunathan 2021; Haag, Hofmann, Paulus,
Schwaiger, and Sellhorn 2020) and evaluating firm financial information. This involvement in the
financial reporting process facilitates a familiarity with financial statement analysis, the
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experimental task in this study. Therefore, future research may examine whether the results in this
study may differ based on who detects fraud (e.g. informed investors, corporate accountants,
internal or external auditors, third parties, etc.).
CONCLUSION
The present study examines the effects of emotion regulation strategy, a mindfulness
practice, and prompts on auditors’ ability to identify fraud risk factors and recall the fraud risk
factors identified. Mindfulness is a fast-growing trend that is promoted by large accounting firms
and corporations as a mechanism for improving focus and decision-making and reducing stress.
Accounting practitioners who practice mindfulness report feeling more confident in client
negotiations and presentations (NF2 2021) and feeling less stressed (F1 2021). Although accounting
firms promote the use of mindfulness, particularly with new employees, and mindfulness has been
shown to improve audit quality (Herda, et al. 2018b), such practices have not been widely adopted.
Where mindfulness has been adopted, firms provide general guidance on the benefits of practicing
mindfulness but fail to explain that different mindfulness practice may yield differing results.
For example, emotion self-regulation may be performed in various ways, including
suppressing emotion or engaging in cognitive reappraisal of the situation. Emotion suppression
adds to cognitive load, taxing the individual’s ability to perform well. Cognitive reappraisal,
however, does not affect cognitive load and improves one’s positive affect. Therefore, this study
examines whether engaging in emotion suppression or cognitive reappraisal affect auditor’s ability
to identify fraud risk factors or accurately recall fraud risk factors in an experimental design.
Results show that while emotion regulation strategy (i.e. emotion suppression or cognitive
reappraisal) does not affect auditors’ ability to identify fraud risk factors or accurately recall fraud
risk factors, the effect of prompts differs between participant. Specifically, participants who are
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more representative of the general population (i.e. mTurkers) and are prompted, less accurately
identify fraud risk factors than those who are not prompted to do so. This effect may be due to the
allocation of cognitive resources used by mTurkers in the study, or the impact of cognitive overload
on graduate student participants due to their lack of familiarity with mindfulness. While this study
does not provide sufficient measures to ascertain why such differences exist, it provides several
suggestions for future research to examine this research question.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 2 Theoretic Model of the Effect of Mindfulness on Fraud Detection
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Figure 3 Frequency of Practicing Mindfulness by Sample
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Figure 4 Level of Education by Sample
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Figure 5 Mean Years of Experience by Sample
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Figure 6 Median Duration to Complete the Study in Minutes by Sample
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Figure 7 Quantity of Fraud Risk Factors Identified by mTurkers, Depending on Whether They are
Prompted to Consider Discrepancies within Financial Information or Not
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Figure 8 Accuracy of Fraud Risk Factors Identified by mTurkers
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Figure 9 Quantity of Fraud Risk Factors Identified by Undergrads, Depending on Whether They are
Prompted to Consider Discrepancies within Financial Information or Not
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Figure 10 Accuracy of Fraud Risk Factors Identified by Undergrads
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Figure 11 Quantity of Fraud Risk Factors Identified by Grads, Depending on Whether They are
Prompted to Consider Discrepancies within Financial Information or Not
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Figure 12 Accuracy of Fraud Risk Factors Identified by Grads

Figure 13 Mean Reporting of the Likelihood that Management is Engaging in Financial Misreporting
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Figure 14 Accurate Identification of Fraud Risk Factors by Prompt x Sample
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Figure 15 Results for All Samples by ERS Condition and Prompt
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5

Figure 16 Comparison of Accurate Identification of Fraud Risk Factors Between mTurkers and Grads
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Figure 17 Estimated Average Accuracy of Fraud Risk Identification by Sample, Depending on Whether
the Participant is Prompted to Identify Discrepancies within Experimental Materials
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Table 1 Summary of Conditions and (Cell Sizes)

Condition
Mindfulness
practice

Yes

No

Emotion suppression

Prompt/suppression (20)

No Prompt/suppression (20)

Control

Prompt /control (23)

No Prompt /control (20)

Cognitive reappraisal

Prompt /reappraisal (25)

No Prompt /reappraisal (24)

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable

N

Mean

Median

SD

Min.

Max.

Accuracy
Financial Misreporting
Duration in Minutes
Participant had Difficulty
Focusing
Stopping to Think
Remembering Details
Likelihood Current Firm Promotes
Mindfulness
Mindfulness Frequency
Emotional Regulation Frequency
Years of Experience

132
130
132

4.81
50.45
76.74

5.00
51.00
21.51

2.05
21.08
390.18

-1
2
2.68

8
100
4107

130
130
130
130

3.97
3.73
5.18
3.98

4.00
4.00
5.00
4.00

1.64
1.95
1.48
1.70

1
1
2
1

7
7
7
7

131
130
132

4.38
4.12
2.60

5.00
4.00
0.83

2.15
1.82
3.77

1
1
0

7
7
15

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables by ERS Condition

Suppress
Variable
Accuracy of Discrepancies Identified
Financial Misreporting
Duration in Minutes
Participant had Difficulty
Focusing
Stopping to Think
Remembering Details
Likelihood Current Firm Promotes
Mindfulness
Mindfulness Frequency
Emotional Regulation Frequency
Years of Experience

N

Control

Mean

N

Reappraisal

Mean

N

Mean

40
40
40

5
50
62.01

43
43
43

5
53
117.29

49
49
49

5
49
53.19

40
40
40
40

4
4
5
4

43
43
43
43

4
4
5
4

49
49
49
49

4
3
5
4

40
40
40

4.78
4
2.85

43
43
43

4.30
4
2.26

49
49
49

4.12
4
2.70
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Table 4 Frequencies of Categorical Variables by ERS Condition

Variable

N

Suppress

Control

Reappraisal

Quantity of Discrepancies Identified
0
9
3*
2*
1
31
9
11
2
43
14
13
3
32
7
13
4
17
7
4*
Additional Tests to Address Deficiencies
Internal Controls
70
23
20
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
76
23
25
Goodwill Impairment
28
8
9
New Product Revenue
69
20
24
*Cell sizes less than 5 preclude chi square test of association to test for proportionality.
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4*
11
16
12
6
27
28
11
25

Table 5 Participant Demographics by ERS Condition

Variable

N

Why Participant Practices Mindfulness
Heightened attention
Self-awareness
Self-regulation
Stress reduction

Suppress

Control

Reappraisal

9
1
33
12

3
0
8
7

3
0
10
2

3
1
15
3

7
64
43
11
5

1
23
11
3
2

2
18
17
4
1

4
23
15
4
2

5
10
47
65

2
3
14
20

2
4
13
22

1
3
20
23

Number of Financial Statements Analyzed Quarterly
50 or more (Including 50)
At least 25 but fewer than 50 (25-49)
At least 10 and fewer than 25 (10-24)
At least 1 but fewer than 10 (1-9)
Fewer than 1 (0)
Position
Partner/principal/owner
Director/ sr. director
Manager/sr. manager/supervisor
Staff/associate/employee
Education
Doctorate or post-graduate degree
Masters or graduate degree
Bachelors or undergraduate degree
Associates or professional certificate
High school graduate
Gender
Female
Male

3
19
71
8
29

0
10
15
1
14

1
6
24
2
9

2
3
32
5
6

36
93

15
25

9
33

12
35

Number of Employees at Participant’s Workplace
10,000 or more
5,001-9,999
2,501-5,000
500-2,500
101-499
Fewer than 100

9
5
1
10
9
18

4
2
0
2
2
6

3
0
0
1
5
4

2
3
1
6
3
8

80

Table 6 Pearson (Lower)/ Spearman (Upper) Correlations Table
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

--

0.144

0.021

0.089

-0.015

.226**

-.398**

-.381**

-.307**

.294**

.184*

.341**

.257**

0.000

0.018

0.008

.203*

-.768**

.426**

2. Quantity

0.144

--

.575**

0.002

0.085

0.023

0.018

0.121

-0.015

.353**

-0.156

-0.020

-0.147

-0.228

-0.021

-0.020

0.152

0.015

.280**

3. Accuracy

-0.007

.568**

--

-0.006

0.060

-0.060

0.073

-0.001

-0.047

0.141

-.198*

-0.132

-0.151

-.505**

.174*

0.080

0.129

0.065

.242**

0.077

-0.003

.007

--

0.028

0.081

-0.066

-0.112

-0.004

-0.021

0.020

0.139

0.052

0.011

0.040

-0.025

0.064

-0.084

-0.070

-0.011

0.085

0.044

0.028

--

-0.032

-0.056

0.018

0.036

0.000

0.080

-0.014

-0.064

-0.105

-0.165

-0.046

-.221*

-0.113

-0.043

.217*

0.025

-0.059

0.065

-0.022

--

-0.004

-0.092

0.031

.227**

0.029

0.088

0.085

-0.353

-0.075

0.081

-0.081

-.218*

0.058

7. Mindful

-.405**

0.033

0.108

-0.085

-0.042

-0.027

--

.656**

.179*

-0.099

-0.151

-0.108

-.234**

-0.245

-0.056

-0.061

-0.019

.267**

-.212*

8. EmoReg

-.359**

0.114

-0.021

-0.119

0.003

-0.089

.664**

--

.265**

0.001

-0.164

-0.149

-0.172

-0.036

-0.002

-0.114

-0.110

.390**

-0.113

9. CurrFirm

-.313**

-0.027

-0.059

0.000

0.041

0.043

.220*

.269**

--

-0.002

-0.141

-.235**

-.178*

0.144

0.016

-0.020

-0.028

.284**

-0.093

10. #AddlTests

.261**

.337**

0.116

-0.017

-0.021

.201*

-0.109

-0.005

0.009

--

-0.025

0.050

0.006

-0.122

0.047

-0.023

-0.012

-0.108

.313**

11. Focus

.173*

-0.148

-.191*

0.030

0.076

0.077

-.184*

-0.162

-0.148

-0.020

--

.541**

.458**

-0.304

0.055

0.077

-0.104

-0.138

-0.012

12. StopThink

.328**

-0.045

-0.164

0.142

-0.018

0.098

-0.140

-0.154

-.252**

0.040

.551**

--

.318**

-0.325

0.079

-0.171

-0.030

-.328**

-0.070

13. Remember

.282**

-0.152

-0.136

0.063

-0.064

0.083

-.256**

-.189*

-.189*

-0.018

.435**

.299**

--

-0.239

0.030

-0.060

-.176*

-.266**

0.026

.c

-0.199

-.481*

0.000

-0.105

-0.380

-0.052

0.045

0.135

-0.174

-0.301

-0.292

-0.233

--

-0.217

-.412*

0.194

-0.207

0.020

15. Education

-0.106

-0.036

0.142

0.071

-0.165

-0.065

-0.078

-0.017

0.022

0.067

0.057

0.076

0.028

-0.204

--

.317**

-0.114

0.089

-0.018

16. Position

-0.072

0.025

0.082

-0.020

-0.012

0.057

-0.106

-.177*

-0.012

0.003

0.071

-0.158

-0.048

-.394*

.287**

--

0.042

.264**

0.170

17. FSAnalyzed

.221*

0.168

.201*

0.013

-0.163

-0.107

-0.045

-0.055

-0.071

0.050

-0.098

-0.063

-0.107

0.028

-0.129

0.000

--

-0.017

.182*

18. Yrs_Exp

0.049

-0.063

-0.160

-0.084

.227**

.230**

.189*

0.028

-0.056

-.235**

-.223*

-0.071

.200*

.241**

-0.104

0.049

-0.063

--

-.182*

19. Duration

-0.073

0.057

0.061

-0.084

-0.016

0.038

0.097

0.035

0.030

0.015

0.023

0.011

-0.160

-0.054

0.032

-0.073

0.057

1. Sample

4. ERS
5. Prompt
6. FinMisrept

14. #EEs

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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-0.076

--

Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables by Sample

mTurk
Variable
Accuracy of Discrepancies Identified
Financial Misreporting
Duration in Minutes
Participant had Difficulty
Focusing
Stopping to Think
Remembering Details
Likelihood Current Firm Promotes
Mindfulness
Mindfulness Frequency
Emotional Regulation Frequency
Years of Experience

N

Undergrads

Mean

N

Grads

Mean

N

Mean

54
52
54

4.85
45.23
17.11

30
30
30

4.63
50.97
165.01

48
48
48

4.88
55.79
88.67

52
52
52
52

3.67
3.00
4.69
4.58

30
30
30
30

3.80
3.80
5.33
3.97

48
48
48
48

4.40
4.48
5.63
3.33

54
52
52

5.26
4.83
5.56

29
30
30

5.00
4.30
0.76

48
48
48

3.02
3.23
0.43

Table 8 Frequencies of Categorical Variables by Sample

Variable

N

mTurk

Undergrads

Quantity of Discrepancies Identified
0
9
4*
4*
1
31
19
9
2
43
15
14
3
32
9
13
4
17
7
8
Additional Tests to Address Deficiencies
Internal Controls
60
20
20
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
76
33
15
Goodwill Impairment
28
12
6
New Product Revenue
69
20
18
*Cell sizes less than 5 preclude chi square test of association to test for proportionality.
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Grads
1*
3*
14
10
2*
30
28
10
31

Table 9 Participant Demographics by Sample

Variable

N

Why Participant Practices Mindfulness
Heightened attention
Self-awareness
Self-regulation
Stress reduction

mTurk

Undergrads

Grads

9
33
12
66

6
18
4
26

1
5
5
17

2
10
3
23

5
11
43
64
7

0
2
16
28
6

3
2
13
11
1

2
7
14
25
0

5
10
47
65

3
5
22
22

0
0
4
24

2
5
21
19

High school graduate
Associates or professional certificate
Bachelors or undergraduate degree
Masters or graduate degree
Doctorate or post-graduate degree

29
8
71
19
3

4
4
34
10
0

19
3
8
0
0

6
1
29
9
3

Female
Male

36
93

14
37

11
19

11
37

9
5
1
10
9
18

9
5
1
8
9
9

0
0
0
1
0
5

0
0
0
0
0
4

Number of Financial Statements Analyzed Quarterly
50 or more (Including 50)
At least 25 but fewer than 50 (25-49)
At least 10 and fewer than 25 (10-24)
At least 1 but fewer than 10 (1-9)
Fewer than 1 (0)
Position
Partner/principal/owner
Director/ sr. director
Manager/sr. manager/supervisor
Staff/associate/employee
Education

Gender

Number of Employees at Participant’s Workplace
10,000 or more
5,001-9,999
2,501-5,000
500-2,500
101-499
Fewer than 100
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Table 10 Multiple Analysis of Covariance Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy
and the Frequency of Practicing Mindfulness or Emotion Regulation, or the Likelihood that the Current
Employer Encourages Mindfulness by Sample (i.e. mTurk, Grads, Undergrads)

Sum of
Variable
Squares
Frequency Practicing Mindfulness

df

Mean
Square
Error

F (111)

Sig.

Sample

86.461

2

43.231

11.160

0.000***

Position

10.974

4

2.744

0.708

0.588

# FS Analyzed

5.857

4

1.464

0.378

0.824

Education

8.597

4

2.149

0.555

0.696

Gender

1.118

1

1.118

0.289

0.592

Years’ Experience

8.154

1

8.157

0.000

0.996

Frequency Practicing Emotion Regulation
Sample

34.807

2

17.404

6.612

0.002***

Position

25.087

4

6.272

2.383

0.056*

# FS Analyzed

1.309

4

0.327

0.124

0.973

Education

19831

4

4.958

1.884

0.118

Gender

0.403

1

0.403

0.153

0.696

Years’ Experience

0.004

1

0.004

0.002

0.968

Likelihood Current Firm Promotes Mindfulness
Sample

18.894

2

9.447

3.456

0.035**

Position

13.555

4

3.389

1.240

0.298

# FS Analyzed

6.548

4

1.637

0.599

0.664

Education

1.441

4

0.360

0.132

0.970

Gender

0.005

1

0.005

0.002

0.966

Years’ Experience

0.000

1

0.000

0.000

0.993

***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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Table 11 Analysis of Covariance Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the
Frequency of Practicing Mindfulness or Emotion Regulation, or the Likelihood that the Current Employer
Encourages Mindfulness by Sample (i.e. mTurk, Grads, Undergrads)

df

Mean
Square
Error

F (86)

Sig.

0.863

2

0.431

0.107

0.899

ERS

2.388

2

1.194

0.295

0.745

Prompt

4.841

1

4.841

1.196

0.277

Sample * ERS

1.308

4

0.327

0.061

0.988

Sample * Prompt

21.209

2

10.605

2.620

0.079*

Sample * ERS * Prompt

24.434

6

4.072

1.006

0.427

Current Firm

24.215

6

4.036

0.997

0.433

EmoRegFreq

38.909

6

6.485

1.602

0.156

2.374

1

2.374

0.586

0.446

18.929

1

18.929

4.686

0.033**

0.221

1

0.221

0.055

0.816

33.951

1

33.951

8.387

0.005**

1.511

1

1.511

0.373

0.543

Sum of
Squares

Sample

Variable
Accuracy

Gender
Education
Position
# FS Analyzed
Years’ Experience
***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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Table 12 Descriptive Statistics for Duration in Minutes by ERS, Removing Outliers

Prompt = Yes
ERS
Suppress

Control

Reframe

Prompt = No

Sample

N

Mean

Median

N

Mean

Median

mTurk
Undergrads
Grads
mTurk
Undergrads
Grads
mTurk
Undergrads
Grads

6
5
6
5
6
9
13
3
8

17.43
22.33
37.87
12.88
21.05
34.41
20.32
19.02
24.41

18.71
22.27
40.98
7.50
20.14
28.65
13.00
17.90
22.33

7
6
5
7
3
9
10
4
9

22.34
34.30
50.11
18.34
16.13
27.49
18.44
17.00
37.06

22.60
25.81
25.65
17.87
15.75
28.23
16.24
15.92
21.68

Table 13 Descriptive Statistics for Duration in Minutes by Sample, Removing Outliers

Prompt = Yes

Prompt = No

Sample

ERS

N

Mean

Median

N

mTurk

Suppress
Control
Reframe
Suppress
Control
Reframe
Suppress
Control
Reframe

6
5
13
5
6
3
6
9
8

17.43
12.88
20.32
22.33
21.05
19.02
37.87
34.41
24.41

18.71
7.50
13.00
22.27
20.14
17.90
40.98
28.65
22.33

7
7
10
6
3
4
5
9
9

Undergrads

Grads
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Mean Median
22.34
18.34
18.44
34.30
16.13
17.00
50.11
27.49
37.06

22.60
17.87
16.24
25.81
15.75
15.92
25.65
28.23
21.68

Table 14 Analysis of Variance of the Relationship Between Sample and Duration to Complete the Experiment in Minutes

DV = Duration in Minutes
Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square
Error

Sample

96475.64

2

48237.82

0.299

0.743

ERS

30447.56

2

15223.78

0.094

0.910

6600.13

1

6600.3

0.041

0.840

927169.18

69

231792.30

1.436

0.232

23976.98

4

11988.49

0.074

0.929

Sample * ERS * Prompt

556600.68

6

92766.78

0.575

0.749

Mindful_Freq

721573.96

7

103082.00

0.638

0.723

Current Firm

879161.33

6

146526.89

0.907

0.495

EmoReg_Freq

1439776.99

6

239962.83

1.486

0.196

790430.34

6

131738.39

0.816

0.561

2101671.78

6

350278.63

2.169

0.056*

Remember

484671.27

5

96934.26

0.600

0.700

Gender

231284.89

1

231284.89

1.432

0.235

Education

196297.03

1

196297.03

1.216

0.274

9.304

1

9.304

0.000

0.994

8131.537

1

8131.537

0.050

0.823

8143.83

1

82143.83

0.509

0.478

Prompt
Sample * ERS
Sample * Prompt

Focus
Stop and Think

Position
Years’ Experience
# FS Analyzed
***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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F (69)

Sig.

Table 15 Ordinal Regression Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the Ability
to Identify Fraud Risk Factors (DV= Quantity), Tests of Hypotheses 1a and 2a – 2b for mTurkers +

Estimate

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Threshold
Frequency=0

-0.921

0.823

1.251

1

0.263

Frequency=1

1.802

0.898

4.023

1

0.045**

Frequency=2

3.210

0.945

11.540

1

0.001***

Frequency=3

4.324

0.999

18.742

1

0.000***

Location
ERS=Suppress (1)

1.430

1.083

1.744

1

0.187

ERS=Control (2)

2.454

1.018

5.804

1

0.018**

Prompt=Yes (8)

-2.952

1.115

7.044

1

0.008***

ERS=1 * Prompt=8

1.054

1.405

0.563

1

0.453

ERS=2* Prompt=8

3.650

1.372

7.083

1

0.008***

***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
+

Reference categories are excluded from the table
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Table 16 Analysis of Variance Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the
Ability to Accurately Recall Fraud Risk Factors (DV= Accuracy) Tests of Hypotheses 1b and 2c- 2d for
mTurkers

df

Mean
Square
Error

F (69)

Sig.

0.254

2

0.127

0.046

0.955

Prompt

0.237

1

0.237

0.089

0.777

ERS * Prompt

0.314

2

0.157

0.057

0.945

Mindful_Freq

6.052

5

1.210

0.443

0.807

Current Firm

11.332

5

2.266

0.829

0.567

EmoReg_Freq

13.206

6

2.201

0.805

0.596

Focus

15.857

6

2.643

0.966

0.508

Stop and Think

21.563

6

3.594

1.314

0.361

Remember

6.717

5

1.343

0.491

0.774

Gender

2.561

1

2.561

0.936

0.365

11.138

1

11.138

4.073

0.083*

Position

0.202

1

0.202

0.074

0.794

Years’ Experience

0.008

1

0.008

0.003

0.958

# FS Analyzed

1.806

1

1.806

0.660

0.443

Sum of
Squares

ERS

Variable

Education

***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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Table 17 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the Ability to Identify Fraud Risk Factors
(DV= Quantity), Tests of Hypotheses 1a and 2a – 2b for Undergrads +
1

2

(n = 3)

3

(n = 13)

ExpB

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

ExpB

SE

Wald

Suppress

1.583

12674.48

0.000

1

0.984

1.042

10728.81

0.000

Control

1.061

15003.64

0.000

1

0.984

1.663

11876.58

0.000

Yes

-1.862

17380.25

0.000

1

0.995

-7.291

16664.62

No

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

4

(n = 10)
df

(n = 2)

Sig.

ExpB

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

ExpB

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

1

0.999

9.836

10728.81

0.000

1

0.998

1.042

10362.32

0.000

1

0.998

1

0.998

3.215

11876.58

0.000

1

0.998

1.056

14552.89

0.000

1

0.998

0.000

1

0.999

-1.682

16664.62

0.000

1

0.999

1.001

20693.67

0.000

1

0.992

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

24366.34

0.000

1

1.000

--

--

--

0.000

1

0.999

ERS

Prompt

Interaction
Suppress * Prompt

1.453

23529.6

0.000

1

0.989

-6.086

22036.53

0.000

1

0.999

-5.209

22036.53

0.000

1

0.999

-1.308

Suppress * No Prompt

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Control * Prompt

4.214

26294.36

0.000

1

0.997

-1.249

23432.66

0.000

1

0.999

2.858

23432.66

0.000

0.999

1.104

Control * No Prompt

--

--

--

--

2458.01

0.002

1

1779.23

0.005

3268.94

0.003

--

--

--

0.964

7.616

1375.97

1

0.942

2.951

1

0.960

1.017

--

--

-28060.0
1
--

0.994

2.200

2593.16

1

--

3.856

2892.790

1

0.983

3.412

2548.29

1

--

--

--

--

--

--

0.000

1

0.995

6.863

1375.97

0.000

1

0.472

7252.520

1

0.000***

4.853

0.000

0.000

2350.86

0.000

1

0.983

6.924

2350.86

0.000

--

--

--

--

Control Variables
4.833

Mindful_Freq

1.629

EmoReg_Freq
CurrFirm

-2.201

***Significant

at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
+

Reference categories are excluded from the table
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0.00
1
0.00
0
0.00
2

1

0.980

1

0.996

1

0.962

Table 18 Analysis of Variance Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the
Ability to Accurately Recall Fraud Risk Factors (DV= Accuracy) Tests of Hypotheses 1b and 2c- 2d for
Undergrads++

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square
Error

ERS

3.920

2

1.960

0.404

0.672

Prompt

7.064

1

7.064

1.455

0.239

ERS * Prompt

0.046

2

0.023

0.005

0.995

Variable

***Significant

F (69)

Sig.

at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
++ Controls are removed from this model as the model with controls was overfit and resulted in zero residuals. As such,
to free degrees of freedom, variables were pruned, and the model run with simple effects.
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Table 19 Ordinal Regression Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the Ability
to Identify Fraud Risk Factors (DV= Frequency), Tests of Hypotheses 1a and 2a – 2b for Grads+

Estimate

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Threshold
Frequency=0

-3.252

0.816

15.891

1

0.000***

Frequency=1

-1.651

0.667

6.137

1

0.013**

Frequency=2

-0.248

0.616

0.162

1

0.687

Frequency=3

1.208

0.652

3.433

1

0.064*

Location
ERS=Suppress (1)

0.489

0.913

0.286

1

0.593

ERS=Control (2)

-0.219

0.873

0.063

1

0.802

Prompt=Yes (8)

1.233

0.863

2.041

1

0.153

ERS=1 * Prompt=8

1.640

1.377

1.418

1

0.234

ERS=2* Prompt=8

0.720

1.204

0.358

1

0.550

***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
+ Reference categories are excluded from the table
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Table 20 Analysis of Variance Results for the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation Strategy and the
Ability to Accurately Recall Fraud Risk Factors (DV= Accuracy) Tests of Hypotheses 1b and 2c- 2d for
Grads+

df

Mean
Square
Error

F (69)

Sig.

0.562

2

0.281

0.279

0.782

Prompt

1.089

1

1.089

1.080

0.408

ERS * Prompt

7.930

2

3.965

3.930

0.203

Mindful_Freq

35.004

7

5.001

4.957

0.178

Current Firm

30.948

6

5.158

5.113

0.173

EmoReg_Freq

37.411

6

6.235

6.181

0.146

Focus

14.472

6

2.412

2.391

0.324

Stop and Think

13.602

6

2.267

2.247

0.340

Remember

35.528

4

8.882

8.804

0.105

Gender

2.435

1

2.435

2.414

0.260

Education

0.811

1

0.811

0.804

0.465

Position

0.104

1

0.104

0.104

0.778

Years’ Experience

6.790

1

6.790

6.730

0.122

# FS Analyzed

3.322

1

3.322

3.293

0.211

Sum of
Squares

ERS

Variable

***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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Table 21 Analysis of Variance of the Relationship Between Sample and the Likelihood that Management is
Engaging in Financial Misreporting

DV = Financial Misreporting (FRF)
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square
Error

ERS

773.80

2

385.90

0.867

0.423

Prompt

354.35

1

354.35

0.794

0.375

Sample

2738.05

2

1369.02

3.069

0.050*

ERS * Prompt

149.80

2

74.90

0.168

0.846

ERS * Sample

1240.99

4

310.25

0.696

0.597

Prompt * Sample

1566.59

2

783.30

1.756

0.177

ERS * Prompt * Sample

2013.33

4

503.33

1.129

0.347

Variable

***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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F (131)

Sig.

APPENDIX A: FRAUD FIRM SOURCE MATERIALS
SEC Charges Quantum with Internal
Accounting Controls Failures
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-19626
December 20, 2019
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Silicon Valley-based data storage company
Quantum Corporation with internal accounting controls violations that resulted in repeated revenue
recognition errors from 2015 to 2017. Quantum has agreed to pay a $1 million penalty to settle the
charges.
According to the SEC's order, Quantum recognized revenue from dozens of transactions with third
parties, known as channel partners, without meeting the necessary revenue recognition criteria under
GAAP. Quantum's business involves selling its hardware to channel partners, who then resell the
products to end users or other channel partners. The SEC's order finds that in 2015, Quantum decided
to rely more heavily on sales practices that allowed channel partners to build up stock of Quantum
products. However, unbeknownst to management, Quantum's sales personnel began regularly adding
terms to channel partner deals that undermined the company's ability to recognize revenue under
GAAP. Accounting personnel responsible for revenue recognition determinations were either unaware
of these extra terms or lacked sufficient expertise to analyze them under GAAP. According to the order,
Quantum's revenue recognition errors continued unchecked for almost three years.
The SEC's order finds that these errors resulted from internal accounting control failures. Specifically,
Quantum did not devise or maintain sufficient controls to provide reasonable assurance that its
accounting personnel had sufficient expertise and knowledge regarding channel partner transactions to
make revenue recognition determinations. Further, the order finds that sales personnel did not
communicate material deal terms to accounting personnel. In the absence of sufficient controls,
Quantum overstated or understated up to approximately 7% of its total quarterly revenue in incorrect
periods and had to restate its previously issued financial statements.
The SEC's order finds that Quantum violated the reporting, books and records, and internal accounting
controls provisions of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder. Without admitting or denying the allegations, the
company agreed to pay a penalty of $1 million and to cease and desist from future violations of these
provisions.
The SEC's investigation was conducted by Walker Newell and Ellen Chen. The case was supervised
by Jennifer J. Lee, Monique Winkler, and Erin E. Schneider.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 87812 / December 20, 2019

ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT
Release No. 4110 / December 20, 2019
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
In the Matter of
QUANTUM CORPORATION,
Respondent.

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND- DESIST
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 21C
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASEAND-DESIST ORDER

File No. 3-19626
I. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that ceaseand-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) against Quantum Corporation (“Quantum” or “Respondent”).
II. In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (“Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose
of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which
the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the
Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted,
Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to
Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III. On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:
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Summary
Quantum is a public data storage company that manufactures and sells hardware to channel partners
such as distributors and resellers, as well as to end-user customers. Between the fourth quarter of its 2015
fiscal year (which ended March 31, 2015) and the second quarter of its 2018 fiscal year (which ended
September 30, 2017) (“the restatement period”), Quantum recognized revenue from dozens of transactions
with channel partners without meeting the necessary revenue recognition criteria under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). These errors caused Quantum to materially overstate its revenue for
certain reporting periods and to understate its revenue in other periods.
Quantum’s revenue recognition errors resulted from internal accounting control failures, including
insufficient controls to provide reasonable assurance that the relevant accounting personnel had sufficient
expertise and knowledge regarding channel partner transactions to make appropriate revenue recognition
determinations. In this environment, Quantum’s revenue recognition errors continued unchecked for
almost three years.
In 2019, Quantum disclosed material misstatements in its consolidated financial statements for
three annual periods and five quarterly periods and announced a restatement, as well as material
weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting.
Respondent
Quantum is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive offices in San Jose, California.
Quantum’s common stock is registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange
Act. Until January 2019, Quantum’s common stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)
under the ticker symbol QTM. Currently, Quantum’s common stock trades on the OTC Pink exchange
under the ticker symbol QMCO.
Facts
Quantum’s Business and Historical Revenue Recognition Policy
At all relevant times, Quantum’s business focused on manufacturing and selling data storage
devices and systems, including physical hardware such as disk drives. Quantum works with a network of
numerous channel partners, including distributors and value-added resellers. Channel partners purchase
hardware from Quantum and then resell the products to end users or other channel partners.
Quantum disclosed in its Forms 10-K for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017 that it prepared its
financial statements in accordance with GAAP. Under Accounting Standards Codification (“ASC”) 605,
Revenue Recognition, revenue should be recognized only when it is both earned and realized or realizable.
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Consistent with GAAP, in its Forms 10-K, Quantum’s critical accounting policies explained that the
company considered revenue to be earned and realized or realizable when: (1) persuasive evidence of an
arrangement exists; (2) delivery has occurred or services have been rendered; (3) the seller’s price to the
buyer is fixed or determinable; and (4) collectability is reasonably assured. As disclosed in its Forms 10K, Quantum told investors that it generally recognized revenue upon shipment (i.e., on a “sell-in” basis)
for hardware products sold to channel partners. Quantum’s Forms 10-K also disclosed that when
significant post-delivery obligations existed, the related revenue was deferred until such obligations were
fulfilled.
For Almost Three Years, Quantum Repeatedly Recognized Revenue in Incorrect Periods
During the restatement period, Quantum did not design or maintain sufficient internal accounting
controls to provide reasonable assurance that the company complied with the revenue recognition criteria
under GAAP. In the absence of sufficient controls, Quantum overstated or understated up to approximately
7% of its total quarterly revenue in incorrect periods as a result of (1) certain sales practices of granting
favorable deal terms to channel partners that were not properly accounted for at the time of revenue
recognition; and (2) bill and hold arrangements. As a result, Quantum materially misstated its financial
statements from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2018 and
failed to make and keep accurate books and records.
Quantum’s Sales Practices to Encourage Channel Partners to Buy More Inventory
Quantum’s revenue recognition issues began in early 2015. By that time, Quantum had
experienced waning market demand for certain products, causing its total revenues to shrink from about
$1.01 billion in fiscal year 2007 to about $553 million in fiscal year 2014. In 2014, an activist investor
approached Quantum regarding its performance and entered into a standstill agreement with the company.
Among other things, the standstill agreement set forth business objectives (including revenue targets) that
Quantum needed to hit in its 2015 fiscal year. If Quantum missed the targets, the activist investor would
gain two additional seats on Quantum’s board of directors.
In response, Quantum made a business decision to rely more heavily on two pre- existing sales
practices to help the company achieve the revenue targets in the standstill agreement. First, Quantum
increasingly encouraged channel partners to place “stocking orders.” The general purpose of “stocking
orders” was to enable channel partners to build up inventory of new Quantum products that they would
resell in later periods to satisfy expected future end user demand. Second, Quantum encouraged channel
partners to “pre-buy” products for specific, already-identified deals that were expected to close in later
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periods but had not yet been ordered by end users. Quantum’s management did not, however, sufficiently
consider the risks presented by these types of transactions, including whether their increased use may
have warranted additional consideration of whether Quantum’s existing internal accounting controls were
sufficient.
In fact, unbeknownst to management, sales personnel regularly added deal terms to stocking orders
and pre-buys that undermined the company’s revenue recognition under ASC 605. However, Quantum’s
lower-level accounting personnel responsible for making revenue recognition determinations lacked both
appropriate accounting expertise and relevant information from sales personnel regarding channel partner
transactions. In many instances, the existence of additional deal terms was not communicated to the
accounting personnel. In the absence of sufficient internal accounting controls around revenue recognition,
Quantum prematurely recorded revenue for many stocking orders and pre-buys with such deal terms, as
set forth below.
Guaranteed Profit Margins and Extra Return Rights
Quantum prematurely recognized revenue from channel partner transactions where the pricing
was not fixed or determinable. For example, in connection with certain transactions, Quantum agreed to
provide channel partners with guaranteed profit margins. For these deals, Quantum’s ultimate price to
the relevant channel partners was not fixed or determinable because the guaranteed profit margins caused
the ultimate payment from the channel partner to be contingent on the subsequent resale price of the
product to the end user, which at times was lower than anticipated.
Quantum also allowed certain channel partners to return previously purchased inventory beyond
the return rights specified in the original contractual agreements. In its
Forms 10-K for the restatement period, Quantum told investors that it recognized hardware
revenue upon shipment and, for deals involving future product returns, recorded an allowance for estimated
future price adjustments in the period revenue was recognized. However, Quantum could not reasonably
estimate future price adjustments in deals involving extra-contractual return rights, so its ultimate price on
the transactions was not fixed or determinable at the time of shipment.
Post-Delivery Obligations
Quantum also prematurely recognized revenue for certain transactions because it continued to
have significant post-delivery obligations after products had been shipped to channel partners. Because
Quantum had not substantially accomplished all it must do to earn the revenue, Quantum should have
deferred revenue until it had fulfilled its post-delivery obligations.
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Among other post-delivery obligations, in connection with certain transactions, Quantum
arranged for the shipment of channel partners’ orders to third party warehouses, paid for channel partners’
storage costs, relabeled products for the benefit of channel partners, and/or paid for shipping and
insurance to end users. Quantum also had continuing involvement in channel partners’ resale efforts
after deals had ostensibly closed, including arranging for certain partners to purchase stale inventory from
other partners and facilitating pricing for such partner-to-partner deals. For transactions involving such
obligations, revenue should not have been recognized at the time of shipment.
Transactions Did Not Meet Bill and Hold Criteria
15. Separate from certain stocking orders and pre-buys, Quantum also determined that it had
not recognized revenue consistently with GAAP and its own accounting policies for bill and hold
arrangements. In bill and hold arrangements, the buyer is billed for products ready for delivery, but the
seller retains possession until the buyer requests delivery at a later date. Quantum determined that it
should not have recognized revenue at the time of sale because Quantum—not the buyer—requested
the bill and hold arrangements, and certain transactions required specific performance obligations from
Quantum after shipment in order to sell the products to end users.
Quantum’s Deficient Controls
Quantum’s revenue recognition issues stemmed from a failure to design and maintain internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that its financial statements were presented
in accordance with GAAP. Quantum accounting personnel did not have the necessary expertise or
knowledge to reach the appropriate accounting treatment for certain transactions with channel partners.
During the restatement period, Quantum’s tone-at-the-top contributed to its insufficient internal
accounting controls environment. While management encouraged sales personnel to pursue stocking orders
and pre-buys, Quantum did not sufficiently consider the risks presented by these transactions, including
whether these transactions may have required them to design any additional internal accounting controls.
Personnel within Quantum’s sales, accounting, and other departments at times lacked knowledge,
experience, and training regarding channel partner arrangements and relationships and proper application
of revenue recognition. Contributing to this issue, Quantum’s accounting department experienced
significant turnover during the relevant period. Key accounting personnel lacked knowledge of the details
and scope of Quantum’s overall business practices with channel partners, which limited their ability to
appropriately recognize revenue for certain transactions.
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In addition, Quantum’s sales teams did not communicate material terms of arrangements with
channel partners to the relevant accounting personnel. Instead, personnel outside the accounting
department had discretion for escalating deals that may have had revenue recognition implications to the
appropriate accounting personnel. However, sales personnel became accustomed to offering additional
deal terms without adequate policies or procedures requiring that they disclose these terms to the relevant
accounting personnel. Due to a lack of clear reporting structures and responsibilities, accounting
personnel were ultimately left unaware of critical information about certain deals necessary to properly
recognize revenue in accordance with GAAP.
Finally, Quantum failed to adequately prepare, analyze, and review revenue recognition and other
significant account reconciliations. As a result, revenue transactions were recorded prematurely and not
in accordance with GAAP during the relevant period.
Quantum Restated Three Years of Financial Statements
Quantum began an internal investigation into its revenue recognition practices after being
contacted by the staff in the Commission’s Division of Enforcement. On February 8, 2018, Quantum
filed a Form 8-K disclosing that it had postponed its quarterly earnings call to allow its audit committee
to complete an investigation into accounting matters and related internal controls. By the close of
trading that day, Quantum’s stock price had declined by approximately 30 percent. On January 15,
2019, due to Quantum’s failure to meet SEC reporting requirements, its stock was delisted from the
NYSE.
On August 6, 2019, Quantum announced that it had completed its restatement of financial
statements for prior periods. Quantum concluded that there were material misstatements in its
consolidated financial statements reported on Forms 10-K for the fiscal years ending March 31, 2015,
2016 and 2017, as well as in the unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements reported on
Forms 10-Q for the quarters ending June 30, 2016, September 30, 2016, December 31, 2016, June 30,
2017, and September 30, 2017. The restatement revealed that Quantum’s revenue, once adjusted for
the correct reporting periods, would have missed the objectives set forth in the standstill agreement, as
well as the company’s public revenue guidance for fiscal year 2017.
Quantum also disclosed that it had identified material weaknesses in its internal control over
financial reporting, which had contributed to the restatement. Among other things, Quantum identified
material weaknesses related to its tone-at-the top, including a lack of sufficient personnel with
appropriate accounting knowledge, a failure to establish clear reporting structures in the organization,
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and a failure to design effective controls over the period-end financial reporting process. As part of
its remediation efforts, Quantum terminated several sales, accounting, and operations personnel and
enhanced its policies and procedures regarding revenue recognition, stocking orders, pre-buys, and
bill-and-hold transactions.
Violations
As a result of the conduct described above, Quantum violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder, which require every issuer of securities registered
pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act to file with the Commission accurate periodic reports,
including annual Reports on Form 10-K and quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q.
As a result of the conduct described above, Quantum also violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of
the Exchange Act, which requires an issuer to make and keep books, records, and accounts which,
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the issuer’s transactions and disposition of assets.
As a result of the conduct described above, Quantum also violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the
Exchange Act, which requires an issuer to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: transactions are executed in accordance
with management’s general and specific authorization; transactions are recorded as necessary to
permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; access to assets is
permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and the
recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
IV. In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions
agreed to in Respondent Quantum Corporation’s Offer.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent shall cease and desist from
committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder.
Respondent shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money penalty in the
amount of $1,000,000.00 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the general fund
of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not
made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717.
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Payment must be made in one of the following ways:
Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide
detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC
website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money
order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center Accounts Receivable Branch HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying
Quantum Corporation as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these
proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Monique Winkler,
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 Montgomery Street, Suite
2800, San Francisco, CA 94104.
C. Amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall be
treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To
preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondent agrees that in any Related Investor
Action, it shall not argue that it is entitled to, nor shall it benefit by, offset or reduction of any award
of compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondent’s payment of a civil penalty in
this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty
Offset, Respondent agrees that it shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty
Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil
penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this proceeding.
For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private damages action brought
against Respondent by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts
as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this proceeding.
By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, EXPERT PANEL PROCESS
Phase
1. Introduction

2. Prime
3. Experimental
Task

7. Reading
check
8.

Conclusion

Task

Purpose of task

Expert panel participants are instructed to read
through the materials provided, and provide
detailed feedback on the materials, the process,
and their findings
Panel participants read an article from the
Journal of Accountancy on the benefits of
Mindfulness in accounting (Vetter 2020)
Panel participants evaluate information related to
two firms, one subject to a SEC AAER and
another firm in the same industry was not subject
to an enforcement action. Materials included:
4.
A 5minute 46 second audio file30
from the fraud firm’s 4th quarter 2015
earnings call question and answer session,
and the accompanying transcript
5.
A 6 minute 8 second audio file
from the non-fraud firm’s 4th quarter 2015
earnings call question and answer session,
and the accompanying transcript31
6.
Excerpts from the 4th quarter 2015
Management Discussion and Analysis and
Financial Statements from Form 10-k for
each firm.
Panel participants are asked to confirm the type
of documents they reviewed during the
experimental task
Panel participants submit their feedback on the
experimental task and other materials

30

To set the context of the
experiment
Prime participants to consider
mindfulness
Materials were provided to panel
participants by firm, randomized
by firm to minimize order effects,
such that half of the panel
participants saw materials related
to the fraud firm first and half saw
materials related to the non-fraud
firm first.
Participants were asked to provide
a list of discrepancies they noted
between the information provided
for each firm.
Panel participants also reported
(on a sliding scale) their belief that
the firm engaged in financial
misreporting and listed the
substantive tests to address the
discrepancies noted.
Confirm participants’ recall of the
documents reviewed
Collect feedback to inform
experiment

A transcript of the audio file is also provided for accessibility and is available in Appendix F.
Each audio file covered revenue-related discussion between the firm’s management and investment
analysts.
31
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APPENDIX C: FINAL LIST OF DISCREPANCIES AND ADDITIONAL TESTS SELECTED
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Experimental
Experimental Task
Phase
1. Introduction
Participants are provided information about the
benefits of mindfulness
2. Attention check
Participants are asked about the benefits of
mindfulness
3. Prime
Participants read information about the benefits of
mindfulness
4. Participant
Participants are asked how frequently they practice
measures
mindfulness and their reasons for doing so
5. Attention check
6. TreatmentEmotional
Regulation
7. TreatmentPrompt

8. Manipulation
check
9. Attention check
10. Experimental
Task

Participant attention is monitored through a simple
task
Participants are randomly assigned to a mindfulness
practice (Suppress, Control, or Reappraise group)
based on their session attendance
Participants are informed that auditors, investors,
and analysts evaluate certain information.
Participants in the Prompt-Y condition are further
instructed to consider discrepancies in information
provided.
Participants are asked about the mindfulness
practice they are assigned to
Participant attention is monitored through a simple
task
Participants listen to a 5minute 46 second audio
file32 and read the experimental materials, reporting:

Discrepancies that relate to the experimental
materials (multiple choice answer).

The likelihood of financial reporting
irregularities. (sliding scale)

11. Manipulation
check

Participants are asked about the mindfulness
practice they are assigned to

12. Reading check

Participants are asked to confirm the type of
documents they reviewed during the experimental
task

32

Purpose of task
To set the context of the
experiment
Check understanding of
construct
Prime participants to consider
mindfulness
Evaluate relevance of
mindfulness practice to
participants
Attempt to manipulate
participant’s emotion
regulation mechanism
Provide instruction to
participants

Verify participants’
understanding of the
manipulation
Measure dependent variables
related to the frequency and
accuracy with which
participants identify fraud risk
red flags

Confirm participants’ memory
of the experimental conditions
to which they are assigned
Confirm participants’ recall of
the documents reviewed

A transcript of the audio file is also provided for accessibility and is available in Appendix F.
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Experimental
Experimental Task
Phase
13. Participant
Participants are asked, on a sliding scale, to report
response
their level of ease or difficulty in completing the
experimental task
14. Participant
Participants report the likelihood that they might
measures
engage in mindfulness
15. Demographic
collection

Participants report their demographic characteristics

16. Closing

Participants are provided a completion code and
compensated according to the terms of the study
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Purpose of task
Evaluate effects of emotion
regulation on working memory
Evaluate relevance of
mindfulness practice to
participants
Measure effect of participant
characteristics on measured
variables

APPENDIX E: INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS
Prime:
Mindfulness can help improve cognition, focus, attention, and decision-making and may reduce
stress by increasing awareness of one’s immediate situation and surroundings. These benefits are
useful in the workplace because they help improve interpersonal relations and satisfaction with
these relationships. The Big 4 accounting firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC) have
emphasized practicing mindfulness and the profession is embracing its usefulness. In this study,
we ask you to use mindfulness techniques as you review information.
Instructions by Random Assignment:
Condition
Instructions
Suppression (Adapted It is extremely important for the sake of this study that if you have any
from Richards and feelings, you please try your best not to let those feelings show. In other
Gross 2000)
words, please try to behave in such a way that a person watching you would
not know you are feeling anything at all.
Control (Richards and Please review the following information carefully.
Gross 2000)

Reframe (Adapted
from Scheppes et al.
2014)

Try your best to feel less negative about the information you are about to
see by trying to change the meaning of it. That means you think of
something to tell yourself about the information that helps you feel less
negative about it. So, for example, you could tell yourself something about
the outcome, so that whatever is going on will soon be resolved or that help
is on the way. You could also focus on a detail of the situation that may not
be as bad as it first seemed. We want you to stay focused on the information
and not think of random things that make you feel better, but rather to
change something about the information that helps you to feel less negative
about it.
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Condition
Prompt

No Prompt

Instructions
Auditors, analysts, and investors review information provided by the
company, in addition to that obtained from outside sources. Some of this
information includes transcripts from earnings calls and the accompanying
financial statements. As you review these documents, please be mindful of
discrepancies that may exist in the information provided between these
documents.
Auditors, analysts, and investors review information provided by the
company, in addition to that obtained from outside sources. Some of this
information includes transcripts from earnings calls and the accompanying
financial statements.
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS, SEEN BY ALL PARTICIPANTS AFTER ASSIGNMENT
Transcript of Earnings Call Q&A segment:
The following is a transcript of the mp3 file for the Company’s Earnings Call. The transcript is
provided in case the mp3 file does not play properly.

Question-and-Answer Session
Operator
Thank you. [Operator Instructions] We’ll go first to Chad with Craig-Hallum.
Please go ahead.
Chad
So nice job on the quarter, the StorNext growth was great and it sounds like obviously
we’re expecting good growth this year. Just on the fiscal ’16 guide if we kind of back
out the scale-out growth of 50% that implies I think a pretty -- it depends on how you
mix it up but a pretty big deceleration in DXi growth and/or kind of take declines that
are at or kind of above historical norms, are we just being conservative or could you
provide any other color into the other segments of the business and how you’re thinking
about them next year?
CEO
Yes, so first I thought you were going to comment on the 30% DXi growth in Q4.
Chad
Well I’m assuming it’s going to grow 30% again this year which wouldn’t mean the
guidance doesn’t make sense.
CEO
Yes, I know. We’re really targeting the market around on that piece. Basically, one of
the things we decided to do is we have so many really strong moving parts for the year
that we wanted to get Q1 under our belt and we’ll provide more guidance as we get
along
here. We think there is a huge opportunity for us in video surveillance. And we want to
see how that materializes I think from a plan perspective we expect DXi to grow next
year. We expect tape to kind of be down in the 5% to 7% range and I think if you do all
that math that should be pretty close to reconciling.
Chad
Okay.
CEO
And OEM piece I commented on that for the quarter, that’s down its half the size of
scaleout, now less than half the size. It’s still about $60 million. It bid by far is the piece
that we have the least control over and the lowest expectations for, for next year. Having
said that it’s getting to be a fairly nominal amount compared to the other growth pieces
so it depends I think Chad on what you pick for all those pieces I think for the royalty
it's been a great royalty year for tape better than we anticipated at the start of the year
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it's hard to forecast it that way but tape’s increasing role in Archive might surprise us
so I think the second thing that is down in that analysis is royalty.
Chad
Okay. So, royalty kind of from our expectation standpoint should be down in line with
kind of tape?
CEO
I would probably make it a little or we’re probably 10% for the royalty and probably
7% for tape. That's what we're starting with and as you know and you've asked this
question before because tape is such an important part of the company both in terms of
install base and profitability we’re trying to not we’re going to drive to get every tape
dollar we can but from a modeling standpoint if we miss it on the revenue it hurts us
from a profitability standpoint. So, we’re trying to be conscious about that.
Chad
Yes, and then a couple of things more. On the scale-out growth that you are talking
about 50% I know you are definitely investing and penetrating into to new verticals
there, but can we get to the 50% growth just I don’t know if you call it blocking and
tackling in media and entertainment market and just kind of rolling within that vertical
or do we need these each other verticals to really kick in to achieve that 50% growth
rate?
CEO
I would say we feel really good about the 50% growth rate in the terms of what we
know what we see I think it's -- so these other verticals take off in anyway shape of
formula we see a lot of upside.
Chad
Okay and then maybe last one from me and this might be more for Linda. Linda is there
any kind of ballpark you can give us over the next couple of quarters of what you can
generate from working capital on a cash flow basis I know December quarters are pretty
good use and March quarters are pretty use of working capital how much can we expect
to kind of realize in the next couple of quarters?
Linda Breard
Yes, let me -- as you know we ended the year with as we ended the year with 50 million
in inventory which is higher than we have outsourced for 35 million and we kind of
expect being lower with the outsource model so there is definitely cash that will come
off the balance sheet with those AR and inventory over the next couple of quarters.
CEO
Yes. And I think if you look Chad we got to get used to this growth company thing for
sure we don’t want to leave revenue in the docks as you might say but the balance sheet
definitely has I don’t know Linda had talked about maybe $20 million of improvement
and maybe even a little more than that.
Chad
Okay. That's perfect. Thank you.
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Excerpts from Fourth Quarter 2015 Management Discussion and Analysis:
Results
We had total revenue of $553.1 million in fiscal 2015, which is essentially flat compared to fiscal
2014. This is the net result of increased revenue from scale-out storage solutions, disk backup
systems and service, offset by decreased tape automation systems and devices and media revenue
and a $15.0 million royalty received in fiscal 2014 in connection with finalizing an intellectual
property agreement that is not expected to recur. We had record revenue from scale-out
storage solutions due to increased branded revenue in all geographies - Asia-Pacific (APAC),
Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and North America. Our total branded product and
service revenue increased 7% from fiscal 2014 and our continued focus on our branded business
is reflected in a greater proportion of non-royalty revenue from branded products and services,
which grew to 88% in fiscal 2015 compared to 84% in fiscal 2014 and 83% in fiscal 2013.
Our gross margin percentage increased 90 basis points from fiscal 2014 to 44.2%, the net result of
higher service revenue driven by the growth in scale-out storage and the improvements we have
made in our business model over the past yearend-a -half, offset by lower royalty revenue.
Operating expenses decreased $20.9 million, or 8%, from fiscal 2014 primarily due to cost controls
and spending reductions that were implemented over the past year. Restructuring
charges decreased by $9.5 million compared to fiscal 2014, primarily related to lower severance
and benefits. Compensation and benefits also decreased due to reduced staffing levels. Intangible
amortization expense decreased due to certain intangibles becoming fully amortized during fiscal
2015. Our operating results improved by $26.2 million, from a loss of $11.8 million in fiscal 2014
to $14.4 million of income from operations in fiscal 2015.
Net income improved by $38.2 million, from a net loss of $21.5 million in fiscal 2014 to net
income of $16.8 million in fiscal 2015, which included a gain of $13.6 million resulting from the
sale of our investment in a privately held company.
Excerpts from Fourth Quarter 2015 Form 10-k:
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS FOR FISCAL 2015, 2014 and 2013
Revenue

Total revenue in fiscal 2015 remained relatively flat compared to fiscal 2014. Revenue
from scale-out storage solutions, disk backup systems and service revenue increased.
These increases were offset by decreases in OEM and branded tape automation systems
revenue, royalty revenue as well as branded devices and media revenue. The decrease
in royalty revenue was primarily due to a $15.0 million royalty in connection with an
intellectual property agreement received in the prior year.
We believe the changes in our product and service revenue are driven by the changing
storage environment, including increased market demand for scale-out storage solutions
and reduced demand for tape products. Revenue from branded data protection products
and services decreased $13.7 million, or 4%, from fiscal 2014, largely due to decreases
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in tape automation systems and media revenue. Data protection products include our
tape automation systems, disk backup systems and devices and media offerings.
Revenue from branded scale-out storage solutions and services increased $43.4 million,
or 74%, from fiscal 2014 largely due to increased sales of our StorNext appliances.
Scale-out storage solutions include StorNext software, torNext appliances, StorNext
Pro Solutions and Lattus extended online storage solutions. In addition, OEM product
and service revenue, which primarily comprises tape automation systems, decreased
$14.0 million from fiscal 2014.
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APPENDIX G: LIST OF VARIABLES

Variable Label

Variable Name

Description

ERS

Emotion Regulation Strategy
condition

1= Suppress; 2= Control 3= Reframe

Prompt

Prompt condition

Coded as Yes = 8, No = 5

Quantity

Identification of fraud risk
factors

Participants’ ability to identify fraud risk factors,
measured as a count (0 – 4)

Accuracy

Ability to accurately identify
fraud risk factors

FinMisrept

Financial misreporting

Calculated as the number of correctly identified
fraud risk factors plus the number of accurately
avoided factors that are not fraud risks to the
company minus the number of incorrectly
identified fraud risk factors
Perceived likelihood that the company is engaging
in financial misreporting (scale of 0 to 100)

#AddlTests

Number of additional tests to
address fraud risk factors
identified

Count variable of the number of substantive tests
participants select to address fraud factors
identified (0 to 4)

Focus

Difficulty focusing

Likert scale of 1 (Not difficult) to 7 (Extremely
difficult)

StopThink

Difficulty stopping and
thinking about the information
reviewed
Difficulty remembering details
about the materials reviewed

Likert scale of 1 (Not difficult) to 7 (Extremely
difficult)

CurrFirm

Likelihood that participants’
current employer encourages
mindfulness

Likert scale of 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Very likely)

EmoRegFreq

Frequency of practicing
emotional regulation

Likert scale of 0 (Never) to 7 (More than once per
day)

Mindful_freq Frequency of practicing
mindfulness

Likert scale of 0 (Never) to 7 (More than once per
day)

#FSAnalyzed Number of financial statements
analyzed per quarter

Ordinal variable from 1 (Less than 1) to 5 (50 or
more)

Yrs_Exp

Continuous variable on a 1 to 50 scale

Remember

Number of years’ experience
working full-time
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Likert scale of 1 (Not difficult) to 7 (Extremely
difficult)

Variable Label

Variable Name

Description

#EEs

Number of employees in
participants’ current workplace

Ordinal variable from 1 (Fewer than 100) to 4
(10,000+)

Position

Participant’s position in their
current workplace

Nominal variable with 4 levels (staff, manager,
director, partner)

Education

Level of education

Ordinal variable from 1 (High school) to 5 (Postgraduate degree)

Gender

Participant’s gender

Coded as Male = 1, Female = 0

Duration

Time spent on study

Measured in minutes

Sample

Participant source

mTurk=1; Undergraduate students= 4; Graduate
(MBA/MAcc) students= 5
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ABSTRACT
When occupational fraud is detected, the organization—the victim to the fraud case—
decides whether or not to terminate, and/or to refer the principal perpetrator to law enforcement
for prosecution. We use survey data collected by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(ACFE) to examine the impact of fraud severity, organization type and perpetrator’s status on the
victim organization’s decisions to pursue a particular outcome against the principal perpetrator.
We find that fraud duration is an important attribute in examining whether and how victim
organizations pursue punishments. Specifically, the interactions between fraud duration with
victim organization type and fraud duration with perpetrator status influence the punishment
outcome selected by the victim organization. To our knowledge, this study is the first to consider
the interactions between perpetrator and victim organization characteristics on punishment
outcomes.
Keywords: Occupational fraud, fraud victim organization, principal perpetrator, status
characteristics theory.
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INTRODUCTION
When high-profile fraud cases were detected in the early 2000s, many victim
organizations rushed to replace their top executives. Some executives resigned voluntarily while
others were terminated. For instance, Enron’s CEO, Jeffrey Skilling had resigned in August 2001,
a few months before accounting manipulations were revealed to the public. WorldCom’s CEO,
Bernard Ebbers, resigned right after the fraudulent scheme had become public, and CFO, Scott
Sullivan, was terminated at the same time. HealthSouth’s CEO, Richard Scrushy, and CFO, Weston
Smith, were terminated weeks after the fraud scheme had become public information. At the same
time, there were many other victim organizations, such as First USA Inc., 3COM, Boston Scientific,
and Bausch and Lomb that did not terminate their CEOs or CFOs subsequent to the accounting
scandals (Agrawal and Cooper 2017).
Organizations, the victims of occupational fraud, choose whether and how to punish
perpetrators involved in fraud schemes. The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that are
associated with the victim organization’s decision to pursue a particular outcome against the
principal perpetrator. Prior research has shown that crime severity is positively associated with
outcome severity, but that this relationship is moderated by the perpetrator’s characteristics
(Albonetti 1998; Wheeler, Weisburd, Waring, and Bode 1988; Hagan and Parker 1985). The
outcomes of white-collar crime cases, such as occupational frauds, are often situation-specific
(Holtfreter, Piquero and Piquero 2008a) and vary by the victim and perpetrator characteristics
(Agrawal and Cooper 2017; Beneish 1999; Garrett 2015; Hermanson, Justice, Ramamoorti, and
Riley 2017; Holtfreter 2005; Karpoff et al. 2008). Victim organizations determine which outcomes
to pursue against the perpetrators, considering the facts and circumstances of the fraud case.
Further, victim organizations need to consider the cost-benefit of deterrence measures (Rae and
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Subramanian 2008), such as physical and monitoring controls (Townsley and Birks 2008), and
how their own organizational type affects the punishment pursued (Beneish, Marshall, and Yang
2017). Punishment outcomes, such as termination and/or referral for criminal prosecution, may
generate short-term or long-term costs to the organization, and it may impact the level of scrutiny,
that the victim organization, faces from outside stakeholders (Holtfreter et al. 2008a; Dugan and
Gibbs 2009). Thus, fraud punishment is determined not only by the severity of fraud scheme, but,
also, by the perpetrator’s characteristics and/or the cost-benefit to the victim organization (Eitle
2000; Dilks et al. 2015; Arnulf and Gottschalk 2013; van Prooijen and Lam 2007; Roberts and
Lyons 2009)
We examine the deterrence costs victim organizations incur and Status Characteristics
Theory to understand the impact of organization type and perpetrator’s status on the victim
organization’s decision to pursue or not to pursue an outcome against the principal perpetrator. The
first part of our study examines the main effects of these factors on the outcome pursued, whereas
the second part of the study explores how the organization type or perpetrator’s status interact with
the association of fraud severity and outcome severity in occupational fraud cases. To our
knowledge, no prior study has examined these interactions in an occupational fraud setting.
We use the occupational fraud data obtained from the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP).
The data are collected by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) through a biennial
survey of Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs). In most fraud cases, the principal perpetrator faces
harsh consequences by losing their employment and being referred to law enforcement for criminal
prosecution. Yet, in over 10 percent of the cases, the victim organization decides neither to
terminate the principal perpetrator nor to file any criminal charges.
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We use multinomial logistic regression and graph distance theory to examine the
moderating effects of the type of organization and the perpetrator status on the association between
the occupational fraud outcome, pursued by victim organizations, and the severity of the fraud
scheme. We find that non-profit, governmental, and privately held organizations are less likely to
terminate the principal perpetrator as compared to publicly-traded companies. That is, the
interaction between the organization type and fraud duration affects the punishment selected by
the victim organization. We further find that, in support of Status Characteristics Theory, victim
organizations pursue less severe outcomes against high status perpetrators, as compared to low
status perpetrators, in fraud cases that lasted a short period of time. As the fraud duration increases,
however, all types of victim organizations pursue equally severe outcomes against all perpetrators,
despite their status. Thus, fraud duration, organization type and perpetrator’s status are meaningful
attributes when victim organizations choose whether and how to punish occupational fraudsters.
These findings matter to the anti-fraud profession, organizational leaders, and occupational
fraud researchers. CFEs and organizational leaders, designing and implementing anti-fraud
controls, refer often to the ACFE’s Report to the Nations (2020) for the descriptive statistics of
current occupational fraud trends, to monitor who commits occupational fraud, where, and how.
During their work, CFEs are often engaged to oversee fraud examinations on behalf of
organizations, including advising which outcome to pursue, given the facts and circumstances of
the case. CFEs advising clients on fraud examinations benefit from considering these inputs and
their interactions when helping clients select an appropriate outcome. Enforcement agencies,
regulators, investors, and other stakeholders may also benefit from the results of our study when
they consider pursuing outcomes against individual or organizational perpetrators. This study adds
context to the ACFE’s Report to the Nations (2020), which serves the anti-fraud profession, by
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showing interactions between the occupational fraud characteristics, the perpetrator’s status, and
the punishment pursued.
This study also enhances researchers’ understanding of victim organizations’ reactions to
fraudulent instances and highlights a need for future research into the impact of fraud duration.
Our findings extend the application of status characteristics theory to a specific type of whitecollar crimes (i.e. occupational fraud) and demonstrate the effects of the status liability hypothesis
in occupational frauds. By being first to examine the interaction of the perpetrator’s status and the
victim organization type, we also generate ideas for a potential extension and future fraud research.
Importantly, the results show that fraud duration interacts with both victim organization type and
perpetrator status to influence fraud outcome. While prior studies have shown that crime
environment (e.g. victim organization) and perpetrator status have direct effects on punishment, to
our knowledge, this is the first study to show that these attributes are further influenced by crime
duration in occupational fraud cases. We recommend further research into the effects of fraud
duration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II develops the hypotheses about the
main effects and the interaction effects of organization type and/or the perpetrator’s status on
outcome severity. Section III describes the sample and the empirical model used in this study.
Section IV presents the results, and section V concludes this study.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Prior literature shows that there is a positive relationship between crime severity and
punishment (Bedau 1978; Wheeler, et al. 1988; Weisburd et al. 1990; Tillman and Pontell 1992;
Hagan and Parker 1985); however, this relationship is affected by the facts and circumstances of
the crime, such as the perpetrator’s and victim’s characteristics, and the loss and duration of the
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crime. Further, termination rates, criminal sentences, and the likelihood of civil remedies differ
based on the victim organization’s characteristics and the perpetrator’s characteristics (Agrawal
and Cooper 2017; Garrett 2015; Karpoff et al. 2008). In occupational fraud, victim organization
type affects whether organizations pursue punishment. Also, the perpetrator’s status affects
whether and how victim organizations choose to punish occupational fraudsters. Finally, the
amount of loss incurred by the organization and the number of months the fraud occurred affect
the type of punishment issued.
Victim Organizations Choose Whether and How to Punish Occupational Fraudsters
Victim organizations are both the crime environment and the evaluators of the fraud act,
determining whether and how to punish the perpetrator. Organizations incur direct and indirect
losses from fraud, including the fraud loss and image repair costs (Caldiero, Taylor, and Ungureanu
2009). To protect themselves, victim organizations employ internal controls to prevent, deter and
detect fraudulent activity. They employ internal controls in lieu of societal controls to reduce the
situational opportunities available for crimes to occur (Holtfreter 2005; Benson and Madensen
2007; Fleming, Hermanson, Kranachar, and Riley 2016); however, those internal controls vary by
the type of the organization (Fleming et al. 2016).
For example, Fleming et al. (2016) find that publicly traded companies employ stronger
anti-fraud measures than their privately held counterparts. This is likely because of the level of
public scrutiny that these organizations face and their structural complexity. The complexity of
internal controls employed by an organization is affected by the regulatory requirements for the
organization. More complex organizational structures may also have more complex control
systems to help identify the individuals responsible for certain activities. Dugan and Gibbs (2009)
show that the separation of duties amongst many employees in corporations reduces the ability to
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identify those responsible for wrongdoing. They explain that “attention must be paid to the
organizational structure to determine the viability of” (Dugan and Gibbs, 2009, p.118) crime
controls. Each situation is different, causing the level of control to vary by the victim organization
type, and the punishment severity to vary correspondingly.
In addition to the organizational considerations of internal controls, deterrence theory
explains that the punishments pursued against criminals are chosen based on cost-benefit analyses
(Rae and Subramanian 2008; Townsley and Birks 2008). Harsher prevention and deterrence
measures often incur higher costs in the short-term but may decrease costs in the long-term by
sending a strong anti-fraud message. Organizations prefer lower cost alternatives for prevention
and deterrence and will likely select occupational fraud outcomes that limit their overall costs
(Beneish et al. 2017). Such costs may include preventative anti-fraud measures, such as the cost
of physical and process controls (Townsley and Birks 2008); detective anti-fraud measures, such
as the costs of anomaly identification (Becker 1968; Kim and Kogan 2014); or costs associated
with employee turnover or damaged reputation (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006).
A victim organization that pursues the termination and/or refer the case for criminal
prosecution will incur greater short-term costs through attrition, legal fees, time spent by current
employees, and a loss of good reputation, but the message sent may reduce future fraudulent
behavior and the likelihood of legal actions by third parties. Therefore, organizations with more
complex internal control systems, or those subject to regulatory oversight, such as governmental
entities or publicly traded companies, may be more willing to incur higher short-term costs by
sending strong signals through harsh punishment. Incurring high short-term costs may prevent
much larger long-term costs (Karpoff et al. 2008). At the same time, taking no action against a
fraud perpetrator will result in no cost in the short-term, but it may send a signal to other employees
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and stakeholders that the company condones or dismisses fraudulent behavior, which may result
in long-term costs through the furtherance of fraudulent behavior by other employees or a reaction
by stakeholders or regulatory agencies. In some cases, victim organizations may elect to retain an
occupational fraudster to avoid the short-term costs of replacement (Beneish et al. 2017).
When organizations are victimized by occupational fraud perpetrators, public knowledge
of the event can hurt the organization’s reputation. Caldiero et al. (2009) explain that victim
organizations often have options when dealing with crises, but in the case of fraud they are limited
to repairing their image. Where there is a “high public visibility, organizational decisions may be
shaped by” (Holtfreter, Van Slyke, Bratton, and Gertz 2008b, p. 309) formal sanctions, as public
companies may suffer from reputation damage if their control environment is not strong (Dugan
and Gibbs 2009). The organizational costs related to regulatory compliance, internal controls
management, and reputation management differs between organizations and is likely higher for
publicly-traded companies than other organization types, leading to our first hypothesis:
H1: Compared to publicly-traded organizations, fraud perpetrators in privately held,
governmental and not-for-profit organizations face less severe outcomes.
Kennedy (2014) further explains that perpetrators gain a deep knowledge of the victim
organization through their occupational duties. This knowledge enables the perpetrator to develop
a cognitive map (Brantingham and Brantingham 1993) of when, where, and how to commit
occupational fraud without being detected by internal controls, as well as increasing their ability
to conceal the crime (Benson and Madensen 2007). While there is debate as to whether the severity
of a crime is more heavily influenced by the fraud characteristics or the crime environment
(Benson and Moore 1992), we contend in H2 that it is the interaction of these attributes that has
the greatest impact on our punishment measure, occupational fraud outcomes.
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H2: Both the fraud scheme and the type of organization impact victim
organization’s decision in pursuing an outcome against fraud perpetrators.
Status Shields Offenders from Punishment
Fraud type, the victim organization type, and the perpetrator’s characteristics, including
their status, influence the victim organization’s decision whether and how to punish fraudsters.
Status characteristics theory (SCT) describes the perceptions one forms when encountering another
based on the second person’s age, race, gender, and/or position that guide the first person’s beliefs
about the second person’s capabilities (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1971). Berger et al. (1971)
define a status characteristic as “a characteristic that is differentially evaluated and implies
possession of other characteristics” (p.3) and a diffuse status characteristic as one that produces
general assumptions about the second person. Status characteristics also capture beliefs and
perceptions about a target individual’s influence over decisions (Berger et al. 1971) that are
developed through interpersonal interactions (Ridgeway 1991). During these interactions,
individuals form schemas, or mental descriptions, of each other that categorize traits and
behavioral profiles (Ridgeway 2001) related to the perceived position or authority.
In the workplace, status characteristics may include the target’s physical features as well
as their position within the company. The position within the company is correlated with the
individual’s education, tenure, and age and is the most salient of these status characteristics.
Webster and Driskell (1978) explain that when a target possesses multiple status characteristics,
the most salient characteristic to the domain determines the perceptions others have of his/her
abilities and influence over decisions. Therefore, the perceived influence one has over others in
the workplace is derived from a combination of his/her status characteristics, with an emphasis on
the position within the company.
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SCT explains how the perceived seriousness of an occupational fraud, and therefore related
punishment, may differ between perpetrators. Specifically, the evaluator may believe a perpetrator
should have a harsher or more lenient punishment, depending on their perceived status
characteristics. Prior literature shows that perpetrators with different statuses receive different
levels of punishment, even when the crimes are similar in severity. Eitle (2000) finds that the
position within the victim organization influences the punitive response. For example, Garrett
(2015) finds that management-level offenders are more frequently penalized than their executivelevel counterparts. Dilks, McGrimmon, and Thye (2015) examine accumulative differences in
diffuse and specific status characteristics between victims and offenders, finding that the higher
the offenders’ status in relation to the victim, the less serious their crime is perceived to be.
Likewise, Weisburd, Waring, and Wheeler (1990) find that officers are less likely to be imprisoned
for white-collar crimes than workers or managers. Longer jail sentences are also noted by
Gottschalk (2012) for lower status white-collar criminals, when comparing fraud to other types of
white-collar crimes.
Extant literature finds that the status variance among occupational fraudsters indeed affects
the punishment that they face due to the influence that higher status individuals have on others and
the opportunities they are afforded. Rosenmerkel (2001) finds that some of the respondent’s
characteristics, such as “age, gender, and SES have a slight effect” (p. 320) on the relationship
between crime severity and punishment severity. In a study of federal white-collar crime cases in
seven separate districts, Albonetti (1998) explains that the perpetrator’s characteristics have a
significant direct effect on the perceived severity of the assigned punishment. Opportunities
available for occupational fraud via the perpetrator’s position further affect the consequences that
the perpetrators experience (Hagan and Parker 1985). Thus, higher status individuals are shielded
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from the repercussions of their transgressions (Niedermeier, Horowitz, and Kerr 2001) and receive
lower punishments than lower status individuals, which leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: Fraud perpetrators with higher status face less severe outcomes
than perpetrators with lower status.
Perpetrator’s Status Can Also be a Liability
Status can also have negative implications (Wiggins, Dill, and Schwartz 1965) in frauds
related to the perpetrator’s occupation (Skolnick and Shaw 1994). For example, Rosoff (1989)
finds that when a high status individual commits a low to moderately serious crime, they are likely
to receive a low punishment. Contrarily, when a high status individual commits a very serious
crime, their status becomes a liability (Skolnick and Shaw 1994) and a severe punishment is issued.
Wiggins et al. (1965) explains that high status individuals are afforded leniency with minor
transgressions because they are perceived to have earned respect and gratitude from others, which
“forgives” minor wrongdoing. Niedermeier, Horowitz, and Kerr (2001) further explain that
evaluators’ perception of whether the perpetrator abused their status, or treated the victim unfairly
influences the punishment issued. Thus, status shields perpetrators from harsh punishment when
the offense is not correlated with the status, but becomes a liability when status affects the
opportunity to commit the offense. Whether there is a negative or positive association between the
perpetrator’s status and punishment severity, prior studies show that the differences in the
perpetrators’ positions create different perceptions of the perpetrators’ abilities and influence, in
part because of the opportunities that the perpetrators have to engage in fraud, which results in
varying punishments.
The ACFE (2020) reports that 20 percent of the fraud cases in their survey were committed
by owners/executives, 35 percent by managers, and 41 percent by employees. Further, it reports
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that the sex split of the perpetrators is 72 percent male and 28 percent female. Finally, although
occupational fraudsters are more educated than street criminals, the ACFE report finds that 22
percent have a high-school or lower education. These status differences within occupational
fraudsters yield the varying punishment severity for similar acts. However, as previously explained,
the status becomes a liability (McGrimmon et al. 2018) when it is used to engage in wrongdoing.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H4: Both the fraud scheme and the perpetrators’ status impact victim
organization’s decision in pursuing an outcome against fraud perpetrators.
ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Sample
We use data collected by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) to generate
our sample of occupational fraud cases. The ACFE is the world’s largest anti-fraud organization,
with more than 80,000 members, most of whom are Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE). The ACFE
distributes a biennial survey to its CFE members (ACFE 2020, 1996) that includes 80 questions
related to the CFE’s single largest fraud case that closed within the prior two years. In the 2013,
2015, 2017 and 2019 surveys, participating CFEs were asked to provide information related to a
second fraud case that they investigated during the same timeframe. We obtained the ACFE data
via a grant from the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP). Our sample includes fraud cases reported
between 2002 (ACFE 2004) and 2015 (ACFE 2016), a 14-year period.
Descriptive Statistics
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Our final sample consists of 2,096 fraud cases. Table 16 reports the descriptive statistics
for the full sample, whereas Table 23 reports the descriptive statistics33 by outcome pursued against
the principal fraud perpetrator. We examine three outcomes pursued against the principal
perpetrator by the victim organization, namely no-termination, termination, termination and
referral for criminal prosecution. The internal actions taken against the principal perpetrator is
measured as a multiple response question in the ACFE survey. The multiple responses are
“termination,” “permitted or required the individual to resign,” “probation/suspension,”
“restitution agreement,” “no punishment,” “perpetrator had resigned before fraud was discovered
or action was taken,” and “other.” In our study, termination indicates whether the perpetrator
continued to work for the victim organization after the fraud had been detected or not. Therefore,
“termination”, “permitted or required the individual to resign” and “perpetrator had resigned
before fraud was discovered or action was taken” are coded as 1 to indicate that the perpetrators
no longer works for the victim organization. However, “probation/suspension,” “restitution
agreement,” and “no punishment” are coded as 0 to indicate that the perpetrators still work for the
victim organization. Observations that had only “others” as a selected response are not included in
the final sample. Additionally, within the termination category, we distinguish whether the
principal perpetrator was referred to law enforcement for criminal prosecution or not. Criminal
prosecution is measured as an indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the fraud case was referred
to law enforcement for criminal prosecution, and 0 otherwise.

33

The list of variables and their definition is provided in Appendix A.
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The principal perpetrator is neither terminated nor referred for criminal prosecution in 217
fraud cases in our data (10.4 percent), is terminated in 535 fraud cases (25.5 percent), and is both
terminated and referred for criminal prosecution in 1,344 fraud cases (64.1 percent) 34. In most
fraud cases, the principal perpetrator faces harsh punishment by losing their employment and
facing criminal prosecution. Yet, in over 10 percent of the cases, the victim organization decides
not to terminate the principal perpetrator and not to file any charges against him/her.
The average age of the principal perpetrator is 41.5 years old, and there is a 65 percent –
35 percent gender split between males and females, respectively. Principal perpetrators are well
educated, with 69.8 percent having at least some college education (30.2 percent have high school
or lower education). Only 11 percent of the principal perpetrators have had prior charges or
convictions of a fraud-related offense. Most of the perpetrators in the data have an employee or
managerial position, 42.9 percent and 39.6 percent, respectively. Perpetrators in the position of an
executive, officer or owner comprise 17.5 percent of the cases in our data.
There are four types of organizations that are victims to a fraud scheme in our sample,
namely publicly traded, privately held, governmental, and not-for-profit. As shown in Table 22,
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The distribution of the outcomes, pursed by the victim organization, in this study differs slightly
from the distribution reported in the Report to the Nations. First, RTTN sample includes fraud
cases that took place over a 2-year period, whereas our sample consists of a 14-year sample period.
Second, RTTN reports the data on the two survey questions related to the outcome pursued by the
victim organization, slightly differently than our study. The RTTN reports a separate percentage
rate for each type of the internal action taken by the victim organization. Whereas, in our study,
we group the responses in two groups, no-termination and termination. From 2008 until 2020, the
RTTN reports an average rate of 62.1 percent of fraud cases were referred to law enforcement,
ranging from 58 percent to 69 percent. Our referral for criminal prosecution percentage rate is
slightly higher at 64.1 percent. Further, we excluded from our final sample fraud cases where the
perpetrator was referred for criminal prosecution but was not terminated.
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73.3 percent of fraud occurred in for-profit organizations, with 30.8 percent of the victim
organizations being public companies and 42.5 percent being private companies. Governmental
and not-for-profit organizations consist 15.6 percent and 11.1 percent of the victim organizations,
respectively, in our sample.
--Insert Table 22 -We examine the sample descriptive statistics by outcomes pursued by victim organizations
and find several differences among the three groups. Results are reported in Table 23. On average,
the fraud schemes where victim organizations pursue the harshest outcome, i.e. termination and
referral for criminal prosecution, cost more (M = 2.4 natural log of fraud), last longer (M = 27.7
months), and have the highest percentage of asset misappropriation schemes (92.7 percent), as
compared to the other two outcome groups, not-terminated and terminated only. The average age
of principal perpetrators who were not terminated is higher (M= 45 years old) than perpetrators
who were only terminated (M= 41.2 years old) or perpetrators who were terminated and referred
for criminal prosecution (M= 41 years old). Furthermore, principal perpetrators who were not
terminated, have the longest tenure with the victim organization, are the most educated, and have
the highest ranked perpetrators among the three groups. In contrast, the perpetrators who were
terminated and referred for criminal prosecution are the youngest among the three groups (M = 41
years old). In comparing the composition of this group, it has the highest percentages of lowtenured perpetrators, females, lower-ranked employees, and less educated perpetrators, and the
highest percentage of perpetrators with prior fraud related charges.
--Insert Table 23 --
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Table 24 reports the Pearson and the Spearman correlation among the independent
variables. The results show a statistically significant and positive Pearson correlation between the
fraud severity indicators and the perpetrator’s status indicators.
--Insert Table 24 -Multivariate Tests
We examine three fraud outcomes that the victim organizations pursue against the principal
perpetrators in occupation fraud cases: no-termination, termination, and termination and referral
for criminal prosecution. We use Multinomial Logit Regression, where the termination outcome is
used as a reference category, to compare the odds of the principal perpetrator facing one of the
three outcomes.
First, we test H1 and H3, which argues that there is a main effect of victim organization type
and perpetrator status on fraud outcomes using Model 1.
Model 1:
Fraud Outcome = α + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*FR_TYPE +
β4*COLLUSION

+

β5*AGE

+

β6*TENURE

+

β7*GENDER

+

β8*POSITION + β9*EDUCATION + β10*PRIORCHARG + β11*ORG_TYPE
+ β12*ORG_SIZE + β13*INDUSTRY + β14*ANTIFRAUD + β15*ORG_LOC
+ε

(1)

Table 4 reports the results from multinomial logistic regression, which we detail in Model
1. In support of prior literature, we find that the coefficients of the fraud severity indicators, except
for collusion, are positive and significantly different from zero, when comparing the odds of the
perpetrator being only terminated to being terminated and referred for criminal prosecution. More
specifically, the effects of FR_DURATION (β1= + 0.01, two-tailed p < 0.05), FR_AMOUNT (β2=
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+0.37, two-tailed p < 0.01), and FR_TYPE (β3 = + 1.16, two-tailed p < 0.01) are all positive and
significant. Thus, these results indicate that as fraud severity increases, the odds of being
terminated and referred for criminal prosecution increase compared to the odds of being terminated
only. Thus, there is a direct and positive association between the fraud severity and the severity of
the punishment, consistent with prior research.
When comparing no-termination to termination only, the coefficients of the fraud severity
indicators are not significantly different from zero. The lack of significant association between the
fraud severity indicators can be explained by two main factors. First, the sample of fraud cases,
where the principal perpetrator was not terminated, is smaller than the other two groups. More
specifically, it only encompasses 10.4 percent of the entire sample. Second, the question included
in the ACFE surveys asks whether the perpetrator was terminated, or any other internal action was
taken against the perpetrator, such as probation, suspension, or restitution agreement. Therefore,
the no-termination group included cases where milder forms of punishment were pursued.
Consistent with H1, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE (β11) is positive and significantly
different from zero. More specifically, when we compare the odds of the perpetrator not being
terminated to the odds of being terminated, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE (β11) is positive and
significantly different from zero for Governmental Organizations (+ 1.19; two-tailed p < 0.01),
Not-for-profit Organizations (+ 0.86; two-tailed p < 0.05), and Privately-held Organizations (+
0.84; two-tailed p < 0.01) when Publicly-held Organizations are used as the reference category.
When comparing the odds of the perpetrator being terminated to being terminated and referred for
criminal prosecution, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE (β11) is positive and significantly different
from zero for Governmental Organizations (+ 0.96; two-tailed p < 0.01) and Not-for-profit
Organizations (+ 0.58; two-tailed p < 0.05). These findings indicate that compared to publicly
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traded organizations, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are more likely
not to terminate the principal perpetrator than to terminate him/her.
In other words, governmental, not-for-profit, and privately-held organizations choose
extreme outcomes against the perpetrators. Governmental and not-for-profit organization are more
likely to not terminate than to terminate the perpetrator and are also more likely to terminate and
refer for criminal prosecution the perpetrator than to just terminate the perpetrator. Thus,
governmental and not-for-profit organizations either decide not to terminate or pursue the harshest
outcome possible, as compared to just terminating the perpetrator.
--Insert Table 25 -When comparing the odds of the perpetrators not being terminated with being only
terminated, we find that the coefficient of AGE (β5) is positive (+ 0.03) and significantly different
from zero (two-tailed p < 0.01). Also, when comparing the odds of being terminated to being
terminated and referred for criminal prosecution, the coefficient of AGE (β5) is negative and
significant (- 0.02, two-tailed p < 0.05), the coefficient of TENURE (β 6) is positive and significant
(+ 0.28, two-tailed p < 0.05), the coefficient of GENDER (β7) is negative and significant (- 0.59,
two-tailed p < 0.01), the coefficient of both levels of POSITION (β 8), employee (+ 0.60, two-tailed
p < 0.01) and manager are positive and significant (+ 0.42, two-tailed p < 0.05), the coefficient of
EDUCATION (β9) is negative and significant (- 0.52, two-tailed p < 0.01), and lastly, the
coefficient of PRIORCHARG (β10) is positive and significant (+ 0.95, two-tailed p < 0.01).
Consistent with our H3, these findings indicate that the perpetrator’s status reduces the odds of
being terminated and referred for criminal prosecution compared to only being terminated. Thus,
older, male, better educated perpetrators, who are in an executive position and have worked for the
victim organization for more than five years, are less likely to be terminated and referred for
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criminal prosecution than younger, female, less educated perpetrators, who are in an employee or
managerial position and have worked for the victim organization for less than five years. Only
prior fraud charges increase the odds of being terminated and referred for criminal prosecution as
compared to only being terminated. Overall, we find that as the perpetrator’s status increases, the
odds of being terminated and referred for criminal prosecution decrease. Therefore, there is a direct
and negative association between the perpetrator’s status and the severity of the punishment as
predicted in H3.
Testing for Moderation
Finally, we test hypotheses 2 and 4. H2 examines whether the main effect of fraud severity
on fraud outcomes is moderated by the type of the victim organization. In other words, we examine
whether the positive association between fraud severity and fraud outcome is moderated by the
type of the victim organization. In Model 2, we interact ORG_TYPE with fraud severity variables.
Model 2:
Fraud Outcome = α + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*FR_TYPE +
β4*COLLUSION + β5*AGE + β6*TENURE + β7*GENDER + β8*POSITION +
β9*EDUCATION + β10*PRIORCHARG + β11*ORG_TYPE + β12*ORG_SIZE +
β13*INDUSTRY + β14*ANTIFRAUD + β15*ORG_LOC + β16
*ORG_TYPE*FR_DURATION + β17*ORG_TYPE*FR_AMOUNT +
β18*ORG_TYPE*COLLUSION + β19*ORG_TYPE*FR_TYPE + ε

(2)

Table 5 reports the results from the multinomial logistic regression, which we define in
Model 2. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the coefficients of the fraud severity
indicators interact with the organization type. When comparing the odds of no-termination to
termination, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE*FR_DURATION (β 16) is positive and significantly
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different from zero. More specifically, the coefficient of Governmental*FR_DURATION is + 0.06
(two-tailed p < 0.01), the coefficient of Non-Profit*FR_DURATION is +0.06 (two-tailed p < 0.01),
and the coefficient of Private*FR_DURATION is + 0.04 (two-tailed p < 0.01), as compared to
publicly traded organizations, the reference category.
When comparing the odds of termination to termination and referral for criminal
prosecution, the coefficient of ORG_TYPE*FR_DURATION (β 16) is significant only for
governmental organizations, specifically, the coefficient of Governmental*FR_DURATION is
+0.02 (two-tailed p < 0.1). Figures 1 and 2 show the graphic representation of the fraud duration
and organization type interaction. As the fraud duration increases, not-for-profit organizations are
more likely not to terminate than to terminate the perpetrator, as compared to publicly traded
companies. Thus, as the fraud severity increases, the not-for-profit organizations tend not to pursue
less severe outcomes against the principal perpetrator. Conversely, as fraud duration increases,
governmental and privately held organizations are more likely to terminate the perpetrators than
not to terminate or to terminate and refer for criminal prosecution the perpetrator, as compared to
publicly traded companies. Thus, as the fraud severity increases, governmental and privately held
organizations are more likely to pursue a harsher outcome. Further, Table 5 shows that there is a
positive relationship between the fraud severity and punishment severity when the victim
organization is either a governmental entity or a privately held company, as compared to publicly
traded companies.
--Insert Figures 18 and 19 -Further, the results in Table 25 indicate a significant interaction between the organization
type and fraud amount, ORG_TYPE*FR_AMOUNT (β17). In comparing the odds of not being
terminated and being terminated, the coefficient of governmental*FR_AMOUNT is negative (137

0.24) and significantly different from zero (two-tailed p < 0.1). Whereas in comparing the odds of
being terminated to being terminated and referred for criminal prosecution, the coefficient of notfor-profit*FR_AMOUNT is positive (+ 0.46) and significantly different from zero (two-tailed p <
0.01). Results further show a significant interaction between the organization type (ORG_TYPE)
and fraud amount (FR_AMOUNT). As the amount of the misappropriated assets (i.e. fraud
severity) increases, the probability that a governmental organization does not terminated the
perpetrator decreases, as compared to publicly traded organizations. In contrast, results show that
not-for profit organizations are more likely than publicly traded organizations to terminate and
refer for criminal prosecution perpetrators as the amount of misappropriated assets increases.
Lastly,

the

results

in

Table

26

report

a

significant

interaction

between

ORG_TYPE*COLLUSION (β18) and ORG_TYPE*FR_TYPE (β19) when comparing the
probability of being terminated to being terminated and referred for criminal prosecution. The
coefficient of governmental*COLLUSION is negative (- 0.12) and significantly different from
zero (two-tailed, p< 0.10), and the coefficient of governmental*FR_TYPE is negative (- 1.13) and
significantly different from zero (two-tailed, p<0.10). Results also show that as the number of
perpetrators involved in the fraud increases, governmental organizations are less likely to terminate
and criminally persecute the principal perpetrators as compared to publicly traded organizations
and that governmental organizations are less likely to terminate and refer for criminal prosecution
the principal perpetrator in fraud cases that involve assets misappropriation than in other type of
fraud cases, when compared to publicly traded organizations.
--Insert Table 26 --
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Signed Graph Theory Provides a Mechanism to Measure Status
In H4, we examine the interactive effect of fraud severity and perpetrator status on the
victim organization’s decision whether and how to punish fraudsters. To test this hypothesis, we
construct a composite variable of the perpetrator’s status (STATUSCOMP) using graph-theoretic
procedures (Dilks, McGrimmon, and Thye 2015). Signed graph theory explains that when multiple
characteristics differentiate group members and that the distribution of those characteristics
between group members is inequitable, outcomes are inconsistently applied (Berger, Norman,
Blackwell, and Smith 1992). Further, signed graph theory explains that differentiating
characteristics may have either diffuse, or indirect, effects or specific/direct effects on the outcome
of interest (Dilks et al. 2015).
Graph-theoretic procedures include building diagrams that connecting actors’
characteristics to the expected task outcomes. These paths are characterized by the sign (positive
or negative) and the length (various lengths based on how relevant the characteristic is to the task)
dubbed graph theoretical distance. In our model, the diffused (D) status characteristics are age,
tenure, gender, position, and education, whereas the specific (C) status characteristic is prior fraud
related charges. Next, we determine the length of the paths for the diffused and specific variables,
which in our case are paths of length three and four for both diffused and specific variables.
The perpetrator’s (“P’s”) aggregate expectations values 35 are reported in Table 6. To
determine the specific variable combination for each path, we converted the perpetrator’s position

35

The P’s aggregate expectations values are estimated using a worksheet developed by Dr.
David Melamed at University of Arizona. More information can be found at Melamed (2011).
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variable into a binary variable, where it equals to 1 if the perpetrator is an employee and zero
otherwise. We also split age at 40 years old to obtain a binary variable.
--Insert Table 27 -In our study, graph-theoretical procedure generates a Likert-scale score for the status of the
perpetrators using the perpetrator’s age, tenure, gender, position, education, and prior charges as
status characteristics. Values closer to +1 indicate a high status, whereas values closer to -1 indicate
a low status. H4 examines whether the main effect of fraud severity on fraud outcomes is moderated
by the perpetrator’s status. We test H4, which examines whether the main effect of fraud severity
on fraud outcomes is moderated by the perpetrator’s status. In Model 3 we interact STATUSCOMP
with fraud severity variables.
Model 3:
Fraud Outcome = α + β1*FR_DURATION + β2*FR_AMOUNT + β3*FR_TYPE +
β4*COLLUSION + β5*STATUSCOMP + β6*FR_DURATION*STATUSCOMP
+ β7*FR_AMOUNT*STATUSCOMP + β8*FR_TYPE*STATUSCOMP +
β9*COLLUSION*STATUSCOMP + β10*ORG_TYPE + β11*ORG_SIZE +
β12*INDUSTRY + β13*ANTIFRAUD + β14*ORG_LOC + ε
(3)
Table 28 reports the results from the multinomial logistic regression, which we detail in
Model 3. In comparing the odds of not being terminated to being terminated, the coefficient of the
interaction term FR_DURATION*STATUSCOMP (β6), FR_AMOUNT*STATUSCOMP (β7),
FR_TYPE*STATUSCOMP (β8), and COLLUSION*STATUSCOMP (β9) is not statistically
significant from zero. However, in comparing the odds of being terminated to being terminated
and referred for criminal prosecution, we find that the status of the perpetrators interacts with the
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fraud duration, i.e. the coefficient of FR_DURATION*STATUSCOMP is positive (+0.02) and
significantly different from zero (two-tailed p < 0.01). Figure 3 shows the graphic representation
of the interaction between the fraud duration and the perpetrator’s status. In fraud cases with a
short duration, low status perpetrators have a higher probability of being terminated and referred
for criminal prosecution than high status perpetrators. As the fraud duration increases, perpetrators
with different status have equal probability of being terminated and referred for criminal
prosecution. In low severity cases, low status perpetrators receive a harsher punishment than high
status perpetrators. As the fraud severity increases, perpetrators with different statuses receive the
equal punishment. Thus, victim organizations take in consideration the perpetrator’s status when
pursuing an outcome in occupational fraud cases.
--Insert Table 28 and Figure 20 -CONCLUSION
When high-profile fraud cases were detected in early 2000s, organizations, victim to these
fraud schemes, rushed to replace their top executives. Some executives resigned voluntarily while
others were terminated. There was also a group of organizations which did not pursue any outcome
against their principal perpetrators. This evidence indicates that organizations, victimized by these
frauds, choose whether and how to punish fraudsters. In this study, we examine whether the victim
organization’s decision to pursue an outcome against their executives is affected by the severity of
fraud, by the type of the organization, and by the perpetrator’s status.
We find that governmental, not-for-profit, and privately held organizations are more likely
not to terminate principal perpetrators as compared to publicly traded organizations over time.
Additionally, governmental and not-for-profit organizations are more likely to terminate and refer
for criminal prosecution the principal perpetrators as compared to just terminate. Thus,
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governmental and not-for-profit organizations decide to pursue the two extreme outcomes against
the fraudsters (i.e. the perpetrator is either not terminated or is terminated and the case is referred
for prosecution). We find, also, that the victim organizations pursue less severe outcomes against
high status perpetrators, as compared to low status perpetrators in fraud cases with a short duration.
As the fraud duration increases, however, victim organizations pursue equally severe outcomes
against all perpetrators. The findings of this study shed light on the importance of fraud duration
and its effect on the outcomes pursued against the occupational fraud perpetrators. We conclude
that the fraud outcome is determined not only by the severity of the fraud act, but also by the type
of victim organization and the status of the perpetrator who perpetrated the fraud scheme.
Our study contributes to criminology and white-collar crime literature by being the first to
consider the perpetrator’s status characteristics and the victim organization type as moderators to
the relationship between crime severity and punishment severity. It further adds to occupational
fraud literature in accounting by providing a context to the descriptive data in the ACFE’s Report
to the Nations. Our study further offers anti-fraud professionals, such as forensic accounting and
fraud examination professionals, an insight into the interactions between the fraud scheme
attributes and victim and perpetrator characteristics. This information may aid them in the design
of internal controls or when advising victim organization clients. As such, our study has both
research and practical implications.
As with any archival study, there are several limitations to this study. First, civil litigation
is not examined as a potential fraud outcome due to data availability. Anecdotally, civil litigation
is less common than referral for criminal prosecution; however, it is still pursued in a considerable
number of occupational fraud cases. Second, certain observations are deleted as the responses of
the CFEs were contradictory or incomplete. For instance, when asked about the actions taken
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against the principal perpetrator, both probation/suspension and termination are selected. We
cannot determine whether this is by mistake or by choice when the perpetrator is initially
suspended and then terminated. Despite these limitations, this study makes important contribution
to the accounting fraud literature.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 18 Graphing Interaction – Pr (No-Termination)
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Figure 19 Graphing Interaction – Pr (Termination and Referral for Criminal Prosecution)

145

Figure 20 Graphing Interaction – Pr (Termination and Referral for Criminal Prosecution)
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Table 22 Full Sample – Descriptive Statistics

Freq.

Mean

N = 2,096
Median
Min.

Max.

Std. Dev.

Fraud severity
FR_DURATION

25.6

18.0

1.0

120.0

24.4

FR_AMOUNT

12.1

12.2

4.8

19.1

2.2

COLLUSION

2.4

1.0

1.0

27.0

2.8

40.0

18.0

71.0

9.6

FR_TYPE:
AM
Non-AM

Obs.

%

1,860

88.7

236

11.3

Perpetrator Status
41.5

AGE
Obs.

%

Less than 5 years

1,005

47.9

More than 5 years

1,091

52.1

1,355

64.6

Female

741

35.4

Employee

899

42.9

Manager

830

39.6

Executive

367

17.5

HS or less

632

30.2

1,464

69.8

Yes

230

11.0

No

1,866

89.0

Obs.

%

Publicly traded

645

30.8

Privately held

891

42.5

Governmental

328

15.6

Not-for-profit

232

11.1

TENURE:

GENDER:
Male
POSITION:

EDUCATION:
Some college or more
PRIORCHARG:

Victim Organization Type
ORG_TYPE:

Control Variables
ORG_SIZE

18.2

18.1

4.6

32.6

3.5

ANTIFRAUD

7.3

7.0

0.0

18.0

4.9

147

Obs.

%

Banking

380

18.1

Manufacturing

305

14.6

Public Service

261

12.5

Customer Service

598

28.5

Others

552

26.3

1,240

59.2

INDUSTRY:

LOCATION:
US firms

Non-US firms
856
40.8
_____________________________
Variable Definitions:
FR_DURATION = number of months that the scheme had been ongoing before it was detected
FR_AMOUNT = natural logarithm of the total dollar value of the number of misappropriated assets or the amount of
the caused loss
FR_TYPE = indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraud scheme involved asset misappropriation and 0 otherwise
COLLUSION = number of perpetrators involved in the fraud scheme
AGE = Age of the principal perpetrator in years at the time of the occupational fraud
TENURE = Indicator variable equal 1 if the principal perpetrator had worked for the victim organization less than five
years at the time occupational fraud occurred, and 0 if s/he had worked for more than five years
GENDER = It equals 1 if perpetrator is a male and 0 if s/he is a female
POSITION = The perpetrator position is measured at three levels: employee, manager (includes supervisor), and
executive (includes owner and officer)
EDUCATION = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the principal perpetrator’s education equals some college or even
higher education, and 0 otherwise, i.e. if the perpetrator has high school or lower education
PRIORCHARG = Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the perpetrator received prior fraud-related charges and 0
otherwise
ORG_TYPE = The type of the organization is measured at four levels: governmental agency, publicly traded company,
privately held company, and not-for-profit organization.
ORG_SIZE = Natural logarithm of the victim organization’s approximate gross annual revenue
INDUSTRY = The following industries are examined: banking/financial services, manufacturing, public services
(includes government and public administration, religious, charitable, social services), customer service (includes
transportation and warehousing), and others.
ANTIFRAUD = Total number of antifraud measures that victim organizations had in place at the time that occupational
fraud occurred
ORG_LOC = Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the victim organization is in the United States and 0 otherwise
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Table 23 Descriptive Statistics by Outcome Type
No Termination

Termination Only

(n = 217)

(n = 535)

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

FR_DURATION

24.5

16.0

FR_AMOUNT

11.4

11.2

COLLUSION

2.4

2.0

Freq.

Termination and Criminal Prosecution
(n = 1,344)

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

25.8

20.9

14.0

2.5

11.6

11.5

2.3

2.4

2.0

Freq.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

20.2

27.7

20.0

25.4

2.2

12.4

12.4

2.1

2.6

2.4

1.0

2.9

40.0

9.7

Freq.

Fraud severity

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

AM

188

86.6

426

79.6

1,246

92.7

Non-AM

29

13.4

109

20.4

98

7.3

FR_TYPE:

Perpetrator Status
45.0

AGE

45.0

9.7

41.2

40.0

8.9

41.0

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Less than 5 years

81

37.3

249

46.5

675

50.2

More than 5 years

136

62.7

286

53.5

669

49.8

Male

164

75.6

414

77.4

777

57.8

Female

53

24.4

121

22.6

567

42.2

Employee

58

26.7

201

37.6

640

47.6

Manager

94

43.3

234

43.7

502

37.4

Executive

65

30.0

100

18.7

202

15.0

HS or less

47

21.7

117

21.9

468

34.8

Some college or more

170

78.3

418

78.1

876

65.2

TENURE:

GENDER:

POSITION:

EDUCATION:
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PRIORCHARG:
Yes

15

6.9

27

5.0

188

14.0

No

202

93.1

508

95.0

1,156

86.0

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Publicly traded

35

16.1

219

40.9

391

29.1

Privately held

108

49.8

221

41.3

562

41.8

Governmental

45

20.7

51

9.5

232

17.3

Not-for-profit

29

13.4

44

8.2

159

11.8

Victim Organization Type
ORG_TYPE:

Control Variables
ORG_SIZE

17.3

16.8

3.3

18.5

18.6

3.5

18.2

18.0

3.5

ANTIFRAUD

6.3

6.0

4.6

8.1

8.0

4.6

7.1

7.0

5.1

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Obs.

%

Banking

22

10.1

80

15.0

278

20.7

Manufacturing

39

18.0

113

21.1

153

11.4

Public Service

40

18.4

44

8.2

177

13.2

Customer Service

64

29.5

142

26.5

392

29.2

Others

52

24.0

156

29.2

344

25.6

US firms

118

54.4

247

46.2

875

65.1

Non-US firms

99

45.6

288

53.8

469

34.9

INDUSTRY:

LOCATION:

______________________________
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 24 Pearson (Upper)/ Spearman (Lower) Correlation Coefficients
1
1

2
0.36

3
**

4

5
0.34

6
**

7

0.36

**

8

-0.08

**

0.02

0.00

-0.15**

0.22**

0.29**

0.18**

0.16**

-0.09**

-0.02

-0.03

0.04

0.17

9
**

0.00

-0.11

0.33**

-0.18**

0.00

-0.14**

-0.09**

0.12**

0.05*

0.17**

0.11**

0.39**

0.08**
0.03

-0.10**

-0.10**

0.06**

-0.08**

0.01

0.08**

0.02

-0.07**

-0.02

0.11**

-0.08**

-0.07**

0.02

0.40**

-0.09**

-0.02

-0.11**

-0.01

0.05*

0.11**

0.18**

-0.01

-0.12**

-0.02

-0.05*

-0.01

0.17**

0.28**

-0.24**

-0.09**

0.12**

-0.01

-0.09**

-0.07**

-0.29**

-0.05*

-0.07**

0.08**

0.02

-0.04

0.11**

-0.06**

0.04

-0.01

0.03

**

*

0.04

0.01

-0.24**

-0.28**

-0.30**

-0.37**

4

0.02

0.30**

-0.12**

5

0.37**

0.30**

-0.02

0.08**

6

0.37**

0.18**

-0.03

0.07**

0.39**

7

-0.08**

0.16**

-0.14**

0.25**

0.09**

0.03

8

0.21**

0.32**

-0.09**

0.21**

0.41**

0.18**

0.28**

9

-0.03

-0.18**

0.12**

-0.11**

-0.09**

-0.01

-0.24**

-0.29**

**

**

-0.09

-0.06

0.11

**

10

-0.01

0.00

0.06

11

-0.11**

0.05*

-0.08**

0.12**

-0.10**

-0.02

0.12**

-0.06**

-0.06**

-0.09**

12

0.04

0.09**

0.01

-0.07**

-0.02

-0.05*

-0.01

0.07**

0.04

0.05*

-0.57**

13

0.05*

-0.10**

0.08**

-0.09**

0.05*

-0.01

-0.09**

0.02

-0.01

0.04

-0.24**

-0.30**

14
0.05*
-0.10**
0.02
0.02
0.11**
0.11**
_______________________________________________________
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

-0.07**

-0.04

0.03

0.01

-0.29**

-0.37**

-0.09

FR_DURATION
FR_AMOUNT
FR_TYPE
COLLUSION
AGE

6=
7=
8=
9=
10 =

TENURE
GENDER
POSITION
EDUCATION
PRIORCHARG

11 =
PUBLICLY TRADED
12 =
PRIVATELY HELD
13 =
NOT-FOR-PROFIT
14 =
GOVERNMENTAL
Variables are defined in Table 16 and Appendix A
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0.05

-0.57**

(n = 2,096)

1=
2=
3=
4=
5=

0.05*

0.08**

-0.13**

-0.12

14
*

0.06**

0.02

-0.02

13
0.05

3

**

12
**

0.04

0.42**

-0.04

11

-0.01

2

**

10

-0.15**
-0.15**

Table 25 Multinomial Logit Regression for Outcome Pursued and Fraud Severity, Perpetrator Status and
Victim Organization Type.
No Termination
Variables (n = 2,096)

B

SE

Intercept

-1.27

0.94

Fraud severity
Fraud Duration
Fraud Amount
Collusion
Fraud Type (AM)

0.00
-0.08
0.03
0.27

0.00
0.05
0.03
0.24

OR

Termination and Criminal prosecution
B

SE

-4.23

0.66

1.01]
1.02]
1.10]
2.11]

0.01
0.37
0.01
1.16

0.00
0.03
0.02
0.17

1.01**
1.44***
1.01
3.19***

0.03 0.01 1.03***
-0.17 0.19
0.84
-0.003 0.21
1.00

[1.01, 1.05]
[0.58, 1.22]
[0.66, 1.51]

-0.02
0.28
-0.59

0.01
0.13
0.14

0.98** [0.97, 1.00]
1.33** [1.03, 1.71]
0.55*** [0.42, 0.72]

-0.43
-0.19

0.28
0.23

0.65
0.83

0.60
0.42

0.20
0.17

0.02

0.22

1.02

[0.38, 1.12]
[0.53, 1.29]
[0.67, 1.55]

-0.52

0.14

1.83*** [1.25, 2.68]
1.52** [1.09, 2.13]
[0.45, 0.78]
0.59***

0.28

0.34

1.32

[0.67, 2.58]

0.95

0.23

2.59*** [1.65, 4.05]

1.19
0.86
0.84

0.35 3.30***
0.36 2.37**
0.24 2.32***

[1.66, 6.55]
[1.16, 4.82]
[1.44, 3.75]

0.96
0.58
0.23

0.24
0.25
0.15

2.62*** [1.63, 4.22]
1.78** [1.10, 2.88]
[0.94, 1.67]
1.26

0.96
0.97
1.03

[0.91, 1.02]
[0.93, 1.01]
[0.72, 1.49]

-0.02
0.01
0.68

0.02
0.01
0.13

[0.94, 1.02]
0.98
[0.98, 1.04]
1.01
1.97*** [1.54, 2.53]

0.99
1.12
1.32
0.90

[0.55,
[0.66,
[0.71,
[0.56,

0.55
-0.48
0.08
-0.07

0.18
0.19
0.25
0.16

1.73***
0.62***
1.09
0.93

1.00
0.93
1.03
1.31

95% CI

[0.99,
[0.84,
[0.97,
[0.81,

OR

95% CI

[1.00,
[1.35,
[0.97,
[2.28,

1.01]
1.54]
1.06]
4.46]

Perpetrator Status
Age
Tenure (less than 5 years)
Gender (Male)
Position:
Employee
Manager
Education (Some college or
more)
Prior Charges (Charged)
Victim Organization Type
Organization Type:
Governmental
Not-for-profit
Privately held
Control Variables

Organization Size -0.04 0.03
Anti-fraud measures -0.03 0.02
US firms (US) 0.03 0.19
Industry:
Banking -0.01 0.30
Manufacturing 0.11 0.26
Public Services 0.28 0.32
Others -0.11 0.24
____________________________

1.78]
1.88]
2.48]
1.44]

*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test.
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[1.21,
[0.43,
[0.67,
[0.68,

2.48]
0.89]
1.76]
1.28]

Table 26 Multinomial Logit Regression for Outcome Pursued and Fraud Severity, Perpetrator Status and Victim Organization Type.
No Termination
Variables

Termination and criminal prosecution

B

SE

OR

95% CI

B

SE

Intercept

-1.80

1.51

Fraud Duration

-0.04

0.02

0.96***

[0.93,

Fraud Amount

-0.01

0.10

0.99

Collusion

0.02

0.07

Fraud Type (AM)

0.73

Governmental *Fraud Duration

OR

95% CI

-4.22

0.87

0.99]

0.00

0.00

1.00

[0.99,

1.01]

[0.81,

1.21]

0.36

0.05

1.43***

[1.28,

1.59]

1.02

[0.89,

1.17]

0.05

0.03

1.06*

[0.99,

1.13]

0.54

2.07

[0.71,

6.02]

1.14

0.27

3.11***

[1.85,

5.24]

0.06

0.02

1.06***

[1.02,

1.10]

0.02

0.01

1.02*

[1.00,

1.04]

Non-Profit * Fraud Duration

0.06

0.02

1.06***

[1.02,

1.10]

-0.01

0.01

0.99

[0.97,

1.02]

Private*Fraud Duration

0.04

0.02

1.04***

[1.01,

1.08]

0.01

0.01

1.01

[1.00,

1.02]

Governmental * Fraud Amount

-0.24

0.14

0.78*

[0.59,

1.04]

-0.07

0.09

0.93

[0.78,

1.11]

Non-Profit * Fraud Amount

-0.27

0.19

0.76

[0.53,

1.10]

0.46

0.15

1.59***

[1.18,

2.15]

Private * Fraud Amount

0.03

0.12

1.04

[0.82,

1.31]

-0.03

0.07

0.97

[0.85,

1.12]

Governmental * Collusion

0.01

0.09

1.01

[0.84,

1.22]

-0.12

0.06

0.89*

[0.79,

1.00]

Non-Profit * Collusion

0.22

0.19

1.25

[0.87,

1.80]

-0.02

0.16

0.98

[0.72,

1.34]

Private * Collusion

-0.03

0.09

0.97

[0.82,

1.15]

-0.06

0.05

0.94

[0.85,

1.03]

Governmental * Fraud Type

-0.82

0.91

0.44

[0.07,

2.61]

-1.13

0.61

0.32*

[0.10,

1.07]

Non-Profit * Fraud Type

-1.65

1.19

0.19

[0.02,

1.99]

-0.73

1.02

0.48

[0.07,

3.57]

Private * Fraud Type

-0.49

0.63

0.61

[0.18,

2.10]

0.38

0.38

1.46

[0.69,

3.09]

Age

0.03

0.01

1.04***

[1.01,

1.06]

-0.02

0.01

0.98**

[0.97,

1.00]

Tenure (less than 5 years)

-0.13

0.19

0.88

[0.60,

1.27]

0.31

0.13

1.37**

[1.06,

1.76]

Gender (Male)

0.01

0.21

1.01

[0.66,

1.54]

-0.61

0.14

0.54***

[0.41,

0.71]

Fraud severity

Perpetrator Status
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Position:
Employee
Manager

-0.38
-0.14

0.28
0.23

0.69
0.87

[0.40,
[0.56,

1.19]
1.37]

0.61
0.43

0.20
0.17

1.85***
1.53**

[1.25,
[1.09,

2.73]
2.16]

Education (Some college or more)
Prior Charges (Charged)

0.04
0.28

0.22
0.35

1.04
1.33

[0.68,
[0.67,

1.59]
2.63]

-0.53
0.98

0.14
0.23

0.59***
2.66***

[0.45,
[1.69,

0.77]
4.20]

Governmental

3.46

1.85

31.90*

[0.84,

1209.84]

2.70

1.24

14.82**

[1.31,

167.85]

Not-for-profit

3.70

2.22

40.60*

[0.52,

3146.78]

-3.57

1.84

0.03*

[0.00,

1.03]

Privately held

0.12

1.55

1.13

[0.05,

23.42]

0.24

0.94

1.27

[0.20,

8.03]

Organization Size

-0.04

0.03

0.96

[0.90,

1.02]

-0.02

0.02

0.98

[0.95,

1.02]

Anti-fraud measures

-0.03

0.02

0.97

[0.93,

1.02]

0.01

0.02

1.01

[0.98,

1.04]

US firms (US)

0.02

0.19

1.02

[0.70,

1.48]

0.67

0.13

1.95***

[1.52,

2.50]

Banking

-0.11

0.31

0.90

[0.49,

1.64]

0.53

0.19

1.70***

[1.18,

2.45]

Manufacturing

0.12

0.27

1.12

[0.67,

1.90]

-0.44

0.19

0.64**

[0.45,

0.93]

Public Services

0.29

0.33

1.34

[0.69,

2.58]

0.06

0.26

1.07

[0.65,

1.76]

Others

-0.16

0.24

0.86

[0.53,

1.38]

-0.09

0.16

0.91

[0.67,

1.25]

Victim Organization Complexity
Organization Type:

Control Variables

Industry:

____________________________
*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test.
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Table 27 P’s Aggregate Expectations

Paths

Perpetrators

P’s Aggregate Expectation

6 positive; 0 negative

Male perpetrators, who are over
40 years old in managerial or
executive position, and have
some college education and no
prior charges.

0.9834

5 positive; 1 negative

0.4722

4 positive; 2 negative

0.19

3 positive; 3 negative

0.00

2 positive; 4 negative

-0.19

1 positive; 5 negative

-0.4722

0 positive; 6 negative

Female perpetrators, who are
under 40 years old in an
employee position, and have
only high school education or
less, and have prior charges.

-0.9834

Table 28 Multinomial Logit Regression for Outcome Pursued and Fraud Severity, Perpetrator Status and Victim Organization Type.

Variables

B

No Termination
SE
OR
95% CI

Intercept

-0.44

0.92

Fraud Duration
Fraud Amount
Collusion
Fraud Type (AM)

0.00
-0.06
0.02
0.12

0.01
0.06
0.04
0.36

1.00
0.94
1.02
1.13

[0.99,
[0.83,
[0.94,
[0.56,

Status
Status*Fraud Duration
Status*Fraud Amount
Status*Collusion
Status*Fraud Type

-0.10
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.49

1.30
0.01
0.10
0.07
0.59

0.91
1.01
1.03
1.01
1.63

1.29
0.96
0.87

0.35
0.36
0.24

-0.04
-0.04
0.13
-0.09
0.07
0.23
-0.12

Termination and criminal prosecution
B
SE
OR
95% CI
-4.50

0.61

1.01]
1.06]
1.11]
2.29]

0.00
0.35
-0.02
1.16

0.00
0.04
0.03
0.23

1.00
1.42***
0.98
3.20***

[0.99,
[1.32,
[0.94,
[2.05,

1.01]
1.54,
1.04]
4.97]

[0.07,
[0.99,
[0.84,
[0.88,
[0.51,

11.48]
1.03]
1.25]
1.17]
5.22]

-1.99
0.02
-0.01
0.07
0.12

1.00
0.01
0.07
0.05
0.43

0.14**
1.02***
0.99
1.08
1.12

[0.02,
[1.01,
[0.86,
[0.97,
[0.48,

0.97]
1.03]
1.15]
1.19]
2.62]

3.62***
2.62***
2.39***

[1.83,
[1.29,
[1.48,

7.16]
5.29]
3.85]

1.00
0.55
0.24

0.24
0.24
0.14

2.73***
1.73**
1.27

[1.70,
[1.08,
[0.95,

4.37]
2.79]
1.68]

0.03
0.02
0.18

0.96
0.96*
1.14

[0.91,
[0.92,
[0.80,

1.02]
1.01]
1.62]

-0.02
0.01
0.71

0.02
0.01
0.12

0.98
1.01
2.03***

[0.95,
[0.98,
[1.60,

1.02]
1.04]
2.58]

0.30
0.27
0.32
0.24

0.91
1.07
1.26
0.88

[0.51,
[0.63,
[0.67,
[0.55,

1.65]
1.80]
2.36]
1.41]

0.51
-0.47
0.06
-0.06

0.18
0.18
0.25
0.16

1.66***
0.63**
1.06
0.95

[1.16,
[0.44,
[0.65,
[0.69,

2.38]
0.90]
1.72]
1.29]

Fraud severity

Perpetrator Status

Victim Organization Complexity
Organization Type:
Government
Not-for-profit
Privately held
Control Variables
Organization Size
Anti-fraud measures
US firms (US)
Industry:
Banking
Manufacturing
Public Services
Others
____________________________

*, **, *** Indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test.

APPENDIX H – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable

Measurement

ACFE
survey
Question

DV - Dependent variable
Termination

Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the perpetrator no longer
worked for the victim organization after fraud was detected, and 0
otherwise.

Q74

Criminal

Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the fraud case was referred
to law enforcement for criminal prosecution, and 0 otherwise

Q75

It equals 0 if the perpetrator was not terminated and was not
referred to law enforcement for prosecution; it equals 1 if the
perpetrator was only terminated; and it equals 2 if the perpetrator
was terminated and was referred to law enforcement for
prosecution.

Q74/Q75

The number of months that the scheme had been ongoing before
it was initially detected.

Q41

Natural logarithm of the total dollar value of the amount of assets
that was misappropriated, or the amount of loss caused.

Q2

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraud scheme involved asset
misappropriation, and 0 otherwise.

Q6

Prosecution
Fraud Outcome

IV- Fraud Severity
Fraud

Duration

(FR_DURATION)
Fraud

Amount

(FR_AMOUNT)
Fraud

Type

(FR_TYPE)
Collusion

The number of perpetrators involved in the fraud scheme.

Q59

(COLLUSION)
IV- Perpetrator Status
Age
(AGE)

Age of the principal perpetrator in years at the time of the
occupational fraud.

Q60

Variable
Tenure
(TENURE)
Gender

Measurement
Indicator variable equal 1 if the principal perpetrator had worked
for the victim organization less than five years at the time
occupational fraud occurred, and 0 if s/he had worked for more
than five years.
It equals 1 if perpetrator is a male and 0 if s/he is a female.

ACFE
survey
Question
Q61

Q65

(GENDER)
Position
(POSITION)
Education
(EDUCATION)
Prior

Charges

The perpetrator position is a categorical variable with three levels:
employee, manager (includes supervisor) and executive (includes
owner and officer).

Q62

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the principal perpetrator’s
education equals some college education or more, and 0 otherwise,
i.e. the perpetrators received high school graduation or less.

Q66

Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the perpetrators has
received prior fraud-related charges, and 0 otherwise.

Q69

(PRIORCHARG)
IV- Victim Organization Type
Organization Type
(ORG_TYPE)

The type of organization is a categorical variable with four levels:
governmental agency, publicly traded company, privately held
company and not-for-profit organization.

Q45

CV – Control Variables
Organization Size

Natural logarithm of the victim organization’s approximate gross
annual revenue.

Q47

The following industries are controlled for: banking/financial
services, manufacturing, public services (includes government and
public administration, religious, charitable, social services),
customer service (includes transportation and warehousing) and
others.
Total number of antifraud measures that victim organizations had
in place at the time that occupational fraud occurred.

Q49

(ORG_SIZE)
Industry
(INDUSTRY)
Anti-fraud
measures
(ANTIFRAUD)
158

Q51

Variable
Organization

Measurement
Indicator variable, where it equals 1 if the victim organization is
located in the U.S.A., and 0 otherwise.

Location
(ORG_LOC)

159

ACFE
survey
Question
Q50
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ABSTRACT
Management teams often increase or modify formal controls when fraud, such as employee theft, is
detected. However, doing so may have unintended consequences for the perpetrator’s coworkers. For
example, affective event theory explains that when employees believe that the response is unfair, they
become counterproductive, reducing the firm’s overall productivity. We test whether theft by a coworker
reduces non-offending employee productivity using a two-period experiment with groups of two
employees and one manager. Employees can steal each period and, if theft is detected in period one,
managers can increase detection for all employees in period two. We find that two out of three managers
increase inspections for all employees, even without incentive to do so. Further, we find that employees’
affect intensity and ability to be influenced by others are related to their levels of productivity and
likelihood of taking in period 1 but not taking in period 2.
Keywords: Theft, management controls, counterproductive workplace behavior, affective event
theory, fairness judgment
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INTRODUCTION
Employee theft has a substantial effect on businesses and total losses from theft of cash and noncash assets range between $40 billion and $120 billion each year (Buss 1993; Lipman and McGraw 1998).
These losses are attributable to approximately 30% of business failures (Lipman and McGraw 1998;
Snyder and Blair 1989; Marasi, Bennet, and Budden 2018), generating a nontrivial impact to the economy.
Further, 33% of retail, manufacturing, and service employees surveyed self-reported stealing from their
employer (Clark and Hollinger 1983).
Managers use formal controls, such as inspections of employees’ work, to accomplish
organizational goals (Chenhall 2007), to increase workplace conformity (Bedford, Malmi, and Sandelin
2016), and to punish workplace deviance (Parilla, Hollinger, and Clark 1988) like employee theft
(Kennedy 2014). While the intent of the controls is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of business
processes, they can have unintended consequences. For example, when management implements
inspections of employees’ work in response to deviant behavior, other employees may perceive the
inspections to be an unfair punitive or threatening action against them (Chenhall, Hall, and Smith 2010;
Penney and Spector 2005). Coworkers base their fairness judgments on the perceived inequity of the
situation and the organization’s response to it.
Affective event theory (AET) explains that perceived unfairness results in a decline in
organizational productivity through reduced job satisfaction, decreased job commitment, and increased
withdrawal behaviors (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996). When employees perceive these actions to be unfair,
they may avoid work, call in sick, or otherwise become counterproductive (Bennett and Robinson 1995).
Counterproductive workplace behavior occurs when employees seek retribution against the organization
for the perceived unfair treatment. Robinson and Bennett (1995) define CWB as “voluntary behavior that
violates significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization” (p.
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556). CWB may be intentional or unintentional and includes loss of motivation to conform to group norms
and increasing motivation to deviate from group norms (Kaplan 1982). Counterproductive workplace
behaviors have a serious effect on the organization (Robinson and Bennett 1995; Penney and Spector
2005) and can reduce productivity by as much as 10% of the organization’s total productivity (Belot and
Schroder 2012). Even though reduced productivity can have detrimental effects on organizations, prior
literature has not examined the effects of reduced productivity from employee fairness judgments.
To evaluate coworker productivity and management’s response to fraud, we conduct a two-period
experiment with groups of three participants, including one manager and two employees. Both roles,
manager and employee, are explained to all participants. Managers oversee employees’ productivity and
an investment fund. They are compensated based on the number of hours employees work toward the
company’s productivity, as well as the investment fund balance at the end of the study. In period 1,
managers have a 50% chance of detecting fraud. If they detect fraud in period one, managers have the
option to increase the likelihood of detection to 100% in period two. Employees choose how many hours
to contribute toward the company’s productivity and have the opportunity to take $0.50 from an
investment fund at the end of each period. Employees are compensated a flat rate of $1.00 and are able to
keep whatever money they take from the investment fund.
We find that two out of every three managers increase inspections for all employees, even with no
incentive to do so. We assign one in three employees to the “No Increase” condition and two in three
employees to either the “Increase Inspections” or “Detect fraud, but No Increase” conditions. Results show
that there is no difference in employee productivity nor likelihood of taking from the investment fund
between these conditions. However, in supplemental analyses we find that employee participants’ affect
intensity and ability to be influenced by others affect their levels of productivity and their likelihood of
taking in period 1 but not taking in period 2. We use this information to design future pilot studies.
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BACKGROUND
Employee Theft as Fraud
Employee theft is defined as “the unauthorized taking, control, or transfer of money and/or
property” (Clark and Hollinger 1983, p. 1) from one’s employer during the course of one’s employment
(Clark and Hollinger 1983) and is a form of occupational fraud called asset misappropriation (ACFE 2018).
Asset misappropriation cases are the most prolific type of fraud, comprising 89% of all cases reported by
Certified Fraud Examiners in 2018, averaging $114,000 per incident (ACFE 2018). Losses from asset
misappropriation are both staggering and difficult to prevent, as offenders have an intimate knowledge of
the organization’s systems and processes. Kennedy (2014) states, “it is likely through the proper
performance of one’s job that an employee gains the trust and knowledge needed to engage in employee
theft” (p.13). Indeed, the specific attributes of one’s job, particularly access to assets, and their skills and
capabilities (Mustaine and Tewksbury 2002) influence the likelihood of committing employee theft.
The antecedents and consequences of employee theft have been examined across white-collar
crime, organizational justice, and occupational fraud disciplines. Antecedents have included
organizational attributes and the interaction between organizational attributes and individual
characteristics. Prior studies on organizational attributes show that employee perception is a key indicator
of the likelihood of committing fraud. For example, when employees feel supported (Clark and Hollinger
1983) they are less likely to steal from the company. Similarly, employees who perceive that
organizational norms discourage unethical behavior (Kulas, McInnerney, DeMuth, and Jadwinski 2007)
or who perceive punishment to be certain or severe (Hollinger and Clark 1982) are less likely to engage
in employee theft. Clark and Hollinger (1983) also find that company policy is a better deterrent against
employee theft than physical security.
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Management Controls in Response to Fraud
The quality of the control environment has a strong effect on reducing fraud (Rae and Subramanian
2008) and a lack of internal controls or override of controls is often a factor in fraud cases (ACFE 2018).
Specifically, the control goal of safeguarding assets (Ouchi 1979) is violated when employee theft occurs.
The security orientation of organizational controls “facilitates a response after an employee has been
caught stealing” (Tomlinson and Greenberg 2007, p. 288) that involves modifying processes and
technology to increase deterrence of future incidents of theft and to identify and hold future offenders
accountable (Tomlinson 2016).
When management modifies the control environment, they signal to non-offending employees (i.e.
the perpetrator’s coworkers) the level of tolerance management has for employee theft. Signaling theory
explains that when information is asymmetric between two parties, one party (the sender) must choose
whether and how to communicate (or signal) that information to the other party, the receiver (Spence
1973). In selecting the communication mechanism, management must consider the intent of the message
and the whether the signal is strong enough that the recipient understands the message (Connelly, Certo,
Ireland, and Reutzel 2011). Additionally, management should consider the potential vicarious effects of
the signal on other employees (Butterfield, Treviño, and Ball 1996) and whether the message will also be
understood by the perpetrator’s coworkers.
Controls offer management tools to communicate their signal to both the individual perpetrator
and to other employees. Management may choose, for example, to increase the likelihood that the same
theft act will be detected in the future. Conversely, management may choose to “turn a blind eye” to
deviant behavior by not acknowledging known wrongful acts or may choose to “sweep under the rug”
wrongful acts that are known only to management by not responding to the event. Taking no action against
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a perpetrator may send a signal to other employees that management condones or dismisses wrongful
behavior, which may result in the furtherance of such behavior by other employees.
While the intent of controls is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of business processes
while monitoring employees (Litzky, Eddleston, and Kidder 2006) and deterring deviant behavior, their
modification can have unintended consequences. For example, when management implements inspections
of employees’ work in response to workplace deviance, other employees may perceive the inspections to
be an unfair punitive or threatening action against them (Chenhall et al. 2010; Penney and Spector 2005:
Tomlinson and Greenberg 2007; Litzky et al. 2006). Further, increasing controls can signal distrust
between management and employees that may incite counterproductive workplace behavior, such as
property or production deviance (Litzky et al. 2006). Thus, management’s use of controls to deter fraud
may have unintended consequences and a detrimental effect on employees.
Management controls have been pervasively examined in organizational justice, organizational
behavior, and accounting literature. Researchers have been evaluating the behavioral facets of internal
control (Carmichael 1970), proposed frameworks for management controls (Ouchi 1979), organizational
inputs of and attributes related to controls (Parilla et al. 1988; Tomlinson and Greenberg 2007), internal
control quality and tests of controls (Schroeder and Shepardson 2016; Bhaskar, Schroeder, and
Shepardson 2018), and the impacts of individuals’ characteristics (Christ, Emett, Summers, and Wood
2012). While management controls have been studied prolifically (Merchant and Otley 2007), prior
literature has not examined the effects of management controls on workgroup productivity in response to
fraud.
Coworkers Observe Management’s Response to Fraud
Coworkers witness social interactions in the workplace, such as management’s response to deviant
behavior (Totterdell, Hershcovis, Niven, Reich, and Stride 2012; Robinson, Wang, and Kiewitz 2014) and
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are undervalued third-party observers in these situations (Robinson et al. 2014). These observations are
impactful, as coworkers spend a large quantity of time together and coworker relationships influence
organizational dissent (Solito and Myers 2015), job affect, and organizational citizenship behavior (Lee
and Allen 2002). Indeed, “relationships between coworkers are an important, yet understudied source of
influence in peoples’ lives” (Basford and Offermann 2012, p. 807). Although overlooked in the literature,
misbehaving employees have a vicarious impact on their coworkers and “trigger potentially potent
reactions” (Robinson et al. 2014, p.124) to organizational situations. For example, coworkers may imitate
deviant behavior (Schmidtke 2007), particularly when they perceive the organizational response to tolerate
the activity (Litzky et al. 2006). Therefore, coworker relationships can have large positive and negative
impacts on the organization and should be studied.
Affective Event Theory and Fairness Judgments
Calls from the industrial/organizational psychology and neuroscientific communities to further
investigate what context and information is relevant when individuals form moral decisions led to the
development of Affective Event Theory (“AET”). AET explains that feelings elicited by workplace
activities influence job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and other workplace behaviors (Weiss
and Cropanzano 1996). Instead of processing information cognitively, affective events such as employee
theft cause emotional responses to supersede cognitive processing (Kennedy 2014), which leads to
cognitive dissonance (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996) that is increased by uncertainty (Lind and van den
Bos 2002). To resolve this dissonance, employees judge the perceived fairness of the situation and the
organizational response to it (Ball, Treviño, and Sims 1994; Henle 2005; Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
Coworkers who observe workplace wrongdoing and perceive the situation to be unfair (Treviño
1992) may seek retribution against the offender. Contrarily, employees who perceive the organizational
response to be unfair may feel dissent (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, and Gee 2002; Butterfield et
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al. 1996) toward the organization. Under fairness theory, organizational research shows that these
decisions induce third-party observers to consider what the wrongdoer would have done if they could have,
and what they should have done (Folger and Cropanzano 2001), and to judge the fairness of the situation
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Fairness judgments are based on the equity and consistency of applied justice,
absence of bias, and “its representativeness of important subgroups” (Leventhal 1980, p.1).
Counterproductive Workplace Behavior
When employees perceive a situation or an organizational response to a situation to be unfair, they
may engage in retributive behavior by becoming counterproductive (Skarlicki and Kulik 2004). Robinson
and Bennett (1995) define counterproductive workplace behavior (“CWB”) as “voluntary behavior that
violates significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization” (p.
556) and may include avoiding work, calling in sick, or otherwise reducing productivity (Bennett and
Robinson 1995). CWB may be intentional or unintentional and includes loss of motivation to conform to
group norms and increasing motivation to deviate from group norms (Kaplan 1982).
Counterproductive workplace behaviors have a serious effect on the organization (Robinson and
Bennett 1995; Penney and Spector 2005) and can reduce productivity by as much as 10% of the
organization’s total productivity (Belot and Schroder 2012). The impact is not only costly, but also
pervasive. Clark and Hollinger (1983) find that two-thirds of survey respondents participated in
counterproductive workplace behavior. The impact and prevalence of CWB is detrimental to organizations
and is predicated by the employees’ perception that the situation or the organizational response to it is
unfair.
Whether an employee engages in CWB is dependent upon the individual’s attributes, including
self-control and integrity (Marcus, Schuler, Quell, and Hümpfner 2002), as well as the organizational
climate attributes, such as incivility, organizational constraints, and interpersonal conflict (Penney and
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Spector 2005). For example, the relationship between job stress and CWB is mediated by opportunities
for career advancement (Roxana 2013). Thus, like fairness judgments, whether an employee engages in
CWB is dependent on individual characteristics and perceived situational variables (Martinko, Gundlach,
and Douglas 2002)
CWB varies by Affective Intensity
Coworker counterproductive workplace behavior increases losses due to fraud (Greenberg and
Robinson 1998) but those losses vary by the extent to which the employee engages in CWB. Employees
who are faced with affective events in the workplace experience the event at different levels of intensity
(Larsen and Diener 1987) of either negative or positive affect. Some employees may have strong negative
reactions to the event and may seek retribution against either the wrongdoer or the organization. These
employees will likely experience the greatest reduction in productivity subsequent to the event, as
compared to other employees. Contrarily, employees who perceive the situation or management’s
response to it to be fair may experience positive affect and may increase their subsequent productivity.
Still others may be apathetic toward the situation and may either engage in lower levels of CWB or may
maintain their pre-event levels of productivity.
Coworker CWB will result in indirect losses in productivity, which increase the organization’s
overall loss from the fraud, thus organizational losses will vary with coworker CWB. While prior research
has examined the effects of direct losses from employee theft, it has negated the indirect effects from lost
productivity.
DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Participants
We obtain participants using Amazon mTurk for our study. mTurk has been shown to yield samples
that are more representative of the general population than student samples, but participants often lack
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attention (Paolacci and Chandler 2014; Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2013). Additionally, participants
self-select into studies (Sharpe Wessling, Huber, and Netzer 2017). However, mTurkers have a variety of
professional and academic experience levels and are more representative of the U.S. workforce than
student samples (Buccheit, Dalton, Pollard, and Stinson 2018). Another specific risk in this population
relates to the number of studies participants engage in. Those who complete a high number of studies are
labeled “Super Turkers” and post on certain comment boards to other participants, sharing information
and commenting about the quality of the study.
To mitigate the risks that participant inattentiveness, self-selection, experimental experience, or
interaction interfered with the results, we employ certain measures. We deploy Turk Prime’s data integrity
controls to ensure our participants are higher quality, have an internet protocol address within the United
States, and are not duplicate participants. To monitor for inattention, we deploy attention and manipulation
checks throughout the study and examine participants’ times for completing each section of the study.
Prior studies have shown that Super Turkers’ non-naiveté yields faster response times than average
participants (Sharpe Wessling et al. 2017). Therefore, we evaluate response times on a case-by-case basis
to evaluate whether winsorizing is necessary. We also monitor Turker boards for commentary or
information regarding the experiment while it is running to assess the likelihood that participants identified
the hypotheses, or otherwise advise potential participants of its contents.
Design
To evaluate coworker productivity, depending on whether theft occurs and management’s
response to the theft, we conduct a two-stage interactive experiment with groups of three participants,
including one manager and two employees. Both roles, manager and employee, and the compensation
structures for each role are explained to all participants. At the beginning of each period, the company
contributes to an investment fund.
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Study One - Managers. Managers oversee employees’ productivity and the investment fund.
They are compensated based on the number of hours contributed to the company’s productivity by
employees, as well the investment fund balance at the end of the study. We use this compensation structure
to assimilate pay-for-performance measures often found in real-world office settings where organizations
compensate a manager based on their team’s performance.
In an initial study, 108 managers are solicited on Amazon mTurk. Managers read information about
the company, each role and its responsibilities, and the related compensation procedures. Managers are
then told that one employee took from the investment account in period one and asked to choose whether
to increase the likelihood of theft detection by increasing the rate of inspections for all employees in the
future.
Study Two- Employees. In a second study, 121 participants who have not previously engaged in
studies related to this project are solicited through Amazon Turk Prime to act as employees. Participants
are assigned to one of three conditions: management did not increase controls, management increased
controls, or management detected fraud but did not increase controls. Employees are assigned to the three
conditions based on the proportion of managers who decide whether to increase controls or not in Study
One.36
Employees choose to contribute hours toward the company’s productivity and can take $0.50 from
an investment fund at the end of each period. Employees are compensated a flat rate of $1.00, plus can
keep whatever money they take from the investment fund. We seek to achieve mundane realism with this
compensation structure as many office workers receive flat compensation, outside of performance review

36

Two out of every three manager participants in Study One increased controls for all employees in period two.
These results were similar to those obtained from prior pilot studies.

171

increases. Coworker connection is enhanced by having employees report the first letter of their first name
and their favorite color to their coworker at the beginning of the study.
Employees are instructed that the system will select one of the two employees for inspection.
Instructions also state that if the selected employee took from the investment fund, all employees will be
notified. The intent of this notification is to induce social desirability bias. Further, employees are told
that the manager may increase inspections for all employees in period two to enhance participants desire
to hold coworkers accountable.
Employees are monetarily incented to take from the investment fund with no threat of individual
punishment. However, the exchange of information between coworkers at the beginning of the study
should reduce employees’ intent to take from the investment fund and increase their sense of duty to their
coworker. When an employee takes from the investment fund, they are endogenously assigned to the
“fraud” group.
After period one, employees are notified whether the inspected employee took from the investment
fund, and whether management increased inspections or not. Thus, employees are endogenously assigned
to the detect (Y/N) and increased inspections (Y/N) groups.
In period two, employees again choose how many hours to contribute to the company’s
productivity and whether to take from the investment fund. When an employee takes from the investment
fund, other employees may signal their dissatisfaction with the event. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1: Employee productivity, on average, will be lower when fraud occurs than when fraud
does not occur.
Fairness impacts future productivity.
When management responds to fraud by increasing the rate of detection for all employees in future
periods, non-offending coworkers may perceive the response to be an unfair universal punishment. The
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judgment that management’s response to the event is unfair is likely to increase counterproductive
measures and reduce productivity after the event. As such, we hypothesize:
H2: When theft is detected and management increases inspections, employee productivity
will decline in subsequent periods.
Failure to act.
Management’s response to fraud detection may also nudge accepted norms and modify employees’
fairness judgments. For example, when managers turn a blind eye to fraud, they may signal that fraudulent
behavior is an acceptable cost of business. In these cases, employees may perceive theft to be an acceptable
norm and may be more likely to take from the investment account in future periods. Therefore, we
hypothesize:
H3: When management detects fraud, but does not increase inspections, other employees
will be more likely to take from the investment account in future periods.
Within the fraud group, employee productivity levels will likely vary by coworkers’ affective
responses to the situation and management’s behaviors. For example, employee productivity is likely
negatively related to the level of affective intensity the employee feels about the theft (Larsen and Diener,
1987). However, productivity may not decline when employees feel a sense of duty to the organization,
or high moral responsibility and/or a belief that management should hold wrongdoers accountable for their
actions37. Employees’ sense of duty to the organization may negate the influence of coworker behavior on
individual productivity as the employee may place greater value in fulfilling their duties than in
maintaining coworker relationships. Alternatively, employees who believe that a coworker who steals
should be blamed and/or held accountable may perceive increased inspections as positive outcomes and

37

Post-experimental questionnaires also include Likert-scale questions related to employees’ propensity to trust,
fairness judgement, and feeling of belongingness.
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may not reduce their productivity in response. That is, the more upset an employee is about the theft, the
lower their individual productivity will be in future periods. Conversely, the more justifiable
management’s response seems to be, the less likely coworkers’ productivity will be to decline. We
hypothesize:
H4a: When fraud occurs, employees’ productivity after the theft will be negatively related
to how upset the employee reported being about the theft.
H4b: When fraud occurs, employees’ productivity after the theft will not be affected when
coworkers believe that managers should hold wrongdoers accountable.
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
Variables
Dependent Variables
We measure employee productivity via the difference in the number of hours contributed toward
the company’s productivity from period one to period two to determine whether the presence or absence
of fraud and/or management’s punitive response affects employee productivity in subsequent periods.
Using the incremental change in hours contributed between periods allows us to account for within-subject
effects.
We measure whether employees are more likely to take from the investment fund in period two,
based on their decisions to take or not take in period one. It is important to capture employees’ decision
in period one as it is likely to influence their decision in period two.
Independent Variables
We record the endogenous choices made by managers and impose them exogenously on employees.
We then elicit employees’ decisions endogenously and record them as observable factors that affect
performance. Specifically, we document employees’ decision whether to take money from the investment
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fund in each period and the number of hours contributed toward company productivity each period.
Managers may elect to 1) take no action or 2) increase inspections of all employees in period 2. Managers
are assigned to groups based on whether they chose to increase inspections or not.
Our design (i.e. Increase - Y/N, Detect- Y/N, Fraud- Y/N) is therefore endogenously derived.
However, the manager’s decision whether to increase inspections (IV1) is distributed across employee
groups exogenously, based on the pro-rata apportionment of increased inspections. That is, the percentage
of groups assigned to either the No Increased Inspections condition or the Yes Increased Inspections
condition is consistent with the percentage of managers who chose to either not increase or increase
inspections in study one.
--Insert Figure 21-Analysis
Our design is quasi-experimental because participants are endogenously assigned to cells based on
their and their group members’ decisions (i.e. Increased inspections Y/N, Detect Y/N, and Fraud Y/N).
Therefore, we measure variance between groups and within individuals using a repeated measures linear
design38. Our model examines individual variation within-participants to account for carry-over effects in
productivity and likelihood of taking between periods. Supplemental analyses are performed to evaluate
the impact of our endogenous design, and to search for potential omitted correlated variables that may
influence participant’s decisions and therefore contribute to the self-selection bias in the study. We further
examine variance between conditions, fraud/no-fraud and increased inspection Y/N, and multivariate
combinations of these variables. We are most interested in examining the effects of fraud on employees’

38

Supplemental analyses are conducted to evaluate the likelihood of omitted correlated variables that contribute to selfselection bias and estimate average treatment effects.
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subsequent productivity. Therefore, we evaluate the differences in productivity between fraud and no
fraud conditions and within the fraud condition.
In addition to these results, we confirm that process measures effectively represent the underlying
theoretical constructs. We use Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to confirm that manager process
measures represent two factors: blame attribution/ retributive justice and fairness. We further conduct an
EFA to ensure employee process measures generate three factors: fairness, affect intensity, and social
influence.
RESULTS
The results of Study One show that two out of every three managers (N = 76 out of 108 managers 39;
see Table 16) increase inspections for all employees in period 2 when given a hypothetical scenario stating
that one of the employees took from the investment fund in period 1. Therefore, we assign 2 out of every
3 employee groups to the increase inspections condition, and 1 out of every 3 employee groups to the no
increase condition. We find that managers who increase inspections statistically significantly differ from
those who choose not to increase inspections in their perceptions of fairness and blame attribution (see
Table 16). In particular, managers who increase inspections are more likely to agree with the statement
“Increased inspections achieve justice for theft in period 1” (t= -4.48, p< 0.001, M= 4.24, SD = 1.211)
than those who do not increase inspections (M = 2.30, SD = 1.577; see Table 16). Figure 2 shows the
results of statistically significant differences in managers’ perceptions between groups.
--Insert Figure 22-In Study Two, we examine the effects of managers’ decisions to increase inspections in response
to fraud on employees. Pearson correlations show that employee productivity in period two is positively

39

These results are similar to results obtained in prior pilot studies.
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related to participants’ beliefs that their pay is fair (r= 0.256, p< 0.0010 and that increased monitoring is
a fair way to reduce fraud (r=0.202, p< 0.10). We use repeated measures analysis of variance to account
for participants’ carryover effects from period one to period two in our tests of hypotheses. Results show
that there is no difference in employee productivity between groups when fraud exists, refuting hypothesis
1. Repeated measures ANOVA models also show that employee productivity (H2) and the likelihood of
taking from the investment fund (H3) in period 2 do not statistically significantly differ depending on
management’s response to detected fraud.
--Insert Table 29 and Figure 23-Finally, employee productivity is not statistically significantly related to how upset the employee reported
being about the theft or employee participants’ belief that managers should hold wrongdoers accountable,
refuting hypotheses 4a and 4b.
Supplemental Analyses
Additional Sample
We collect additional employee participants via Turk Prime (n=32) and assign them to the role of
employee 1. Employees in this condition are informed that employee 2 was detected taking from the
investment fund in period 1. Like Study Two, we manipulate whether management increased inspections.
We compare productivity and the likelihood of taking in period 2 for our new sample to productivity and
the likelihood of taking in period 2 from employee participants in our prior sample. Our selection of
employee participants from our prior sample met the following criteria: management detected theft in
period 1 and the participant is employee 1.
We retest hypotheses two and three using this additional sample. We find that employees are
marginally statistically significantly more likely to take from the investment fund in period 2 when fraud
is detected and management does not increase inspections, as compared to when fraud is detected and
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management increases inspections (Greenhouse-Geisser F(1,109) = 2.903, p= 0.091), supporting the retest
of H3.
--Insert Figures 24 and 25-Our results refute the retest of H2 as we find that employee productivity does not statistically
significantly differ between conditions (e.g. increase Y/N), regardless of whether employee 1 is aware that
management detected employee 2. Contrarily, results show that the change in productivity from period 1
to period 2 directionally differs depending on whether management increased inspections for all
employees in period 2 and whether management informed employee 1 that employee 2 was detected
taking from the investment fund in period 1.
Cluster Analysis of Employee Process Measures
To evaluate similarities and differences within employee participants, we examine employee
participants from both samples using cluster analysis. Clustering is a well-known technique for finding
groups in data (Frayley and Raftery 1998) and is helpful in classifying profiles of individuals, based on
their responses to questionnaires. Process measures collected from employee participants were grouped
into profiles with Ward’s method, measuring squared Euclidean distance utilized by Janssens et al. (2003),
and k-means clustering (Ketchen and Shook 1996).
We use hierarchical clustering methods with Ward’s linkage before partition clustering with kmeans for pragmatic reasons. First, hierarchical clustering builds a dendrogram and an agglomeration
schedule that can be visually inspected to show how similar empathy profiles are and the ranking of
clusters based on the a priori validation via EFA of three factors present in the process measures. Second,
Ward’s linkage performs well with the data set, given that the clusters are similar in sample sizes and
number of observations. Third, partition-clustering with k-means requires a priori specification of the
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number of clusters, k, to create distinct non-overlapping groups. The first phase of the hierarchical cluster
is calculating the distance between objects with Euclidean distance method and cluster formation.
Cluster analysis shows that employee participants subscribe to one of three profiles related to their
affect intensity and their ability to be influenced by others. Specifically, employee participants in cluster
1 exhibit high affect intensity and a high ability to be influenced by their manager or others, while those
in cluster 3 have low affect intensity and are unlikely to be influenced by others. Finally, employee
participants in cluster 3 have a moderate level of affect intensity but are highly influenced by others. We
use these clusters to examine individual variance within employee participants that may contribute to
employee participants’ productivity levels and/or likelihood of taking from the investment fund.
--Insert Figure 26-We find that employees in cluster 3 differ from other employee participants in both their
productivity and their likelihood of taking from the investment fund. Specifically, omnibus repeated
ANOVA model (Pillai’s trace F (6, 234) = 2.973, p= 0.008) shows that members of cluster 3 have higher
average productivity in period 1 than employee participants in cluster 1 (F (2,120) = 3.578, p= 0.031, t(2)
= 2.674, p=0.009). Similarly, employees in cluster 3 have higher average productivity in period 2 (F
(2,120) = 7.745, p= 0.001, t(2) = 3.933, p< 0.001).
--Insert Figures 27 and 28-Employee participants in cluster 3 are also more likely to take from the investment fund in period
1 but not take in period 2 when fraud is detected, as compared to employee participants in other clusters
(Pillai’s trace F (6,234) = 2.677, p= 0.016). Specifically, members of cluster 3 are less likely to take in
period 2 when they took from the investment fund in period 1 than members of cluster 2 (t(2) = 5.679,
p=0.004, MDiff = 0.2283). These results show the theoretical relevance of affect intensity and social
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desirability to our research question. We will use this information to examine the interplay of coworker
relationships and productivity when fraud is detected in future studies.
--Insert Figure 29-LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper includes many limitations. Notably, conditions are not manipulated exogenously, and
all independent variables arise endogenously leading to self-selection bias. For example, it is possible that
participants’ risk-taking preferences will influence employees’ decisions to contribute time to company
productivity and whether to take from the investment fund or not. Therefore, we conduct supplemental
analyses to address endogeneity issues and to test for potential omitted correlated variables, particularly
those that may contribute to participants’ self-selection into conditions.
Participants’ decisions to contribute hours and to take from the investment in period two may be
correlated with their decisions in period one. We account for within-participant variance using hierarchical
linear modeling to account for carry-over effects and use incremental changes between periods one and
two as variables of interest.
We use mTurk participants in our study. mTurkers are a more representative sample of the U.S.
workforce than student participants but are experienced experimental participants; however, participants
self-select into studies. We monitor for the likelihood that participants communicate with each other,
recruit one another, and/or identify our hypotheses by monitoring chatrooms and mTurk worker boards.
Further, our study lacks mundane realism. For example, in a professional setting, managers face
confounds and exogenous factors that influence their decisions to investigate allegations of fraud and/or
establish policies and procedures to mitigate the risk of future occurrences of fraud. However, we believe
that our design provides ecological validity and experimental realism related to our constructs of interest.
Specifically, our study isolates the effects of increased inspections on the coworkers of fraud perpetrators.
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Our study contributes to accounting, management controls, fraud, and organizational justice
literature by being the first to examine the effects of management’s decision to increase controls when
fraud occurs. While prior literature has examined the effects of management controls on the likelihood of
fraud prevention or detection, no prior study has considered the spillover effects on the perpetrator’s
coworkers. Coworkers spend a significant amount of time together and their relationships are an “integral
component of the everyday working lives of most people” (Basford and Offermann 2012). Coworker
support can influence an individual’s satisfaction with both their job and their life in general (Simon, Judge,
and Halvorsen-Ganepola 2010). Therefore, the effects of management’s decisions on coworkers are
empirically important.
Our study also has practical implications by informing management’s decision-making when
organizations face employee theft. Specifically, our study evaluates the potential risk of non-offending
employees’ counterproductivity. Management teams need to choose whether and how to spend limited
resources responding to fraud, and unintended consequences such as reduced productivity, should be
considered as part of those decisions.
CONCLUSION
Managers use formal controls in response to fraudulent activity but responding in this way can
have unintended consequences for the firm through reduced productivity. This study examines the
potential negative effects increasing controls has on the perpetrator’s coworkers. Our preliminary
evaluations of these effects have shown opportunities for us to explore these constructs in other settings.
For example, our sample was obtained from Amazon Mechanical Turk which in which participants
autonomously interact with a website. Therefore, the setting lacks mundane realism in that participants
are not in contact with one another nor are they interacting within a group. Supplemental analyses show
that individuals’ level emotional intensity and ability to be influenced by others are related to their
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productivity and the likelihood that they will take from the investment fund in period 1, but not in period
2 when fraud is detected. Therefore, it is likely that group social norms and personality traits may affect
coworker’s affective event response. We continue to pursue our research question: What effect does
management’s use of controls in response to fraud on coworker’s productivity? in future studies.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 29 Descriptive Statistics and t-Test Results for Differences between Manager Conditions

Variable

Increase
No Increase t
p
M (SD)
M (SD)
If you were an employee, how
2.25
1.71 -2.410 0018 **
much would you enjoy being
(1.570)
(1.274)
monitored at work?
How powerful of a deterrent
against theft do you think
monitoring is?

5.62
(1.012)

4.69
(1.673)

-2.498

It was unfair that a manager was
able to increase inspections for
those who did not take from the
investment fund.

3.41
(1.499)

5.00
(1.374)

3.317

Increasing monitoring is a fair
way to reduce theft.

5.68
(0.944)

4.11
(1.560)

-3.704

0.001***

It is important to blame the
employee who took from the
investment count.

4.35
(1.379)

3.00
(1.633)

-2.864

0.005 **

Increased inspections achieve
justice for theft in period 1.

4.24
(1.211)

2.47
(1.577)

-4.480

0.000***
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0.016 **

0.001***

Figure 21 Experimental Design Flowchart

Figure 22 Managers’ Perceptions of Fairness toward Employees
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Figure 23 Test H3, Likelihood of Taking from the Investment Fund When Fraud is Detected by Condition

Figure 24 Test of Supplemental H2, Difference in Productivity When Fraud is Detected, by Condition
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Figure 25 Test of Supplemental H3, Likelihood of Taking from the Investment Account in Period 2 When Fraud is
Detected, by Condition

Figure 26 Cluster Analysis of Process Measures for Employee Participants
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Figure 27 Mean Productivity in Period 1 by Employee Participant Cluster

Figure 28 Mean Productivity in Period 2 by Employee Participant Cluster
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Figure 29 Likelihood of Not Taking in Period 2 by Employee Participant Cluster
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSION
This dissertation includes three studies that examine key processes in managing occupational
fraud: detecting fraud, assigning punishment to the perpetrator, and evaluating the effects of changes to
the management control environment when fraud is detected. Taken together, these studies contribute to
the fraud literature by highlighting important nuances in occupational fraud management and the
implications that management’s decisions regarding fraud have on organizations and their stakeholders
(e.g. employees and external regulators). This dissertation provides suggestions for future research, based
on the results from each study.
Results of study one show that prompts to identify discrepancies between financial information, a
tool commonly used in audit practice to increase focus, may not always be effective. The effectiveness of
prompts was found to differ between graduate students and Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. However,
these groups differed in the level of cognitive processing they used during the experiment, their familiarity
with the manipulations (i.e. emotion regulation strategies), and their years of experience. While graduate
students took longer to complete the study, indicating a higher level of cognitive processing, mTurkers
were more familiar with the constructs of interest and had more years of work experience. Therefore,
future studies should examine whether, when, and how prompts affect fraud detection.
Results of study two show that organizations differ when issuing punishments for occupational
fraud. Higher status perpetrators received weaker punishments than lower status perpetrators when their
frauds were short in duration. However, as duration increased, higher and lower status perpetrators
received similar punishments. This finding aligns with Status Characteristics Theory by showing that
perpetrator’s status may benefit them, if they rectify their behavior early on. Results further show that
publicly traded companies are less likely to formally punish (i.e. pursue no outcome) than to terminate a
fraud perpetrator than other organization types, and that nonprofits and governmental organizations are

more likely to both terminate and prosecute than just terminate fraud perpetrators. Future research may
examine how these differences affect organizational fraud risk management, anti-fraud policy
development, and workplace deviance.
Results of study three show that affect and one’s ability to be influenced by others may affect
whether and how fraud perpetrators’ coworkers perceive management’s response to detected fraud. For
example, high affect intensity is correlated with changing one’s behavior by taking from the investment
fund in period one, but not in period two. Those who report moderate levels of affect intensity are more
likely to take from the investment fund in both periods. These results highlight the importance of
monitoring affective responses of a fraud perpetrator’s coworkers to reduce the likelihood that fraud will
occur again. Future studies may further examine whether group dynamics, coworker support systems, or
employee engagement tools mitigate the effects of emotional response on workplace deviance.
This dissertation contributes to occupational fraud literature and offers suggestions for future
research to answer questions related to fraud detection tools, organizational fraud management, and ways
for organizations to mitigate future instances of fraud.
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